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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/281997" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/272281" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279791" />
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    <dc:date>2026-04-29T10:23:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/281997">
    <title>Market democracy, rising populism, and contemporary ordoliberalism</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/281997</link>
    <description>Title: Market democracy, rising populism, and contemporary ordoliberalism
Authors: Dold, Malte; Krieger, Tim
Abstract: For several decades, what has been called the "liberal cosmopolitan-minded urban elites" set the political agenda of Western democracies (Dold and Krieger 2019a). They aimed at personal freedom and upward social mobility by means of a meritocratic system that was safeguarded by a combination of a competitive market economy, a liberal and open democracy, and the rule of law (Fuest 2018). These elites welcomed the opening of the Iron Curtain as the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy" (Fukuyama 1989, 4). However, political realities have challenged this perspective severely in recent years (Dold and Krieger 2019a). Around the globe, but especially in the liberal Western market democracies - i.e., societies in which "markets and democracy have coexisted quite healthily" in the post-World War II era (Chua 2000, 289) - populist movements have gained prominence in public discourse and in some cases even won elections (e.g., in Hungary, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, or Sweden). There is ongoing debate over the causes of the rise of populist movements in the early 21st century (Gidron and Hall 2017; Guiso et al. 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). While important, our chapter will touch upon this debate only in passing, though, and instead focus on the consequences of populism's rise; in particular, we will ask how to deal with the populist challenge to the liberal order. We do so in three steps, thereby referring to one specific liberal conception, ordoliberalism. Considering ordoliberalism is instructive because, on the one hand, it strives for a "functioning and humane order of the economy, society, law, and the state" (Eucken 1990 [1952], 373; our italics), which is a much broader idea of liberalism than pure economic liberalism. On the other hand, critics argue that ordoliberalism has failed on following up on its own agenda (Dold and Krieger 2019b and 2023). They believe that ordoliberalism is the culprit of various misguided developments since the Eurozone crisis of 2009, which then provided a breeding ground for populism (Algan et al. 2017; Dold and Krieger 2019a). In their view, this is also related to ordoliberalism's - alleged - preference of the rule of law and economic freedom over democratic decision-making.</description>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/272281">
    <title>Paying them to hate US: The effect of U.S. military aid on anti-American terrorism, 1968-2018</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/272281</link>
    <description>Title: Paying them to hate US: The effect of U.S. military aid on anti-American terrorism, 1968-2018
Authors: Dimant, Eugen; Krieger, Tim; Meierrieks, Daniel
Abstract: Does U.S. military aid make the United States safer? Or does it have unintended consequences for U.S. security? To answer these questions, we estimate the effect of U.S. military aid on anti-American terrorism for a sample of 174 countries between 1968 and 2018. We find that higher levels of aid especially for military financing and education increase the likelihood of anti-American terrorism in recipient countries. Examining potential transmission channels, we show that more U.S. military aid undermines military capacity and increases corruption and exclusionary policies in recipient countries. Our findings are consistent with the argument that military aid aggravates local grievances, creating anti-American resentment and leading to anti-American terrorism. Indeed, we also provide tentative evidence that military aid lowers public opinion about the United States in recipient countries.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279791">
    <title>Foreshadowing Mars: Religiosity and pre-Enlightenment warfare</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279791</link>
    <description>Title: Foreshadowing Mars: Religiosity and pre-Enlightenment warfare
Authors: Barber, Luke; Jetter, Michael; Krieger, Tim
Abstract: Can religiosity sway a society's propensity for violence against outgroups? We first introduce two state-year-level religiosity measures for several pre-Enlightenment European states with the frequencies of religious language in book publications and Christian names of newborns. To identify causal effects on warfare, we exploit the local visibility of solar eclipses - phenomena orthogonal to climatic, cultural, economic, environmental, and institutional developments that, in pre-Enlightenment Europe, were overwhelmingly viewed as supernatural, religious events. Accounting for dyad- and year-fixed effects, we observe positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively sizeable effects on subsequent attack war onset. Reduced form estimates, robustness checks (e.g., acknowledging dyad-specific time trends), and placebo exercises yield consistent patterns. Exploring mechanisms, religious terminology explicit to religious outgroups (specifically Jews and Muslims) spikes in solar eclipse years and predicts attack war onset, particularly against Islamic states. Finally, consistent with the idea of a religious primer highlighting ingroup-outgroup demarcations and exacerbating tensions along such lines, city-year-level solar eclipses also predict Jewish expulsions and witch trials in pre-Enlightenment Europe.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/272280">
    <title>The decision to flee: Exploring gender-specific determinants of international refugee migration</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/272280</link>
    <description>Title: The decision to flee: Exploring gender-specific determinants of international refugee migration
Authors: Renner, Laura; Schmid, Lena
Abstract: While the determinants of refugee migration are well-studied, heterogeneities within the group of refugees have received little attention. In this paper, we use data on female and male refugee movements among African and Asian countries in the years 2002-2018 to explore gender differences in flight behavior along three dimensions: reasons for leaving, associated costs, and factors attracting individuals to specific asylum countries. Most prominently, our results show that women are more deterred by longer distances than men and flee significantly more often to neighboring countries. In addition, the number of battle-related fatalities increases male flows to neighboring countries significantly more than female flows. This gender difference decreases when conflict intensity is high. We also find significant differences concerning the economic situation: extreme poverty has a larger impact on women whereas GDP per capita plays a more important role for male than for female flows.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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