<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
  <channel rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330268">
    <title>EconStor Community:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330268</link>
    <description />
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339388" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339387" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339355" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339354" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
    <dc:date>2026-10-23T01:36:44Z</dc:date>
  </channel>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339388">
    <title>The elasticity of imports to MFN tariffs</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339388</link>
    <description>Title: The elasticity of imports to MFN tariffs
Authors: Tamberi, Nicolò
Abstract: When the UK left the EU, it introduced a new import tariff schedule, one of the largest MFN tariff reforms in decades of a developed economy. This paper exploits this policy change to estimate the elasticity of imports to MFN tariffs, addressing the endogeneity of trade policy through two strategies: a country-based approach using trade agreement partners whose MFN exposure is plausibly exogenous, and a product-based approach leveraging mechanical tariff changes from schedule simplification. Using a difference-indifferences design with EU imports as a control group, I find that ignoring endogeneity yields an elasticity of 2.5, while IV estimates range from 4.5 to 8.7. Dynamic responses are even larger: three years after the reform, elasticities reach 10-12. These results suggest that widely used tariff-based elasticities are substantially underestimated, with implications for quantitative trade models and welfare analysis.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339387">
    <title>The trade elasticity from tariffbased regressions: What do we measure?</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339387</link>
    <description>Title: The trade elasticity from tariffbased regressions: What do we measure?
Authors: Tamberi, Nicolò
Abstract: Most empirical estimates of the trade elasticity exploit tariff variation generated by Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). Because firms only partly utilize preferential tariffs, standard regressions identify an eligible-tariff elasticity rather than the structural elasticity with respect to tariffs actually paid that is required for quantitative trade models. I model PTA tariff cuts as a treatment with partial compliance and estimate the effective-tariff elasticity using an instrumental variable approach that explicitly accounts for preference utilization. The effective-tariff elasticity lies between 10 and 12, roughly three times larger than eligible-tariff estimates around 3.5. I show that the eligible-tariff elasticity varies with the tariff preference utilization of the estimation sample and is therefore not portable across policy environments, while the effective-tariff elasticity identifies a policy-invariant elasticity that can be used for quantitative modelling.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339355">
    <title>Industrial policy and retaliatory protection under the WTO: Lessons from China</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339355</link>
    <description>Title: Industrial policy and retaliatory protection under the WTO: Lessons from China
Authors: Feng, Yusheng; Li, Haishi; Wang, Siwei; Zhu, Min
Abstract: Using Chinese firm-level trade data combined with global anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations, we uncover a previously overlooked cost of industrial policy under WTO agreements. At every stage of AD/CVD investigation, subsidies significantly raise the probability of affirmative rulings and lead to higher imposed duties. Firms that received larger subsidies are also less likely to be granted firm-specific duties, which are lower than the product-level duties applied to all other firms exporting the investigated product. While AD/CVD duties create a moderate trade barrier that an average Chinese firm expects to face, they represent a significant cost of subsidy for those heavily subsidized and those potentially receiving firm-specific duties. The intended benefits of industrial subsidies are partially offset by increased foreign trade protection: AD/CVD duties induced by subsidies reduced the subsidy effect on firm revenue growth by 22%.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339354">
    <title>The dawn of inequality</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339354</link>
    <description>Title: The dawn of inequality
Authors: Bertazzini, Mattia C.; Eckhoff, Gina; Heldring, Leander
Abstract: Why did enduring socio-economic inequality emerge between the 4th and 3rd millennium BCE, after millennia of substantial egalitarianism? We test the hypothesis of inequality being a by-product of state formation in an archeological panel covering Southern Iraq between 3900 and 1900 BCE. We implement a difference-in-differences design that compares areas that became part of a state in the first half of the 3rd millennium, during the first phase of substantial state expansion, with the rest of the a rea. State formation led to a persistent increase in socio-economic inequality over the following millennium in the form of labor specialization, income inequality and slavery. Early states protected trade and property rights, which led to the early increase in income inequality which then crystallized into persistent socioeconomic differences as captured by slavery.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

