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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75894</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339368" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339358" />
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    <dc:date>2026-05-02T13:48:59Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339368">
    <title>The transmission of reliable and unreliable information</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339368</link>
    <description>Title: The transmission of reliable and unreliable information
Authors: Graeber, Thomas; Noy, Shakked; Roth, Christopher
Abstract: Information often spreads and influences beliefs regardless of its reliability. We show that this occurs in part because indicators of reliability are disproportionately lost in the process of word-of-mouth transmission. We conduct controlled experiments where participants listen to economic forecasts and pass them on through voice messages. Other participants listen either to original or transmitted audio recordings and report incentivized beliefs. Across various transmitter incentive schemes, a claim's reliability is lost in transmission more than twice as much as the claim itself. Reliable and unreliable information, once filtered through transmission, impact listener beliefs similarly, substantially reducing the efficiency of downstream decisions. Mechanism experiments show that reliability is lost not because it is perceived as less relevant or harder to transmit, but because it is less likely to come to mind during transmission. Evidence from experiments, a large corpus of everyday conversations, and economic TV news demonstrate that reliability information is less likely to be cued during transmission and that attempts to retrieve it face greater interference in memory.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339358">
    <title>Standing in prisoners' shoes: A randomized trial on how incarceration shapes criminal justice preferences</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339358</link>
    <description>Title: Standing in prisoners' shoes: A randomized trial on how incarceration shapes criminal justice preferences
Authors: Arman, Arto; Beerli, Andreas; Henkel, Aljosha; Maréchal, Michel André
Abstract: We study how incarceration experience shapes preferences for criminal justice policies. In collaboration with a newly opened prison, we conducted a randomized field experiment that o!ered citizens the opportunity to experience up to two days of incarceration, closely replicating the real-life journey of inmates. Providing citizens with a chance to gain firsthand incarceration leads to a significant shift in punitive attitudes, with participants becoming less supportive of harsh criminal justice policies and donating more money to organizations advocating more moderate justice policies. Although individuals overestimated the wellbeing of actual prisoners, the intervention did not alter these beliefs. This suggests that the observed changes in policy preferences are driven more by personal experience than by revised beliefs about the burden of confinement. By randomizing institutional exposure outside the laboratory, our study highlights the causal role of personal experience in the formation of policy preferences.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339367">
    <title>Behavioral attenuation</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339367</link>
    <description>Title: Behavioral attenuation
Authors: Enke, Benjamin; Graeber, Thomas; Oprea, Ryan; Yang, Jeffrey
Abstract: We report the results of over 30 experiments to study the elasticity of economic decisions with respect to fundamentals. Our experiments cover a broad range of domains, from choice and valuation to belief formation, from strategic games to generic optimization problems, involving investment, savings, effort supply, product demand, taxes, externalities, fairness, beauty contests, search, policy evaluation, forecasting and inference. We identify two general patterns. First, behavioral attenuation: in 93% of our experiments, the elasticity of decisions to variation in fundamentals decreases in subjects' cognitive uncertainty about their best decision. Second, diminishing sensitivity: the elasticity of decisions decreases in the distance of the fundamental from 'simple points' at which the best decision is transparent, and this decrease in elasticities is again mirrored by an increase in cognitive uncertainty. These results suggest that cognitive uncertainty systematically predicts an attenuation of economic elasticities, and that there is less (or no) uncertainty and attenuation when problems are cognitively easy. We argue that attenuation links several known decision anomalies, and study its limits.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339366">
    <title>Explanations</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339366</link>
    <description>Title: Explanations
Authors: Graeber, Thomas; Roth, Christopher; Schesch, Constantin
Abstract: When people exchange knowledge, both truths and falsehoods can proliferate. We study the role of explanations for the spread of truths and falsehoods in 15 financial decision tasks. Participants record the reasoning behind each of their answers with incentives for accuracy of their listeners' responses, providing over 6,900 unique verbal explanations in total. A separate group of participants either only observe one orator's choice or additionally listen to the corresponding explanation before making their own choice. While listening to explanations somewhat improves average accuracy, there is substantial heterogeneity: explanations enable the spread of truths, but do not curb the contagion of falsehoods. To study mechanisms, we extract every single argument provided in the explanations, alongside a large collection of speech features, revealing the nature of financial reasoning on each topic. Explanations for truths are richer and contain higher argument quality than explanations for falsehoods. These content differences in the supply of explanations for truths versus falsehoods account for 60% of their asymmetric benefit, whereas orator and receiver characteristics play a minor role.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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