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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/142132</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 06:04:13 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-30T06:04:13Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Impact of Non-truthful Bidding on Transport Coalition Profits</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144761</link>
      <description>Title: Impact of Non-truthful Bidding on Transport Coalition Profits
Authors: Jacob, Jonathan; Buer, Tobias
Abstract: A coalition of freight carriers is considered which has to decide how to allocate a pool of transport requests among its members. The literature is aware of a number of solution approaches which usually assume truthful behavior of the freight carriers. However, the used negotiation protocols are mostly not proven to enforce truthful behavior. This paper gives some insights into the impact of non-truthful behavior via computational experiments. We solve the collaborative problem via a genetic algorithm (GA) which is operated by an auctioneer. The GA’s individu- als are allocations of requests to carriers. To calculate the fitness of an individual, the carriers bid on the allocations. Bidding below a carrier’s true valuation could ceteris paribus increase its profits. However, understated valuations can influence the search process negatively, in particular when a favoured allocation is dismissed wrongly. It is shown via computational experiments that for six tested instances, bidding non-truthfully is individually, but not collectively, rational and results in a kind of prisoner’s dilemma.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144761</guid>
      <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Cooperative liner shipping network design by means of a combinatorial auction</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145380</link>
      <description>Title: Cooperative liner shipping network design by means of a combinatorial auction
Authors: Buer, Tobias; Haass, Rasmus
Abstract: Cooperation in the ocean liner shipping industry has always been important to improve liner shipping networks (LSN's). As tight cooperations like alliances are challenged by antitrust laws, looser forms of cooperation among liner carriers might become a reasonable way to increase efficiency of LSN's. Our goal is to facilitate a loose form of cooperation among liner carriers. Therefore, we introduce a coordination mechanism for designing a collaborative LSN based on a multi round combinatorial auction. Via the auction, carriers exchange demand triplets, i.e. orders which describe the transport of containers between ports. A standard network design problem which includes ship scheduling and cargo routing decisions is used as isolated network design problem of an individual carrier. A carrier has to solve this isolated problem repeatedly during the auction so that the carrier is able to decide which demand triplets to sell, on which demand triplets to bid, and what prices to charge. To solve these problems we propose a variable neighborhood search based matheuristic. The matheuristic addresses the isolated planning problem in four phases (construct ship cycles, modify cycles, determine container flow, and reallocate ships to cycles). Our computational experiments on a set of 56 synthetic test instances suggest that the introduced combinatorial auction increases profits on average compared to isolated planning significantly by four percent. The more diverse the original assignment of demand triplets and ships to carriers is, the higher the potential for collaboration; for 18 diverse instances, the profits increase on average by ten percent.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145380</guid>
      <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>A storage strategy with dynamic bay reservations for container terminals</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145092</link>
      <description>Title: A storage strategy with dynamic bay reservations for container terminals
Authors: Voß, Andre; Guckenbiehl, Gabriel; Schütt, Holger; Buer, Tobias</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145092</guid>
      <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>A three-phase heuristic for a multi-size container transport problem with partially specified requests</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145291</link>
      <description>Title: A three-phase heuristic for a multi-size container transport problem with partially specified requests
Authors: Nordsieck, Niklas; Buer, Tobias; Schönberger, Jörn
Abstract: The present paper studies a generalization of the less-than-truckload pickup and delivery problem. The problem at hand arises in the hinterland of container terminal where empty and loaded containers have to be transported between a container depot and a set of customer locations. However, requests including empty containers are only partially specified. That is, either the pickup location or the delivery location of a request including the transportation of an empty container is a priori known. Customers who demand an empty container do not care which specific empty container is provided, i.e., while the delivery location is given, the pickup location is part of the problem's solution. To solve this problem, an iterated three-phase heuristic is introduced. The first phase completes the partially specified requests, the second phase solves a standard pickup and delivery problem, the third phase changes parameters of the objective function and the process iterates. Computational results on a set of 1,000 test instances are presented.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145291</guid>
      <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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