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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49651</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324431" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300403" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300405" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306620" />
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    <dc:date>2026-04-28T11:39:21Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324431">
    <title>Measuring creativity: Associative thinking in semantic networks</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324431</link>
    <description>Title: Measuring creativity: Associative thinking in semantic networks
Authors: Baader, Malte; Fischbacher, Urs; Starmer, Chris; Tufano, Fabio
Abstract: Identifying creative ability and its determinants is crucial in understanding artistic and innovative achievements. Previous work has shown that performance across established creativity tasks does not correlate within participants. A potential reason for this finding is that most creativity tasks lack well-defined performance criteria. In this paper, we develop a novel tool for measuring creative ability and assess its performance through experimental tests. We construct a semantic network serving as the underlying structure of our tool. Based on this network, participants perform two associative thinking tasks, Local Search and Depth Search. We characterise each task by relating it to an established measure of creativity, finding that performance in our proposed tasks is significantly related to their matched creativity task across several dimensions. Our new tool improves on established creativity tasks by utilising a predefined solution space. While capturing key features of established methodologies, it substantially increases on the ease of implementation and interpretation. In addition we also provide causal evidence on the effect of incentives on our tool.</description>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300403">
    <title>Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation: Evidence from gift-exchange experiments</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300403</link>
    <description>Title: Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation: Evidence from gift-exchange experiments
Authors: Gächter, Simon; Kaiser, Esther; Königstein, Manfred
Abstract: Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after incentives have been abolished. This crowding out occurs also in repeated relationships, which otherwise strongly increase effort compared to one-shot interactions. Using a unified econometric framework, we unpack these results as a function of positive and negative reciprocity, as well as the principals' wage offer and the incentive-compatibility of the contract. Crowding out is mostly due to reduced wages and not a change in reciprocal wage-effort relationships. Our systematic analysis also replicates established results on gift exchange, incentives, and crowding out of voluntary cooperation while exposed to incentives. Overall, our findings show that the behavioral consequences of explicit incentives strongly depend on the features of the situation in which they are embedded.</description>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300405">
    <title>Social preferences and the variability of conditional cooperation</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300405</link>
    <description>Title: Social preferences and the variability of conditional cooperation
Authors: Baader, Malte; Gächter, Simon; Lee, Kyeongtae; Sefton, Martin
Abstract: We experimentally examine how incentives affect conditional cooperation (i.e., cooperating in response to cooperation and defecting in response to defection) in social dilemmas. In our first study, subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma games with varying payoffs. We elicit second mover strategies and find that most second movers conditionally cooperate in some games and free ride in others. The rate of conditional cooperation is higher when the own gain from defecting is lower and when the loss imposed on the first mover by defecting is higher. This pattern is consistent with both social preference models and stochastic choice models. In a second study subjects play 64 social dilemma games, and we jointly estimate noise and social preference parameters at the individual level. Most of our subjects place significantly positive weight on others' payoffs, supporting the underlying role of social preferences in conditional cooperation. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation is not a fixed trait but rather a symptom of the interaction between game incentives and underlying social preferences.</description>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306620">
    <title>Attribution of responsibility for corrupt decisions</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306620</link>
    <description>Title: Attribution of responsibility for corrupt decisions
Authors: Montero, María; Possajennikov, Alexandre; Verbel, Yuliet
Abstract: This paper studies responsibility attribution for outcomes of collusive bribery. In an experiment, participants labeled as either citizens or public officials can propose a bribery transaction to another participant (labeled as either public official or citizen, respectively), who decides whether to accept the proposal. We then let either the victims of the corrupt transaction or the bystanders of it judge the individual decisions of proposing and accepting. We interpret these judgments as a measure of responsibility attribution. We find that labels (citizen or public official) have a stronger effect than roles (proposer or responder): public officials are consistently regarded as more responsible for corruption than citizens, while those accepting a bribe are regarded as only somewhat more responsible than those proposing it. Further, we find that victims judge corruption decisions more severely than bystanders, although bystanders' judgments are also consistently negative. In treatments with a neutral context, we find that judgments are less harsh than in the corruption context, bystanders' judgments are much less harsh than those of victims, and responders are judged more severely than proposers. Our results suggest that people judge corrupt actors in context, more harshly when they are labeled as law enforcers (i.e., public officials), and that unaffected parties (i.e., bystanders) react nearly as negatively to corruption as those directly affected by it (i.e., victims).</description>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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