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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54565" />
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    <dc:date>2026-05-09T19:00:20Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54565">
    <title>An empirical assessment of the 2004 EU merger policy reform</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54565</link>
    <description>Title: An empirical assessment of the 2004 EU merger policy reform
Authors: Duso, Tomaso; Gugler, Klaus; Szücs, Florian
Abstract: Based on a database of 326 merger cases scrutinized by the European Commission between 1990 and 2007, we evaluate the economic impact of the change in European merger legislation in 2004. We first propose a general framework to assess merger policy effectiveness, which is based on standard oligopoly theory and makes use of stock market reactions as an external assessment of the merger and the merger control decisions. We then focus on four different dimensions of effectiveness: 1) legal certainty; 2) frequency and determinants of type I and type II errors; 3) rent-reversion achieved by different merger policy tools; and 4) deterrence of anti-competitive mergers. To infer the economic impact of the merger policy reform, we compare the results of our four tests before and after its introduction. Our results suggest that the policy reform seems to have been only a modest improvement of European merger policy.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54564">
    <title>Using rival effects to identify synergies and improve merger typologies</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54564</link>
    <description>Title: Using rival effects to identify synergies and improve merger typologies
Authors: Clougherty, Joseph A.; Duso, Tomaso
Abstract: The strategic management literature has found it difficult to differentiate between collusive and efficiency-based synergies in horizontal merger activity. We propose a schematic to classify mergers that yields more information on merger types and merger effects, and that can, moreover, distinguish between mergers characterized largely by collusion-based synergies and mergers characterized largely by efficiency-based synergies. Crucial to the proposed measurement procedure is that it encompasses the impact of merger events not only on merging firms - as is custom - but also on non-merging competitor firms (the rivals). Employing the event-study methodology with stock-market data on samples of large horizontal mergers drawn from the US and UK (an Anglo-Saxon sub-sample) and from the European continent, we demonstrate how the proposed schematic can better clarify the nature of merger activity.</description>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51207">
    <title>How to measure the deterrence effects of merger policy: Frequency or composition?</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51207</link>
    <description>Title: How to measure the deterrence effects of merger policy: Frequency or composition?
Authors: Barros, Pedro P.; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Seldeslachts, Jo
Abstract: We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.</description>
    <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51212">
    <title>Deterrence in competition law</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51212</link>
    <description>Title: Deterrence in competition law
Authors: Buccirossi, Paolo; Ciari, Lorenzo; Duso, Tomaso; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Vitale, Cristiana
Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of deterrence: 1) sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 4) quality of the law; 5) independence and 6) separation of power. We then discuss how to measure deterrence. We review the literature that uses surveys to solicit direct information on changes in the behavior of firms due to the threats posed by the enforcement of antitrust rules, and the literature based on the analysis of hard data. We finally argue that the most challenging task, both theoretically and empirically, is how to distinguish between “good” deterrence and “bad” deterrence.</description>
    <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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