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    <title>EconStor Community:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 01:39:10 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-10-12T01:39:10Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Wealth taxation, capital gains taxation and the inequality-mobility trade-off</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337495</link>
      <description>Title: Wealth taxation, capital gains taxation and the inequality-mobility trade-off
Authors: van Langenhove, Christophe; Lorenz, Jan; Schulz-Gebhard, Jan
Abstract: We compare wealth taxes and capital gains taxes in a random growth model with idiosyncratic investment risk. At equal tax revenue, wealth taxes generate higher wealth inequality but also higher wealth mobility than capital gains taxes. The mechanism operates through variance: wealth taxes shift the mean of post-tax wealth growth without affecting variance, while capital gains taxes compress the upper tail and reduce variance. Lower variance compresses the stationary distribution, reducing wealth inequality, but also dampens rank changes, reducing wealth mobility. The variance effect dominates the fact that lower inequality shrinks the wealth gaps agents must overcome. Policymakers who value both low wealth inequality and high wealth mobility therefore face a trade-off. This trade-off is robust to type and scale dependence in returns, hand-to-mouth households, aggregate risk, and tax progressivity.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337495</guid>
      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Coevolution of stock prices and their perceived fundamental value</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311829</link>
      <description>Title: Coevolution of stock prices and their perceived fundamental value
Authors: Mignot, Sarah
Abstract: We develop a simple nonlinear stock market model in which speculators switch between technical and fundamental trading rules depending on market conditions. Additionally, we assume that agents are unaware of the true current fundamental value and, thus, use a weighted average of the current price and the known long-run fundamental value as an estimate of the fundamental price. Using analytical and numerical methods, we demonstrate that an increase in the reaction parameter of technical traders may cause boom-bust dynamics. Moreover, we show that a heightened belief among agents that the fundamental value is more sensitive to deviations of the current price from its long-run fundamental value can cause the price to become trapped above or below this long-run value, oscillate within a higher price range, and prolong the duration of a bubble. In two model extensions, we assume that agents compute the current fundamental value based on the deviation between the average price and the known long-run fundamental value, using a moving average of the past k prices and an exponential moving average, respectively. These robustness checks show that, in these cases, price and perceived fundamental value fluctuate less statically around the long-run fundamental value.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311829</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Round-Robin tournaments in the lab: Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311830</link>
      <description>Title: Round-Robin tournaments in the lab: Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions
Authors: Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco
Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Whereas we confirm the theoretical prediction that tournaments are less fair if matches are organized as all-pay auctions, we reject the predicted difference in tournament intensity. Moreover, the reason for the reduced fairness of tournaments based on all-pay auctions is also at odds with theory. In the lab, such tournaments heavily disfavor (in payoff-terms) the player acting in the final two matches. The reason is the substantially weaker than predicted discouragement of this player when competing first against the loser of the first match. Subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations but only manage to end up in a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Connecting the dots: How social networks shape expectations through economic narratives</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319882</link>
      <description>Title: Connecting the dots: How social networks shape expectations through economic narratives
Authors: Kothe, Rafael
Abstract: This paper investigates how social network and conformity dynamics shape the stability of inflation expectations and the dissemination of economic narratives. Using an agent-based macroeconomic simulation, I integrate a heuristic switching framework with an opinion dynamics mechanism to examine the impact of targeted narrative dissemination by highly central agents on expectation dispersion. The computational experiments reveal that when influential network actors transmit the central bank's inflation narrative, both inflation rate dispersion and the dispersion of expectations are substantially reduced. Conversely, when distorting narratives spread through these key nodes, it requires very high persuasion levels to significantly amplify instability. Moreover, impulse response analyses show that stronger social influence accelerates convergence toward rational expectations following shocks, thereby mitigating both the magnitude and persistence of deviations. However, heightened persuasion can also weaken the link between expectations and underlying fundamentals, as agents increasingly align with dominant narratives rather than economic signals. Overall, these findings underscore the dual role of social networks in monetary policy communication, capable of both anchoring expectations and amplifying destabilising narratives.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319882</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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