<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/157762</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 10:22:13 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-28T10:22:13Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Military Spending and Economic Growth: A 2025 Update</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313786</link>
      <description>Title: Military Spending and Economic Growth: A 2025 Update
Authors: Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, Jonathan
Abstract: The start of the second millennium brought a growing sense that capitalism was becoming more ‘authoritarian’ and ‘illiberal’, with various indicators suggesting that ‘democracy’ is waning around the globe, that the protection of human and civil rights is in retreat and that the number and intensity of military conflicts is on the rise. *** This angst is now greatly amplified by the domestic and foreign policies of the new Trump administration. Having returned to office in early 2025, Trump promptly launched a highly publicized crusade against his country’s ‘deep state’, with blasé disregard for its laws and con-stitution; announced his intentions to retreat from his country’s traditional postwar role as leader and protector of the Western world; and embarked on seemingly unhinged acts against friends (Canada, Mexico, Denmark, Panama and, primarily, Ukraine) while cozying up to long-term foes (Russia). *** One possible consequence of this growing angst is a global ‘arms race’.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313786</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Partisan Politics and the Road to Plutocracy</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313121</link>
      <description>Title: Partisan Politics and the Road to Plutocracy
Authors: Fix, Blair
Abstract: As billionaires dance in the halls of the second Trump administration, it’s haunting how well Plutarch’s two-thousand-year-old words describe the state of American politics. It’s a barren landscape of plutocratic insatiability. *** How did it get this way? *** One way to tell the story is to look at the battle between the ruling class and everyone else — a battle which elites are obviously winning. But another way to understand the struggle is to look at the war between factions of the ruling class — a battle that plays out largely within partisan politics. *** On this partisan front, the historical backdrop is that for forty years, Republicans have been playing a political shell game. As Jay Michaelson puts it, Republicans “appear populist … but act plutocrat”. What’s disorienting is that this shell game has worked. Although Republicans have historically governed for the benefit of the rich, they have recently rebranded themselves (successfully, it seems) as the party of the working class. *** Is this new Republican messaging sincere? Or is it gaslighting? Well, Trump’s billionaire-stacked administration is quickly answering the question for us. However, this essay is not primarily about Trump, nor is it focused on the future. Instead, it’s a journey into how the partisan politics of the past have shaped the American plutocracy of today. *** The essay consists of a deep dive into the realm of US state politics. The story will be simple and repetitive. Across states, I will measure the degree to which Republicans control each state’s legislature. Then I will observe, in a statistical sense, the policies and social outcomes that follow. That’s it. Of course, I’ll add commentary along the way. But the goal is to let the evidence speak for itself. And what leaps from the data is this: Republican control of state legislatures is systematically associated with the rich being (and becoming) richer. In short, American plutocracy seems to be a quintessentially Republican affair. *** And that’s not all. *** As we journey into the depths of US state politics, the plot will thicken. We’ll find striking partisan differences in the language used in state bills. We’ll see the many ways that Republicans help the rich and hurt workers. We’ll see the impact partisan politics have on the population as they work longer hours with less security. We’ll see the toll that Republican control takes on human welfare. And we’ll study the ways that Republicans gain power, despite enacting policies that are self-evidently bad for the majority. And we’ll reflect on the reasons that plutocracy can become self-reinforcing. *** Think of the evidence that follows as a case study in how the machinery of democracy can be used to benefit the few and harm the many. It’s a warning from the past about tactics that will no doubt be intensified by Trump and his posse of plutocrats.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313121</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Capital as Coordination: A Synthesis Encompassing Marx and CasP</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323254</link>
      <description>Title: Capital as Coordination: A Synthesis Encompassing Marx and CasP
Authors: De Beer, Pieter
Abstract: The global system we inhabit is often described in terms of markets, capital, and labor, but beneath these abstractions lies the deeper question of how coordination produces power and how power organizes coordination. Among the most influential traditions attempting to answer this question are Marxism and Capital as Power (CasP), two frameworks that, while sharing certain roots, diverge sharply in their interpretation of what capital is and how it operates. This divergence has led to ongoing tension. Marxists often argue that CasP misrepresents or abandons the core of Marx’s critique, while CasP theorists argue that Marxism remains tethered to outdated economic metaphysics. Both claim to reveal capitalism’s inner workings. But must we choose between them? *** This essay argues that we do not. Through the lens of Coordination: the Fabric of Power (CfP), a broader theoretical framework that views coordination itself as the primary material of power, we can move beyond this impasse. Rather than asking whether capital is labor-time or capitalization, CfP reframes the question: How is coordination patterned, withheld, or manipulated in ways that produce asymmetries of power? In doing so, it offers a synthesis that integrates the structural insights of Marxism with the empirical clarity of CasP, not by erasing their differences, but by metabolizing their strongest claims.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323254</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Deep Roots of Fascist Thought</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323308</link>
      <description>Title: The Deep Roots of Fascist Thought
Authors: Fix, Blair
Abstract: For decades, the word ‘fascist’ existed solely as a hyperbole — a term meant to insult rather than describe. But lately, politics have grown so hyperbolic that the label looks increasingly sincere. For example, when a powerful man advocates far-right politics and brazenly performs Nazi salutes in front of a cheering crowd, it seems like we have a word for that. *** What was it again? Ah yes … fascist. *** Of course, fascism is easy to see when it happens elsewhere. But when it grows under your nose within your own culture, even the most blatant signs can seem obscure. So what we need, then, is a hard-nosed way to measure the spread of fascist ideology — a method that is calmly quantitative, immune to both apologetics and hyperbole. In my mind, the best option is to study patterns in written language. *** Backing up a bit, all ideologies have words that they emphasize, corresponding to concepts that they deem important. Now, we can get a qualitative sense for these words by reading a corpus of ideological text. But if we want to quantify an ideology, a better approach is to count words. When we do so, we can objectively identify the ‘jargon’ of an ideology — the words that it uses frequently and (crucially) overuses relative to mainstream writing. And once we’ve got this jargon, we can return to written language at large and track the changing frequency of our ideological jargon. The goal is to use word frequency to measure the spread (or collapse) of the ideology in question. *** In this essay, I’ll use word frequency to track the spread of fascist ideology. The journey starts with a trip to 1930s Europe, where we’ll encounter the works of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler (translated into English). The rantings of these two villains will serve as our corpus of fascist text. From this text, we’ll extract the ‘jargon’ of fascism — the words that Mussolini and Hitler use frequently and overuse relative to mainstream English. With this jargon, we’ll then track the popularity of fascist thinking in written language. *** Because I’m an anglophone, I’ll start with English writing. Running the numbers, I find that in English books, fascist jargon has been on the rise since the 1980s. Now this trend is admittedly alarming. But I’m going to resist the urge to focus myopically on the present. And that’s because the best way to understand today’s neo-fascism is by studying the deep past. *** Here, then, is my key finding. Although ‘fascism’ was ostensibly born in the early 20th century, the linguistic data tells a different story about fascism’s origin. Looking at five European languages (English, German, Italian, Spanish, and French), I find that the high point of fascist jargon came several centuries before Hitler and Mussolini were born. In short, what we call ‘fascism’ may be best treated as a repackaging and rebranding of a set of dark ideas that have longed plagued humanity. So when fascists look into the future, they’re really peering into the long-dead past.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323308</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>

