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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107597" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100461" />
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    <dc:date>2026-04-29T16:18:49Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107597">
    <title>Cooperation and Trustworthiness in Repeated Interaction</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107597</link>
    <description>Title: Cooperation and Trustworthiness in Repeated Interaction
Authors: Cagala, Tobias; Glogowsky, Ulrich; Grimm, Veronika; Rincke, Johannes
Abstract: Public goods provision often involves groups of contributors repeatedly interacting with administrators who can extract rents from the pool of contributions. We suggest a novel identification approach that exploits the sequential ordering of decisions in a panel vector autoregressive model to study social interactions in the laboratory. Despite rent extraction, contributors and administrators establish a stable interaction with cooperation matching the level from a comparable Public Goods Game. In the short run, temporary changes in behavior trigger substantial behavioral multiplier effects. We demonstrate that cooperation breeds trustworthiness and vice versa and that one-time disruptions are particularly damaging in settings with a lack of cooperative attitudes and trust.</description>
    <dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100461">
    <title>The Great Schism in the Theory of Public Finance. A Treatise in the Theory of Economic Thought</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100461</link>
    <description>Title: The Great Schism in the Theory of Public Finance. A Treatise in the Theory of Economic Thought
Authors: Blankart, Charles B:
Abstract: In 1870 Menger, Jevons and Walras succeeded in explaining prices in a market economy. While most economists welcomed their achievement, economists of the theory of public finance split in a Great Schism. The dissent is on the two Gossen Laws on which the neoclassical revolution relies. Continental Europeans insist in the relevance of choice and therefore adopt both Gossen laws, meaning that of declining marginal utility and that of utility equalization at the margin. The Anglo-Saxons adopt only declining marginal utility because they found that individual choice does not work for public goods. The former became choice individualists, the latter utilitarians. The Schism was revitalized with the Mirrlees Review of 2010/2011, a monumental work by 63 renowned economists over 1880 pages on what a good tax system ought to be. The author argues that without choice, nothing can be said on a good tax system. Therefore the Mirrlees Review is rejected in favour of a choice alternative which is developed in this paper.</description>
    <dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100599">
    <title>Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100599</link>
    <description>Title: Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement
Authors: Rosar, Frank; Mueller, Florian
Abstract: For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production cost, but only the incumbent can influence the buyer s procurement mechanism choice with a relationship specific investment. The relative performance of the cultures depends non monotonically on the importance of the investment relative to the value of selecting the lowest cost supplier. We use the model to explain stylized facts from the automotive industry.</description>
    <dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100477">
    <title>Cross sectional evidence on the relation between monetary policy, macroeconomic conditions and low-frequency inflation uncertainty</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100477</link>
    <description>Title: Cross sectional evidence on the relation between monetary policy, macroeconomic conditions and low-frequency inflation uncertainty
Authors: Hartmann, Matthias; Conrad, Christian
Abstract: In this study, we examine how the interaction between monetary policy and macroeconomic conditions affects inflation uncertainty in the long-term. The unobservable inflation uncertainty is quantified by means of the slowly evolving unconditional variance component of inflation in the framework of the semiparametric Spline-GARCH model (Engle and Rangel, 2008). For a cross section of 13 developed economies, we find that long-term inflation uncertainty is high if central bank governors are perceived as less inflation-averse, if the conduct of monetary policy is rather ad-hoc than rule-based and in economies with a low degree of central bank independence.</description>
    <dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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