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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150069</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 11:39:21 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-28T11:39:21Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320285</link>
      <description>Title: Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions
Authors: Dilmé, Francesc
Abstract: This paper studies repeated trade with noisy information about previous transactions. A buyer has private information about his willingness to pay, which is either low or high, and buys goods from different sellers over time. Each seller observes a noisy history of signals about the buyer's previous purchases and sets a price. We compare the cases where previous prices are observable to sellers with the case where they are not. We show that, in both cases, more signal precision is counterbalanced in equilibrium by less separation between types, either because (1) sellers offer discounted prices more often, which are accepted by both types, or (2) the buyer with a high valuation rejects high prices with a higher probability. The effect on welfare and efficiency of making prices observable depends on the signal precision: When the signal is imprecise, making prices public strengthens the discounting mechanism, improving efficiency and buyer welfare; when the signal is precise, making prices public activates the rejection mechanism, and efficiency and buyer welfare may decrease. Independently of price observability, the buyer tends to benefit from a more precise signal about previous purchases.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320296</link>
      <description>Title: Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers
Authors: Galperti, Simone; Perego, Jacopo
Abstract: We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a "revelation-principle" result for settings in which a mediator cannot communicate directly or privately with the agents. Our model identifies which spillovers are more restrictive and which seeds are more impactful. We apply our results to a problem of optimal organization design.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320296</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Queueing to learn</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320295</link>
      <description>Title: Queueing to learn
Authors: Margaria, Chiara
Abstract: I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long-lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when served. An agent can decide anytime whether to either join a queue of his choice or renege. I show that it is efficient to elicit agents' private information by offering a simple binary menu (i.e., two customer classes): a first-come, first-served queue, to attract low-value agents, and one in random order, to attract high-value agents. When queueing is costly, offering a single queue may be optimal because of the tradeoff between allocative efficiency and the cost of screening.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320295</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Optimal taxation with multiple incomes and types</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320293</link>
      <description>Title: Optimal taxation with multiple incomes and types
Authors: Spiritus, Kevin; Lehmann, Etienne; Renes, Sander; Zoutman, Floris T.
Abstract: We analyze the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule for taxpayers with multiple incomes and multiple unobserved characteristics. We identify smoothness assumptions and extensions of the single crossing conditions that enable the characterization of the optimum through variational calculus. Both the tax perturbation and mechanism design approaches yield identical results when the number of incomes equals the number of unobserved characteristics. Notably, the mechanism design approach requires slightly less stringent assumptions than the tax perturbation approach. Additionally, we introduce a numerical method to determine the optimal tax schedule. Applied to couples, the optimal isotax curves are nearly linear and parallel. Additional contributions include a Pareto efficiency test and a condition on primitives ensuring the sufficiency of the government's necessary conditions, thereby guaranteeing the uniqueness of the solution.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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