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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79668</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79963" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79995" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79803" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79830" />
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    <dc:date>2026-10-12T00:56:33Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79963">
    <title>Competition in Austrian Treasury Auctions</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79963</link>
    <description>Title: Competition in Austrian Treasury Auctions
Authors: Zulehner, Christine; Elsinger, Helmut; Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
Abstract: We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a natural experiment causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the increased number in bidders caused a significant drop in the yields Austria had to pay for newly issued debt. We use structural estimates of bidders private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction revenue. We compare bidder surplus before and after the auction. We find a small effect on the the surplus earned by bidders as a result of increased competition.</description>
    <dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79995">
    <title>Offshoring Domestic Jobs</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79995</link>
    <description>Title: Offshoring Domestic Jobs
Authors: Wrona, Jens; Egger, Hartmut; Kreickemeier, Udo
Abstract: We set up a two-country general equilibrium model, in which heterogeneous firms from one country (the source country) can offshore routine tasks to a low-wage host country. The most productive firms self-select into offshoring, and the impact on welfare in the source country can be positive or negative, depending on the share of firms engaged in offshoring. Each firm is run by an entrepreneur, and inequality between entrepreneurs and workers as well as intragroup inequality among entrepreneurs is higher with offshoring than in autarky. All results hold in a model extension with firm-level rent sharing, which results in aggregate unemployment. In this extended model, offshoring furthermore has non-monotonic effects on unemployment and intra-group inequality among workers. The paper also offers a calibration exercise to quantify the effects of offshoring.</description>
    <dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79803">
    <title>Unemployment and Domestic Violence: Theory and Evidence</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79803</link>
    <description>Title: Unemployment and Domestic Violence: Theory and Evidence
Authors: Rainer, Helmut; Anderberg, Dan; Wadsworth, Jonathan; Wilson, Tanya
Abstract: While many commentators perceive unemployment to be a key risk factor for intimate partner violence, the empirical evidence remains limited. We combine individual-level data from the British Crime Survey (BCS) with local labor market data to estimate the effects of total and gender-specific unemployment rates on domestic violence. The analysis uses the substantial variation in the increase in unemployment across areas, gender, and age-groups associated with the onset of the latest recession. Our main specification links a woman's risk of being abused to the unemployment rate among females and males in her local area and age group. Our results suggest that male and female unemployment have opposite-signed effects on domestic violence: while female unemployment increases the risk abuse, unemployment among males has the opposite effect. The result is shown to be robust to the inclusion of a wide set of control and also remains when we instrument for male and female unemployment using shift-share indices of labor demand. We argue that our findings are consistent with a theory of domestic violence in which (i) marriage provides insurance against employment risk through the pooling of resources, and (ii) a woman does not know the violent predisposition of her partner but infers it from his behavior. When the male partner face a high risk of unemployment, a potentially abusive husband strategically conceals his type as he has an economic incentive to avoid divorce and the associated loss of spousal insurance. However, when the female spouse faces a high risk of unemployment, her expected financial dependency on her partner prompts a husband with violent predisposition to reveal his abusive nature.</description>
    <dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79830">
    <title>The Intergenerational Distribution of Demographic Fluctuations in Unfunded and Funded Pension Systems</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79830</link>
    <description>Title: The Intergenerational Distribution of Demographic Fluctuations in Unfunded and Funded Pension Systems
Authors: Knell, Markus
Abstract: In this paper I use a multi-period OLG model to study how a demographic shock is distributed among different generations. In particular, I investigate whether a funded pension system allows for a smoother adjustment than an unfunded system. The results suggest that the answer to this question depends on the specific organization of the funded system. If the contributions are only invested into a non-accumulated asset in fixed supply (e.g. into "land") and if the investment decisions are guided by fixed rules then the intergenerational distribution of the demographic shock is almost identical in the two systems. Assuming optimal investment decisions, on the other hand, will increase or decrease the fluctuations of the funded pillar (depending on the degree of risk aversion). It is only for the case where all savings are invested into accumulable, productive capital that the funded system will dampen the distributional consequences of a demographic shock.</description>
    <dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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