https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25 Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association 2026-11-13T20:30:48Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/277606.2 Title: Executive Compensation and Secured Debt: Evidence from REITs Authors: Li, Ying; Li, Lingxiao; Zhu, Bing Abstract: This paper explores the impact of executive compensation structure on firm debt choices. To analyze the relationship between executive compensation and firm debt structure via the managerial effort channel, we extend the theoretical model developed by Boot et al. (1991) by incorporating an agent-principal model. We employ data from US Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to empirically assess the model's implications. The evidence presented in this study reveals that when executive compensation exhibits a higher sensitivity to the firm's stock price (represented by a higher Delta), the firm tends to use a greater proportion of secured debt within its overall debt structure. This phenomenon can be attributed to the managerial effort channel: firms with higher Delta values tend to engage in investments that are more effort-sensitive, and these investment choices are positively associated with increased utilization of secured debt, where the collateral plays the role of incentivizing the manager to put more effort into projects - an "effort-lifting" behavior. These findings hold for an expanded sample consisting of firms from all industries. Our analysis offers a fresh perspective on the use of collateral and executive compensation as a tool to mitigate principal-agent problems. 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339550 Title: Consumer consent regulation Authors: Strausz, Roland Abstract: Consumer consent regulation is the cornerstone of modern data privacy regulation such as the European GDPR and the Californian CCPA. By ensuring that consumers can reject any harmful data collection, the regulation seems an effective tool for protecting consumers against price discrimination. By contrast, I provide the insight that consent regulation alone is ineffective because it provides firms with the loophole to commit to unattractive offers to dissenting consumers. Effective consent regulation therefore requires an explicit regulation of the firm's dissent offer. This is informationally demanding; regulation that merely insists on "reasonable" (sequential rational) offers is ineffective. 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339549 Title: Dividend policy: An empirical analysis for imperial Germany Authors: Burhop, Carsten; Selgert, Felix Abstract: In the German Empire, corporations almost always paid a dividend to their shareholders. Dividends have been cut or increased in line with the development of profits. We demonstrate that the target dividend and the average dividend tended to be nearly the same. If the dividend paid deviated from the target, we measure an extraordinarily fast return towards the target. Our analysis of the change in dividends, the payout ratio, and the dynamics of the dividend level provides evidence in favour of the agency theory of dividend policy. Companies with good investment opportunities paid comparatively high dividends. An improvement in shareholder protection weakened this effect. Best practice voting rights at the company level have systematically influenced dividend levels, the relevance of investment opportunities for the dividend policy and the speed of adjustment after a deviation from the target. 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339551 Title: Are taxes or user-fees more popular among politicians? The case of childcare Authors: Breyer, Friedrich; Sterba, Maj-Britt Abstract: How shall publicly provided excludable goods be financed - by general taxation or user fees? The general conclusion of the existing literature is that exclusive tax financing is neither efficient nor desirable under widely shared distributive goals. A striking example is childcare because here fees are often made dependent on parents' income. Given the rather clear arguments in favor of user fees for formal childcare, it is surprising to notice that some German states with leftist governments have abolished user fees and replaced them with pure tax financing. It is the purpose of this research to investigate the attitudes of politicians towards user fees for publicly funded childcare and to explore the justifications given for these attitudes. We do so by directly surveying members of eight federal state legislatures. The survey results confirm the experience of real political decisions in that left-leaning politicians tend to oppose parental fees. They do so mainly with the justification that "education must be free for all". Right-leaning politicians tend to support fees for various reasons. We discuss how these results can be reconciled with the redistributive goals of leftist parties. 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z