<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
  <channel rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71910">
    <title>EconStor Community: Institute of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71910</link>
    <description>Institute of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck</description>
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308791" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/318487" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312922" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312923" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
    <dc:date>2026-05-08T05:23:03Z</dc:date>
  </channel>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308791">
    <title>Assessing the global impact of EU carbon pricing: Economic and climate spillovers</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308791</link>
    <description>Title: Assessing the global impact of EU carbon pricing: Economic and climate spillovers
Authors: Hasler, Elias
Abstract: This paper explores the global economic and climate spillovers of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), leveraging exogenous variations in carbon prices identified through a carbon policy surprise series. Findings reveal that higher EU carbon prices lead to significant and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, both within the Euro Area (EA) and globally, with no evidence of carbon leakage. Structural Scenario Analysis confirms that these reductions are driven by energy efficiency improvements rather than solely by declines in industrial production. The results highlight the transmission of the shock trough the Brussels Effect, where EU carbon policies influence global standards, evidenced by stricter carbon policies abroad and shifts in investor behavior favoring green industries. Furthermore no region benefits economically from EU carbon pricing. Overall, the EU ETS proves effective in reducing emissions without being undermined by carbon leakage.</description>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/318487">
    <title>Battlefield bargains: The high-stakes dance of rebel finances and ceasefire deals</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/318487</link>
    <description>Title: Battlefield bargains: The high-stakes dance of rebel finances and ceasefire deals
Authors: Kupek, Sebastian
Abstract: Wars fueled by resource wealth pose complex challenges for conflict resolution. I combine data on conflict events, rebel resource dependence, world market prices, and ceasefire details to investigate how fluctuations in rebel funding affect the likelihood of ceasefires. Increased funding opportunities strengthen the rebel position and decrease the bargaining range between belligerents. Higher resource rents prolong the conflict and make resolution less likely. Using the exogenous variation of world market prices, I find that rebels react strongly to changes in their budget situation. Price increases reduce the likelihood of rebels entering ceasefires connected to conflict resolution.</description>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312922">
    <title>Reducing strategic uncertainty increases group protection in collective risk social dilemmas</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312922</link>
    <description>Title: Reducing strategic uncertainty increases group protection in collective risk social dilemmas
Authors: Steimanis, Ivo; Struwe, Natalie; Benda, Julian; Blanco, Esther
Abstract: Interrelated global crises - climate change, pandemics, loss of ecosystem services and biodiversity - pose risks that demand collective solutions. Uncertainty about others' behavior, coupled with the dependence on some to take collective efforts to mitigate risks for all (e.g. conservation of natural habitats by those living at wildlife boarders to reduce risk of zoonoses), complicates collective action. We extend the experimental collective risk social dilemma to consider that some individuals ('beneficiaries') cannot protect themselves and must rely on others ('providers') for collective protection. Our approach allows to disentangle the relevance of self-interest and uncertainty over the actions of others in explaining self-reliance by providers. Our findings show that reducing strategic uncertainty leads to more collective solutions, with more beneficiaries protected, less resources wasted, and lower inequality. Moreover, we show that institutions inspired by payments for ecosystem services that allow beneficiaries to make compensation transfers to providers of protection are highly effective in fostering collective solutions. Indeed, these voluntary institutions are similarly effective in alleviating the social dilemma as (the hypothetical case of) fully removing strategic uncertainty. Thus, we show that understanding the reasons for self-reliance in collective risk social dilemmas can help develop better institutions to enhance the use of collective solutions, and thereby enhancing social welfare.</description>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312923">
    <title>The value of rating systems in credence goods markets</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312923</link>
    <description>Title: The value of rating systems in credence goods markets
Authors: Angerer, Silvia; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Mimra, Wanda; Rittmannsberger, Thomas; Waibel, Christian
Abstract: In this paper, we experimentally investigate the effect of public consumer ratings on market outcomes in credence goods markets. Contrary to search or experience goods, consumers cannot evaluate all dimensions of trade for credence goods, which may inhibit the information and reputation-building value of public rating systems. We implement a market in which experts have an informational advantage over consumers with respect to the appropriate service level. The rating system takes the form of a five-star rating system as is common on online rating websites. The value of this rating system is compared in two different expert market settings: First, one in which consumers cannot rely on information from personal experience with the expert, reflecting markets in which consumer-expert interactions are often first-time and infrequent (e.g. specialist visits in healthcare markets). Second, one in which consumers have personal experience with the expert, reflecting markets in which consumer-expert interactions are frequent and repeated (e.g. general practitioner visits in healthcare markets). We find that the public rating system significantly improves market outcomes. Furthermore, a public rating system is a good substitute for personal experience information in terms of market efficiency and consumer surplus. Combined, however, we find no complementarity between public ratings and personal experience information, mainly due to the already high market efficiency in the presence of either one.</description>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

