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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/169277</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 11:56:06 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-30T11:56:06Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Stolen decades: The unfulfilled expectations of the Belarusian economic miracle</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/299167</link>
      <description>Title: Stolen decades: The unfulfilled expectations of the Belarusian economic miracle
Authors: Alachnovič, Aleś; Korosteleva, Julia
Abstract: The case of the Belarusian economy has puzzled many academic scholars for years. Belarus has often been referred to as a transition outlier, given its relatively fast recovery in 1996 and spectacular growth prior to the global financial crisis without much transformation of its economy. Three decades after gaining its independence, the state control of the economy still remains considerably high. Subsidized financing of state-owned enterprises allowed to preserve production capabilities over the first decade, achieve some productivity gains in the late 1990s-early 2000s, and to avoid social destabilization. However, with a delay in structural reforms, this economic model, also heavily dependent on the Russian subsidies and foreign debt, has become fatigue, driving the economy into stagnation in the 2010s. The Covid-19 pandemic, the 2020 post-presidential political crisis and Russia's war in Ukraine in 2022 put further strains on the economy, calling for change. This working paper will give an overview of the Belarusian economic developments before the presidential elections to have a better understanding of how various rigidities of the Belarusian economic model have amplified the detrimental effect of the political unrest for the economy and the Belarusian society overall, and will discuss the anticrisis and mid-term economic reforms Belarus will have to undergo.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/299167</guid>
      <dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>The biggest problem in post-communist transition: The privatization of large enterprises</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/274087</link>
      <description>Title: The biggest problem in post-communist transition: The privatization of large enterprises
Authors: Åslund, Anders
Abstract: Thirty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is rather clear what transition policies have worked. Almost all the post-communist countries have become market economies and have achieved macroeconomic stability. Privatization was economically necessary, and its economic outcomes have been very positive. Alas, politically, these successes have often been unsustainable because of strong popular sentiments against the private ownership of big enterprises. Substantial renationalization has occurred. What went wrong? How could privatization be done better, or be defended? What should be done to defend private enterprise in the future? This paper argues that the nature of privatization is far less important than the establishment of good rule of law so that private property rights can be defended.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/274087</guid>
      <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics?</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/274086</link>
      <description>Title: The political economy of Kazakhstan: A case of good economics, bad politics?
Authors: Commander, Simon; Prieskienyte, Ruta
Abstract: Can autocracies and their associated institutions successfully implement economic policies that promote growth and investment? Can 'good economics' somehow offset the effects of 'bad' politics? Kazakhstan is a case where an autocratic regime has actively projected market-friendly policies and attracted significant amounts of incoming investment. These policies are to some extent reflected in the country's governance ratings, although there has been a significant amount of investment disputes that question the attachment to the rule of law. Moreover, the political regime remains strongly personalised around the founder President, his family and associates. This is reflected in the economics of the autocracy whereby a large public sector and a set of privately held businesses coexist to mutual benefit. The latter have been formed around a very small number of highly connected individuals whose initial accumulation of assets allows them also to act as necessary gatekeepers for entrants. Competition as a result remains limited in both economic and political domains. Yet, uncertainties over the future leadership, along with latent rivalry over access to resources and markets, make the political equilibrium quite fragile. In short, 'bad' politics both squeezes the space for, and distorts the benefits from, 'good' economics.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/274086</guid>
      <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Informal employment and wages in Poland</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/274082</link>
      <description>Title: Informal employment and wages in Poland
Authors: Liwiński, Jacek
Abstract: Purpose: This paper tries to identify the wage gap between informal and formal workers and tests for the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland. Design/methodology/approach: I employ the propensity score matching (PSM) technique and use data from the Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the period 2009-2017 to estimate the wage gap between informal and formal workers, both at the means and along the wage distribution. I use two definitions of informal employment: a) employment without a written agreement and b) employment while officially registered as unemployed at a labour office. In order to reduce the bias resulting from the non-random selection of individuals into informal employment, I use a rich set of control variables representing several individual characteristics. Findings: After controlling for observed heterogeneity, I find that on average informal workers earn less than formal workers, both in terms of monthly earnings and hourly wage. This result is not sensitive to the definition of informal employment used and is stable over the analysed time period (2009-2017). However, the wage penalty to informal employment is substantially higher for individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution, which supports the hypothesis of the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland. Originality/value: The main contribution of this study is that it identifies the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland: informal workers in the first quartile of the wage distribution and those above the first quartile appear to be in two partially different segments of the labour market.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/274082</guid>
      <dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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