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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249369" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249368" />
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    <dc:date>2026-04-30T11:56:06Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249369">
    <title>When are mixed equilibria relevant?</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249369</link>
    <description>Title: When are mixed equilibria relevant?
Authors: Friedman, Daniel; Zhao, Shuchen
Abstract: Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical relevance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population mean-matching), whether time is discrete or continuous, and whether players can specify mixtures or only pure strategies. Comparing point predictions, NE always does better than maximin and often does no worse than Logit QRE. NE predicts better than Center (50-50 mixes) under mean-matching, but otherwise not as well. By contrast, in a dominance solvable game, NE predicts better than alternatives in all treatments. Qualitative and quantitative dynamic models capture regularities across all treatments.</description>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249368">
    <title>The 0.0003 percent: Short-run dynamics of extreme wealth in America</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249368</link>
    <description>Title: The 0.0003 percent: Short-run dynamics of extreme wealth in America
Authors: Mirza, Arshad; Singh, Nirvikar
Abstract: This paper analyzes the short-run dynamics and changing sources of wealth among the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest individuals in the United States, using annual data for 12 years spanning before and after the financial crisis of 2008-9. Over the entire time period the growth of wealth was negatively related to the previous years' wealth, implying a slight degree of wealth convergence within the group. We find that the overall growth of the group's wealth slowed after the crisis but stayed well above the GDP growth rate. Considering the interaction of growth of wealth with personal characteristics, we find that those who can be classified as self-made had a higher average wealth growth rate than their counterparts, although this lead narrowed after the financial crisis, during the Great Recession. Similarly, those with advanced degrees also had higher average growth of wealth in the pre-crisis period. We also examine the mobility of in and out of the Forbes 400, and find that turnover was higher in the period prior to the financial crisis, particularly for self-made individuals and those with advanced degrees. The self-made were also more likely to rise in rank within the Forbes 400 conditional on persisting in the list. By employing an innovative method of dealing with selection bias in a truncated panel, we are able to ascertain that our results are not driven by these biases. We also find some differences in these patterns at the sectoral level, compared to the aggregate group.</description>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197762">
    <title>Are transparency and accountability enough? Open corruption and why it exists</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197762</link>
    <description>Title: Are transparency and accountability enough? Open corruption and why it exists
Authors: Jeong, Dahyeon; Shenoy, Ajay; Zimmermann, Laura
Abstract: The global movement against corruption has long assumed its demise lay in transparency and accountability. We test this assumption by measuring whether highly accountable Indian village council presidents favor their own households while making observable allocations of public works jobs. We link millions of public works records to election outcomes. We find that winners of close elections receive 3 times as many days of labor as losers, earning excess wages equaling two-thirds of the median president's salary. Using an original survey of council presidents we find suggestive evidence that corruption is "performance pay" used to attract talented candidates into office.</description>
    <dc:date>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197761">
    <title>Varieties of risk elicitation</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197761</link>
    <description>Title: Varieties of risk elicitation
Authors: Friedman, Daniel; Habib, Sameh; James, Duncan; Crockett, Sean
Abstract: We explore a variety of risk preference elicitation procedures that involve direct choice from a set of lotteries, including budget lines (BL) and binary choice lists (HL). We find statistically significant violations of the expected utility hypothesis (EUH) consistent with disappointment aversion, and also find violations of first order stochastic dominance, but both sorts of violations are mostly small and only slightly impair the predictive power of a parametric implementation of EUH. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion, gamma, varies widely across individual subjects (consistent with EUH) and also across elicitation tasks (inconsistent with direct implementation of EUH). An alternative nonparametric measure of risk preferences displays similar patterns. The two risk preference measures are highly correlated with each other for each elicitation task. Each separate measure varies widely across individual subjects and across elicitation tasks, with low to nil correlation between BL tasks and HL tasks. Some of the variation across tasks can be explained by attributes such as graphical vs text representation that have no role in decision theory.</description>
    <dc:date>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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