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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271216</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/334461" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336962" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338893" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339987" />
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    <dc:date>2026-04-28T15:29:37Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/334461">
    <title>An experimental study of a continuous Japanese-English auction for the wallet game</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/334461</link>
    <description>Title: An experimental study of a continuous Japanese-English auction for the wallet game
Authors: Georgalos, Konstantinos; Gonçalves, Ricardo; Ray, Indrajit; SenGupta, Sonali
Abstract: This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value 'wallet game'. The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour: instead of bidding according to the Nash equilibrium, subjects appear to rely on expected value (EV) bidding. As a consequence, observed auction prices are higher than the theoretical benchmark, and the winner's curse occurs in a substantial fraction of auctions. We analyse bidding behaviour in detail and discuss the implications of our findings.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336962">
    <title>The Un'Healthy' Gaps: Evidence on Gendered Faultlines in Digital Healthcare Services</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336962</link>
    <description>Title: The Un'Healthy' Gaps: Evidence on Gendered Faultlines in Digital Healthcare Services
Authors: Brahma, Dweepobotee; Sangwan, Nikita
Abstract: We study whether digital platforms for high-skilled professionals level the playing field or reproduce traditional gender inequalities. Using high-frequency data on physicians, we examine gender differences in labor supply, pricing, patient engagement, and platform visibility. Although the platform equalizes supply-side margins of working hours and fees, female physicians experience lower demand, reduced search visibility, and lower reputation metrics. Investigating the underlying mechanisms, experimental evidence indicates taste-based discrimination, while text-analysis of patient reviews finds no gender differential. These findings underscore the potential role of platforms in reducing institutional constraints but not demand-side biases, with reputation metrics playing a crucial mitigation role.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338893">
    <title>Experimental School Choice with Parents</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338893</link>
    <description>Title: Experimental School Choice with Parents
Authors: Freer, Mikhail; Klein, Thilo; Ortega, Josué
Abstract: We conduct the first laboratory school choice experiment in which parents - the relevant decision makers in the field - are the experimental subjects.We compare Deferred Acceptance (DA) with two manipulable but potentially more efficient alternatives: Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) and the Rank-Minimizing mechanism (RM). We find that all mechanisms are frequently manipulated, with no significant differences in truth-telling rates. Parents and students manipulate at similar rates, supporting the external validity of student-based experiments, though students make significantly more obvious errors, suggesting parents' deviations are more deliberate. Despite widespread manipulation, the predicted welfare-stability tradeoff largely survives: DA never produces Pareto-efficient allocations yet generates little justified envy; whereas RM delivers substantial efficiency gains at a meaningful stability cost. EADA occupies a middle ground: its efficiency gains over DA are modest and imprecisely estimated yet double justified envy. Higher cognitive ability is associated with more deviations, and under EADA with worse outcomes. While DA does not induce truth-telling, it is the only mechanism in which manipulation never pays off and rarely changes outcomes.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339987">
    <title>Justifiable Priority Violations</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339987</link>
    <description>Title: Justifiable Priority Violations
Authors: Ortega, Josué; Arribillaga, R. Pablo
Abstract: Addressing the large inefficiencies generated by the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism requires priority violations, but which ones are justifiable? The leading approach is to ask individuals if they consent to waive their priority ex-ante. We develop an alternative question-free solution, in which a priority violation is justifiable whenever the affected student either (i) directly benefits from the improvement, or (ii) is unimprovable under any assignment that Pareto-dominates DA. This endogenous justifiability criterion permits improvements unattainable by the leading consent-based mechanism under any consent structure. We provide a "just below cutoffs" mechanism that always finds a strongly justifiable matching whenever DA's outcome is inefficient, and build on it to construct a polynomial-time algorithm that expands justifiable improvements iteratively, converging to a DA improvement that cannot be Pareto-improved by any justifiable matching without strictly expanding the beneficiary set. Finally, we prove theoretically that both the ex-ante consent and the endogenous justifiability frameworks have important limitations in reaching Pareto-efficient outcomes, and use simulations to quantify how binding these constraints are in practice.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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