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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331939</link>
    <description />
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339550" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339549" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339551" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331949" />
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    <dc:date>2026-05-09T19:52:26Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339550">
    <title>Consumer consent regulation</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339550</link>
    <description>Title: Consumer consent regulation
Authors: Strausz, Roland
Abstract: Consumer consent regulation is the cornerstone of modern data privacy regulation such as the European GDPR and the Californian CCPA. By ensuring that consumers can reject any harmful data collection, the regulation seems an effective tool for protecting consumers against price discrimination. By contrast, I provide the insight that consent regulation alone is ineffective because it provides firms with the loophole to commit to unattractive offers to dissenting consumers. Effective consent regulation therefore requires an explicit regulation of the firm's dissent offer. This is informationally demanding; regulation that merely insists on "reasonable" (sequential rational) offers is ineffective.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339549">
    <title>Dividend policy: An empirical analysis for imperial Germany</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339549</link>
    <description>Title: Dividend policy: An empirical analysis for imperial Germany
Authors: Burhop, Carsten; Selgert, Felix
Abstract: In the German Empire, corporations almost always paid a dividend to their shareholders. Dividends have been cut or increased in line with the development of profits. We demonstrate that the target dividend and the average dividend tended to be nearly the same. If the dividend paid deviated from the target, we measure an extraordinarily fast return towards the target. Our analysis of the change in dividends, the payout ratio, and the dynamics of the dividend level provides evidence in favour of the agency theory of dividend policy. Companies with good investment opportunities paid comparatively high dividends. An improvement in shareholder protection weakened this effect. Best practice voting rights at the company level have systematically influenced dividend levels, the relevance of investment opportunities for the dividend policy and the speed of adjustment after a deviation from the target.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339551">
    <title>Are taxes or user-fees more popular among politicians? The case of childcare</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339551</link>
    <description>Title: Are taxes or user-fees more popular among politicians? The case of childcare
Authors: Breyer, Friedrich; Sterba, Maj-Britt
Abstract: How shall publicly provided excludable goods be financed - by general taxation or user fees? The general conclusion of the existing literature is that exclusive tax financing is neither efficient nor desirable under widely shared distributive goals. A striking example is childcare because here fees are often made dependent on parents' income. Given the rather clear arguments in favor of user fees for formal childcare, it is surprising to notice that some German states with leftist governments have abolished user fees and replaced them with pure tax financing. It is the purpose of this research to investigate the attitudes of politicians towards user fees for publicly funded childcare and to explore the justifications given for these attitudes. We do so by directly surveying members of eight federal state legislatures. The survey results confirm the experience of real political decisions in that left-leaning politicians tend to oppose parental fees. They do so mainly with the justification that "education must be free for all". Right-leaning politicians tend to support fees for various reasons. We discuss how these results can be reconciled with the redistributive goals of leftist parties.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331949">
    <title>Trade uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty and shipping costs</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331949</link>
    <description>Title: Trade uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty and shipping costs
Authors: Melas, Konstantinos D.; Michail, Nektarios; Louca, Kyriaki G.
Abstract: We examine how trade and policy uncertainty affect shipping freight rates, using a Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) model. Trade uncertainty has a strong effect on shipping costs, even though the effects become insignificant within a year. On the other hand, policy uncertainty has a slightly smaller initial effect but tends to have longer-lasting effects on shipping costs. Trade uncertainty tends to benefit European stocks, perhaps as investors may believe that consumers will shift to local companies, with the impact on US stocks also being (mildly) positive, despite the (lagged) deterioration in economic activity. Trade uncertainty tends to have a longer-lasting impact on GDP than policy uncertainty, given then known merits of comparative advantage, while the effect of policy uncertainty is higher in the European markets compared to the US ones.</description>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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