<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
  <channel rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340774">
    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340774</link>
    <description />
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340783" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340784" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340781" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340780" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
    <dc:date>2026-05-09T16:00:22Z</dc:date>
  </channel>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340783">
    <title>Default options and tax avoidance: Evidence from the church tax</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340783</link>
    <description>Title: Default options and tax avoidance: Evidence from the church tax
Authors: Bengtsson, Niklas
Abstract: This article investigates how the design of the tax system affects tax revenue when avoidance is legal. Between 1952 and 1995, the Swedish church tax was constructed as an opt-out system: Swedish citizens were automatically enrolled in the church at birth but were free to opt out. I compare children born shortly before and after the system's discontinuation and find that birth memberships significantly affect church tax payments later in life. The baseline estimates imply that changing from an opt-out to an opt-in system reduced church tax revenue by 8.2 percent. The default effects are significant on the full population but are especially strong among individuals born in low-income households, implying the opt-out system made the church tax more regressive. I find no evidence that the default option affected religious socialization: reform-affected individuals are equally likely to baptize their children and equally likely to join a different congregation.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340784">
    <title>Improving early literacy through teacher professional development: Experimental evidence from Colombia</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340784</link>
    <description>Title: Improving early literacy through teacher professional development: Experimental evidence from Colombia
Authors: Marinelli, Horacio Alvarez; Berlinski, Samuel G.; Busso, Matias; Martinez-Correa, Julian
Abstract: Teachers are a fundamental input for classroom learning. Consequently, teacher development is a policy priority for governments around the world. We experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of ''Let's All Learn to Read,'' a curricular reform implemented via a one-year professional development program that trained and coached first-grade teachers throughout the school year and provided them and their students with structured materials. Following a year of instruction by trained teachers, students' literacy scores in treated schools grew by 0.39 of a standard deviation compared to students in the control group. These gains persisted after the intervention finished; through the second and third grades.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340781">
    <title>Pricing pollution in a non-cooperative world</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340781</link>
    <description>Title: Pricing pollution in a non-cooperative world
Authors: Mideksa, Torben
Abstract: I examine a policy-making game among countries that must choose both a policy instrument (e.g., a tax or a quota) and its intensity (i.e., the tax rate or the quota level) to price pollution. When countries price pollution non-cooperatively, they not only set the intensity inefficiently, they are also likely to adopt Pigouvian fees, despite quotas being better from a welfare perspective. Adopting a Pigouvian fee to address a multi-country externality generates a risk externality, and in some cases non-cooperatively chosen quotas can generate higher social welfare than maximum social welfare Pigouvian fees can deliver.</description>
    <dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340780">
    <title>When promising interventions fail: Personalized coaching for teachers in a middle-income country</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340780</link>
    <description>Title: When promising interventions fail: Personalized coaching for teachers in a middle-income country
Authors: Carneiro, Pedro; Cruz Aguayo, Yyannú; Intriago, Ruthy; Ponce, Juan; Schady, Norbert Rüdiger; Schodt, Sarah
Abstract: Children in developing countries have deep deficits in math and language. Personalized coaching for teachers has been proposed as a way of raising teacher quality and child achievement. We designed a coaching program that focused on one aspect of teacher quality - teacher-child interactions - that researchers in education and psychology have argued is critical for child development and learning. We implemented the coaching program in Ecuador, with 100 1st grade teachers randomly assigned to treatment and 100 to control. Coaching improved the quality of teacher-child interactions but reduced child achievement. Our results underline the importance of evaluating new forms of professional development for teachers, even those that follow best practice, before these interventions are taken to scale.</description>
    <dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

