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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101318" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104068" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104709" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73034" />
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    <dc:date>2026-04-30T06:38:22Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101318">
    <title>Market driven network neutrality and the fallacy of a two-tiered Internet traffic regulation</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101318</link>
    <description>Title: Market driven network neutrality and the fallacy of a two-tiered Internet traffic regulation
Authors: Knieps, Günter; Stocker, Volker
Abstract: Within a Generalized DiffServ architecture entrepreneurial flexibility for building intelligent multipurpose traffic architectures enables the provision of a variety of tailored traffic services for a wide range of heterogeneous application services. In order to solve the entrepreneurial traffic capacity allocation problem, we propose an incentive compatible pricing and quality of service (QoS) differentiation model for the Generalized DiffServ architecture resulting in market driven network neutrality. Optimal allocation decisions based on the opportunity costs of capacity usage require that all relevant traffic classes are taken into account simultaneously, rather than 1) excluding traffic classes (by means of minimum traffic quality requirements), 2) prescribing a maximum or minimum number of traffic classes or 3) arbitrarily including parameter specifications for or levels of QoS which are not reflected by demand side. It is particularly important that the opportunity costs of capacity reservations for deterministic premium traffic classes are interrelated with subsequent non-deterministic traffic classes. As a consequence, every form of market split would be artificial.</description>
    <dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104068">
    <title>Competition and third party access in railroads</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104068</link>
    <description>Title: Competition and third party access in railroads
Authors: Knieps, Günter
Abstract: This chapter is organized as follows: In section 2 the historical roots of third party access regulation are characterized. This includes the Prussian railway law of 1838 and the terminal railroad case of 1912. In section 3 a normative frame-work, based on modern network economics, for the evaluation of third party access policies is provided. In section 4, the gradual process of market opening for railway transport services and the evolution of third party access regulation in Europe are characterized. In this context the potentials for competition on the markets for passenger rail services and public subsidies are also considered.</description>
    <dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104709">
    <title>The fallacies of regulatory market splits: Network neutrality regulation ante portas</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104709</link>
    <description>Title: The fallacies of regulatory market splits: Network neutrality regulation ante portas
Authors: Knieps, Günter; Stocker, Volker
Abstract: Network neutrality regulations for the Internet have been discussed for about a decade. In Europe, recent efforts have produced a proposal by the European Commission for a network neutrality regulation. Envisaged is the introduction of a two-tiered Internet traffic regulation based on a regulatory market split between the markets for 'public' Internet traffic services and markets for specialized services giving higher and ensured quality of data transmission. We argue that regulatory market splits are artificial and the proposed regulation of markets for Internet traffic services constitutes a regulatory fallacy.</description>
    <dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73034">
    <title>Der Irrweg regulatorischer Marktspaltung: Zur Novelle des Personenbeförderungsgesetzes in Deutschland</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73034</link>
    <description>Title: Der Irrweg regulatorischer Marktspaltung: Zur Novelle des Personenbeförderungsgesetzes in Deutschland
Authors: Knieps, Günter
Abstract: Die in der Novelle des Personenbeförderungsgesetzes vollzogene Marktspaltung in vor Marktzutritt geschütztem öffentlichem Personennahverkehr und wettbe-werblichem Linienbusfernverkehr ist willkürlich. Wettbewerbspotenziale zeigen sich bei freiem Marktzutritt sowohl im Fernverkehr als auch im Nahverkehr. Regulatorische Marktabgrenzungen hinsichtlich der Reisedistanz oder Reisezeit sagen weder etwas über die erforderlichen technischen Regulierungen, noch über den branchenspezifischen Verbraucherschutz oder über den verbleibenden Marktmachtregulierungsbedarf beim Zugang zu den erforderlichen Infrastruk-tureinrichtungen aus. Zudem gilt, dass nicht nur im Nahverkehr, sondern auch im Fernverkehr politisch gewünschte defizitäre Universaldienstleistungen im Ausschreibungswettbewerb bereitgestellt werden können.</description>
    <dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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