https://hdl.handle.net/10419/12 Fri, 11 Sep 2026 20:06:27 GMT 2026-09-11T20:06:27Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335681 Title: Smooth and persistent forecasts of German GDP: Balancing accuracy and stability Authors: Heinisch, Katja; van Norden, Simon; Wildi, Marc Abstract: Forecasts that minimize mean squared forecast error (MSE) often exhibit excessive volatility, limiting their practical applicability. We address this accuracy smoothness trade-off by introducing a Multivariate Smooth Sign Accuracy (M-SSA) framework, which extracts smoothed components from leading indicators to enhance the signal-to-noise ratio and control the forecast volatility and timing. Applied to quarterly German GDP growth, our method yields smoothed forecasts that can improve forecasting accuracy, particularly over medium-term horizons. We find that while smoother forecasts tend to lag slightly around turning points, this can be offset by adjusting the forecast horizon. These findings highlight the practicality of the M-SSA framework for both forecasters and policymakers, Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335681 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/275742.2 Title: What explains international interest rate co-movement? Authors: Camehl, Annika; von Schweinitz, Gregor Abstract: The international co-movement of interest rates reflects correlated business-cycle fluctuations, largely driven by demand shocks. Monetary policy in advanced economies follows domestic mandates – inflation and the output gap – and does not respond to foreign policy shocks. We derive this result from a Bayesian structural panel vector autoregression with informative priors, homogeneity restrictions on contemporaneous relations, a hierarchical Minnesota prior with cross-sectional shrinkage, and a factor structure for structural shocks. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/275742.2 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336907 Title: Delegated social responsibility: Is managerial prosociality a source of agency cost? Authors: Szymczak, Wiebke Abstract: Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principal-agent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find that principals set ethically constrained targets and wages that track fairness benchmarks. Agents, however, do not divert resources to stakeholders: transfers are negative on average, and prosocial traits do not increase giving. Instead, contract terms, though unenforceable, systematically shape effort, transfers, and returns. Notably, prosocial agents generate higher total returns. Prosociality appears to mitigate rather than create efficiency losses, suggesting that discretion channels norm-sensitive loyalty rather than stake-holder redistribution. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336907 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340107 Title: Common ownership, tacit know-how, and the market for technology Authors: Hutschenreiter, Dennis Abstract: Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know- how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter's gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable - absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340107 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z