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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57671" />
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    <dc:date>2026-05-01T19:04:37Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57661">
    <title>Estimating the effect of mortgage foreclosures on nearby property values: A critical review of the literature</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57661</link>
    <description>Title: Estimating the effect of mortgage foreclosures on nearby property values: A critical review of the literature
Authors: Frame, W. Scott
Abstract: In response to the wave of residential mortgage foreclosures in the past few years, federal, state and local government intervention programs have aimed to reduce the presumed social costs of foreclosures. Before the recent crisis, there was little economic research documenting foreclosure spillover effects. This article takes a critical look at the recent literature that seeks to estimate the negative effects of residential mortgage foreclosures. This review suggests that foreclosed properties sell at a discount, likely because such properties are in worse condition than surrounding properties. What's more, very nearby foreclosures appear to depress the sales prices of nondistressed properties, but this effect diminishes rapidly over physical distance and time. The author suggests that the considerable variation in foreclosure discount and spillover estimates that occurs from study to study may be related to data limitations (specific places and times) and poorly specified empirical models in some studies. He notes that studies using a repeat-sales approach seem to hold greater promise than those using hedonic regressions; the former approach is more likely to hold property and neighborhood characteristics constant and make it easier to examine multiple geographies and longer time periods.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57671">
    <title>Too big to fail after FDICIA</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57671</link>
    <description>Title: Too big to fail after FDICIA
Authors: Wall, Larry D.
Abstract: In 1993, when this article was originally published, Congress had recently passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) to reduce taxpayers' exposure to financial system losses, including their exposure at too big to fail financial institutions. In his new preface, the author observes that, by passing FDICIA, Congress was signaling that it was serious about ending 100 percent de facto deposit insurance. He notes that FDICIA's least-cost resolution provisions were partially successful, terminating 100 percent de facto deposit insurance  for most banks. The recent financial crisis demonstrated, though, that too big to fail has still not been eliminated for the very largest banks. To provide a background for the debate about what should be done to eliminate the persistent problems with existing too big to fail policies, this article outlines what Congress originally intended FDICIA to accomplish. From its 1993 perspective, the article reviews the controls FDICIA placed on regulators' ability to protect or extend the lives of large banks while keeping other policy tools for dealing with systemic risk. The article also discusses some lingering systemic risk issues, including the effect of a large bank's failure on financial derivatives markets and the effect of unexpected massive losses at one or more banks, as well as FDICIA's provisions designed to reduce systemic risk.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57666">
    <title>Mortgage foreclosure prevention efforts</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57666</link>
    <description>Title: Mortgage foreclosure prevention efforts
Authors: Gerardi, Kristopher; Li, Wenli
Abstract: In 2007, the United States began to experience its worst housing and foreclosure crisis since the Great Depression. In response, policymakers have been devising foreclosure prevention plans, most of which focus on loan modifications. This article begins with an overview of the different loss mitigation tools that mortgage lenders and policymakers have used in the past to combat foreclosure and then briefly summarizes the main U.S. programs of the past few years. By most analyses, the authors note, these recent programs have had poor results in terms of significantly reducing foreclosures, and borrowers who have received modifications are redefaulting at extremely high rates. The authors then review both the theoretical academic literature of the 1990s and early 2000s and the more recent empirical literature generated by the recent foreclosure crisis. Many of the recent studies have focused on loan modification as a loss mitigation tool. Given the limited success of government loan modification programs, the authors believe that policymakers will likely turn their attention to other alternatives. The authors point to signs that the focus is now shifting to programs that do not attempt to prevent foreclosures but rather try to help homeowners who have already experienced foreclosure.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <title>Changes in the aggregate labor force participation rate</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57667</link>
    <description>Title: Changes in the aggregate labor force participation rate
Authors: Hotchkiss, Julie L.
Abstract: Human capital is a vital component in the production process, so the size of the labor force can profoundly affect the potential for economic growth. In the United States, the overall labor force participation rate (LFPR)the percent of the population supplying labor to the marketbegan to grow in the mid-1960s, mainly because of the rise in women's LFPR. But since 1997 the aggregate LFPR has been generally declining. Many researchers have linked this decline to demographic factors, chiefly the drop in labor force participation among young people and working-age women. This article presents a simple methodology for decomposing changes in the aggregate LFPR over time into demographic group changes in both labor force participation behavior and population shares. The decomposition reveals that a decline in the population shares of working-age men and women was actually the driving force behind the recent drop in the aggregate LFPR, outweighing the effect of the declining participation rates of women and youth. This simple method demonstrates how little information is needed to evaluate the historical evolution of the aggregate LFPR and to make projections of its future path that are a close match to estimates from more complex structural forecasting models.</description>
    <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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