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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/83165</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339147" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296885" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249914" />
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    <dc:date>2026-04-29T17:56:39Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339147">
    <title>Reforming global tax governance: OECD and UN paths to effective and participatory tax reform</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339147</link>
    <description>Title: Reforming global tax governance: OECD and UN paths to effective and participatory tax reform
Authors: Boukal, Tomáš; Janský, Petr; Palanský, Miroslav; Parízek, Michal
Abstract: Global tax governance has long struggled with ineffectiveness, as reflected in rising corporate tax avoidance that costs governments hundreds of billions of dollars annually. In response, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/G20 advanced the most ambitious initiative to date - the global minimum tax under its Two-Pillar Solution - which began to take effect in 2024. Yet this reform faces significant challenges: the United States insists on recognition of its unilateral minimum tax, developing countries offer limited support for the initiative, and carve-outs threaten to undermine the reform's effectiveness. In 2024, the United Nations launched negotiations on a parallel Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, which was instigated by developing countries. Drawing on 13 semi-structured interviews and analysis of relevant documents, this report finds that while the OECD emphasises effectiveness, the UN prioritises participation. Neither forum currently ensures a reform process that is both effective and participatory, and future progress will depend on addressing this trade-off.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296885">
    <title>Macroprudential policy in central banks: Integrated or separate? Survey among academics and central bankers</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296885</link>
    <description>Title: Macroprudential policy in central banks: Integrated or separate? Survey among academics and central bankers
Authors: Malovaná, Simona; Hodula, Martin; Gric, Zuzana; Bajzík, Josef
Abstract: We surveyed experts from academia, central banks and other regulatory institutions on the preferred institutional setup of macroprudential policy and the underlying interactions stemming from the conduct of monetary and macroprudential policy. We find substantial support for the integration setup, under which macroprudential policy is entrusted to the central bank and not to a separate institution. The most significant factors driving the respondents' views are the large degree of interdependence of the two policies, the potential information gains from keeping them 'under one roof', and a greater capability to resolve strategic conflicts. We identify non-negligible heterogeneity in the responses, especially in terms of respondents' age, managerial position and research orientation.</description>
    <dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249914">
    <title>A prolonged period of low interest iates: Unintended consequences</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249914</link>
    <description>Title: A prolonged period of low interest iates: Unintended consequences
Authors: Malovaná, Simona; Bajzík, Josef; Ehrenbergerová, Dominika; Janků, Jan
Abstract: Based on intraday data for a large cross-section of individual stocks and Exchange traded funds, we show that short-term as well as long-term fluctuations of realized market and average idiosyncratic higher moments risks are priced in the crosssectionof asset returns. Specifically, we find that market and average idiosyncratic volatility and kurtosis are significantly priced by investors mainly in the long-run even if controlled by market moments and other factors, while skewness is mostly short-run phenomenon. A conditional pricing model capturing the time-variation of moments confirms downward-sloping term structure of skewness risk and upwardsloping term structure of kurtosis risk, moreover the term structures connected to market skewness risk and average idiosyncratic skewness risk exhibit different dymanics.</description>
    <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249915">
    <title>Profit shifting of multinational corporations in the European Union: Evidence and policy reforms</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249915</link>
    <description>Title: Profit shifting of multinational corporations in the European Union: Evidence and policy reforms
Authors: Janský, Petr
Abstract: Profit shifting of multinational corporations (MNCs) negatively affects citizens, governments as well as other companies in the European Union. This consensus seems to be emerging in spite of the fact that the phenomenon of profit shifting is unobservable directly and therefore only indirect and imperfect estimates can shed light on its effects. In this study, I rely on one set of such estimates, from an academic working paper by Garcia-Bernardo &amp; Jansk´y (2021), to focus on its negative effects on the EU member states' government revenues. Two thirds (18 out of 27) of the EU member states lose out due to profit shifting of MNCs. At the same time, a few EU member states, most notably Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg, serve as tax havens and enable this tax avoidance. The EU as whole loses out due to profit shifting. When summed up across the EU member states, 302 billion USD (287 billion EUR) are shifted out of the EU yearly, while 215 billion USD (204 billion EUR) are shifted in. The difference is even starker when expressed in the estimated tax revenues: the EU is losing 12 billion USD (11 billion EUR) while gaining 53 billion USD (50 billion EUR). The bigger difference in estimated tax revenue than in profit shifting is due to the fact that, almost by definition, the shifted profits are taxed at a lower rate in their destination than if they were at their origin. For example, Cayman Islands tax shifted profits at zero rate, whereas profits would be taxed at higher rates in basically all countries from which they were shifted out. In corporate tax avoidance, losers lose more than winners win. Last, but not least, I discuss the global minimum tax rate reform proposals, discussed during 2021. Overall, tax avoidance and the reforms to counter it are, more often than not, the two sides of the same coin and why I draw five lessons jointly for both.</description>
    <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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