https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76695 2026-10-05T03:35:53Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330121 Title: A note on the welfare and policy implications of a two-period real option game under imperfect information Authors: Wang, Congcong; Wang, Yuhan; Chen, Shanshan; Luckraz, Shravan; Pansera, Bruno Antonio Abstract: We show that the discrete real option game model proposed in the recent literature can be extended to the case of imperfect information. As a result, the model can cover a wider range of applications. However, we also observe that the effectiveness of implementing the subsidy is affected by the imperfect informational structure. 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330142 Title: The impact of gifts and shared experiences on an investor-manager relationship Authors: Hoyer, Maximilian; van Winden, Frans A. A. M. Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates the relationship between an investor and a project manager. Project managers choose from a pool of projects, the success probabilities of which are uncertain. Investors can change projects, but also have to change project managers if they want to do so. An additional joint project or a voluntary money transfer precedes their interaction. We hypothesize that investors favor projects of managers with whom they share positive experiences at that stage, even though these experiences do not provide any information about the subsequent project's success probability. Interaction through a voluntary transfer plays a clear and significant role in the investors' decision-making via bonding, whereas the influence of merely sharing a positive or negative experience proves more complex. 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330145 Title: Spatial competition across borders: The role of patients' mobility and institutional settings Authors: Levaggi, Laura; Levaggi, Rosella Abstract: Health care systems rely on geographical boundaries that secure financial stability and adequate planning. Quality differences across regions often arise for efficiency reasons, causing patient flows if mobility is free. In this paper, a theoretical spatial competition model is developed to study the role of patients' mobility on quality setting and to draw policy implications on its use as an instrument to reduce disparities, in a setting where regions differ in efficiency, costs, and market structure. From the analysis, it emerges that the institutional setting matters and a trade-off may appear between equity (in terms of quality difference across patients) and welfare (finding an allocation that maximizes social benefits). In a centralized setting, it is optimal to regulate mobility and increase the quality gap, while allowing free mobility calls for a refined quality setting, in which, depending on a balance between costs and benefits, the quality gap may be either increased or decreased. In decentralization the gap is generally lower, compared to centralization: the different consideration of benefits from local quality provision results in higher quality levels where the market structure is vertically integrated. 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330144 Title: Equilibrium coalition structures in three-player symmetric games Authors: Shen, Jingyi; Qu, Chen Abstract: In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two solutions: 𝐧∗, which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games, and equilibrium binding agreements, which represent the cooperative blocking approach. We find that the coarsest equilibrium coalition structure (based on the latter notion) is never finer than 𝐧∗, and we provide a sufficient and necessary condition for these two solutions to generate the same coalition structure (i.e., the two solutions coincide if and only if the first coalition to form in 𝐧∗ is not a two-player coalition or a particular condition about average coalitional worths is satisfied). In symmetric games with more than three players, we demonstrate through a series of examples that any relationship between these two solutions is possible. We also discuss symmetric games with positive externalities or equal division in which these two solutions coincide. 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z