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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268858" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268870" />
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    <dc:date>2026-10-24T17:04:09Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268858">
    <title>From contractors to investors? Evolving engagement of Chinese state capital in global infrastructure development and the case of Lekki Port in Nigeria</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268858</link>
    <description>Title: From contractors to investors? Evolving engagement of Chinese state capital in global infrastructure development and the case of Lekki Port in Nigeria
Authors: Zhang, Hong
Abstract: This paper introduces and critically analyzes an emerging form of global infrastructure development by China's infrastructure construction companies, known as "integrated investment, construction, and operation" (IICO). This model has been promoted by the Chinese infrastructure industry, financial institutions, and policymakers in recent years, as a response to the moral hazard problems exposed in the past sovereign loan-based infrastructure engagements, the industry's need to upgrade, and the global rise of PublicPrivate Partnerships. IICO can be understood as a form of market-seeking foreign direct investment. Compared to past forms of globalization of Chinese state capital, it has a much more complicated risk profile and less clear pay-off. While Chinese state capital actors are not yet well equipped to manage such new risks, they have been driven to make such attempts by the political pressure to become globally leading firms. A case study of Lekki Port in Nigeria serves to illustrate the challenges in the transition toward IICO. This paper calls for continued attention to this emerging form of Chinese state capital's engagement in global infrastructure development, especially on how risks are managed and the implications for the relationships between Chinese actors and host country stakeholders.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268870">
    <title>From contractors to investors? Evolving engagement of Chinese state capital in global infrastructure development and the case of the Lekki Port in Nigeria</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268870</link>
    <description>Title: From contractors to investors? Evolving engagement of Chinese state capital in global infrastructure development and the case of the Lekki Port in Nigeria
Authors: Zhang, Hong
Abstract: Chinese companies have been seeking to climb up the value chain by becoming investors and operators of the infrastructure projects they are contracted to build. Despite their prominent market share in Africa as contractors, Chinese companies face a steep learning curve and have sought to work with other international actors from advanced economies. The industry's willingness to upgrade can harness a move away from China's lending practice that is overly reliant on sovereign loans. Host governments need to be realistic about the capabilities of Chinese companies as investors and operators, and push for localization and skill transfer.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290359">
    <title>Integrating China into multilateral debt relief: Progress and problems in the G20 DSSI</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290359</link>
    <description>Title: Integrating China into multilateral debt relief: Progress and problems in the G20 DSSI
Authors: Bräutigam, Deborah A.; Huang, Yufan
Abstract: On March 25, 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the world, the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank proposed that the leaders of the world's 20 largest economies, the Group of 20 (G20), provide breathing space by suspending the collection of debt service on official loans to 73 of the world's poorest countries. The G20 quickly launched the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) on April 15, 2020. The DSSI was the first big test of the G20's global economic coordination leadership regarding low and middle-income country sovereign debt. The changing pattern of global credit demanded a new architecture for solving debt crises. Since 2008, the G20 has been the premier forum for international economic coordination, but the G20 had not previously worked with the Paris Club. The DSSI was intended by some of its designers to bring China into a well-oiled system for global sovereign debt governance, with the Common Framework as the scaffold upon which a new architecture would be built. Through analysis of available data, process-tracing through over 100 interviews with G20 participants and borrowers, and case studies, we argue, with some caveats, that China fulfilled its role fairly well as a responsible G20 stakeholder implementing the DSSI.</description>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271579">
    <title>Integrating China into multilateral debt relief: Progress and problems in the G20 DSSI</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271579</link>
    <description>Title: Integrating China into multilateral debt relief: Progress and problems in the G20 DSSI
Authors: Bräutigam, Deborah A.; Huang, Yufan
Abstract: This paper provides an evaluation of China's participation in the G20's COVID-19 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). Through analysis of available data, more than 100 interviews, and fieldwork in Angola, Kenya, and Zambia, we argue, with some caveats, that the DSSI was a success.  First, the existing architecture for sovereign debt relief was badly in need of reform. The old system was based on the G7 negotiating rules for relief, which were carried out by the informal Paris Club and the IMF. With the G20 emerging as the premier forum for global economic coordination, and the rise of major new creditors like China and bondholders, new institutions, and new rules, were in order. The DSSI succeeded in providing a pathway for China, the world's largest bilateral creditor, to negotiate debt treatments together with the Paris Club in the context of IMF balance of payments assistance. Getting Chinese commitment to join was 'miraculous' as one G20 participant put it. Yet much remains to be done.  Second, China fulfilled its role fairly well as a responsible G20 stakeholder implementing the DSSI in the challenging circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the 46 countries that participated in the DSSI, Chinese creditors accounted for 30 percent of all claims, and contributed 63 percent of debt service suspensions. The perception that other creditors - private and multilateral banks -- were free-riding on Chinese suspensions reinforced Chinese banks' later resistance to providing debt reductions in the Common Framework. On the other hand, Chinese disbursements dropped significantly in countries requesting DSSI relief, but remained steady for other creditors. The terms of the moratorium did not include instructions on how creditors should act in a situation that closely resembled a default.  Third, the DSSI prompted China and other G20 creditors to take steps to classify their banks into 'official' and 'commercial' categories, a necessary distinction for member countries participating in the IMF's financing assurances requirement. It pushed the Chinese government to align interests among fragmented banks and bureaucracies with conflicting goals. It started an internal learning process about how debt restructuring has been done historically, and how China might safeguard its interests by participating with others in a multilateral forum.  Finally, geopolitical tensions affected negotiations over debt relief and allowed Chinese stakeholders facing losses to argue that pressure from the United States was an effort to "take advantage of China".</description>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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