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    <title>EconStor Community:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/334460" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296467.3" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305221.2" />
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    <dc:date>2026-10-16T23:55:13Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/334460">
    <title>Inflation and Public Support for the Euro</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/334460</link>
    <description>Title: Inflation and Public Support for the Euro
Authors: Roth, Felix
Abstract: The paper finds that the post-pandemic inflation surge and subsequent decline from 2021 to 2024 had no significant impact on public support for the Euro for the EA-19 and for most individual member states of the EA-19. From 2021 to 2024, net public support for the euro remained remarkably stable and reached historically high values across the EA-19. Perceptions of inflation in the national and personal economic situation had no significant effect on public support for the euro during the post-pandemic inflation surge and subsequent decline from 2021 to 2023. These findings contrast with those for the before-crisis and crisis periods, in which inflation and inflation perceptions had a significant negative impact on public support for the euro. Similar to public support for the euro, trust in the institutions that govern the Euro was also not affected by the post-pandemic inflation surge.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296467.3">
    <title>Evolution and Determinants of Generalized Trust – The Global Evidence over 41 Years</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296467.3</link>
    <description>Title: Evolution and Determinants of Generalized Trust – The Global Evidence over 41 Years
Authors: Roth, Felix
Abstract: By constructing a unique international database on generalized trust covering 142 countries worldwide for 41 years from 1980 to 2020, this paper finds a pronounced intertemporal variation of generalized trust over time in a majority of countries across the globe. When analyzing the time series patterns over the last four decades, a divergence in generalized trust between OECD and non-OECD economies is found. While the OECD economies saw an increase in generalized trust, the non-OECD economies faced a decline. European Coordinated Market Economies drive the increase in trust in OECD economies. Their increase in trust is driven by rising income, higher college graduation rates, and an ageing society. Asian and African economies drive the decline in non-OECD economies. Their decline in trust is driven by a rejuvenating society and country-specific shocks, such as the autocratization of the political system or severe famine. The decline in trust in those countries is responsible for the overall global decline.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305221.2">
    <title>Trust and Growth: The Global Evidence over 40 Years</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305221.2</link>
    <description>Title: Trust and Growth: The Global Evidence over 40 Years
Authors: Roth, Felix
Abstract: This paper analyzes the intertemporal variation of trust on economic growth. Constructing a unique global country panel dataset and applying a system-generalized method of moments (SYSGMM) estimation approach to a sample of 75 global economies over a 40-year time span (1980-2019), this paper finds evidence of a curvilinear (inverted U-shape) relationship between trust and growth.3 Only a minority of global economies can attain a position close to or above the optimum threshold for trust and growth. Most economies, in fact, fall well below that threshold, and for them, it is incumbent to consider trust-building measures in order to achieve higher growth. In countries that are close to the optimum threshold, however, such policies can likely be neglected. In fact, in countries where trust levels exceed the optimum, an increase in trust might even hamper growth.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340063">
    <title>International Sanctions and Corruption</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340063</link>
    <description>Title: International Sanctions and Corruption
Authors: Gutmann, Jerg; Langer, Pascal; Neuenkirch, Matthias
Abstract: A major concern about the imposition of international sanctions is that they may permanently deteriorate the quality of institutions in target countries, potentially causing an increase in corruption. While case studies suggest that this is frequently the case, systematic evidence is so far missing. We provide the first cross-country statistical analysis of the impact of sanctions on public-sector corruption. Using a panel difference-in-differences model and an event study approach, we analyze sanctions against 125 countries from 1971 to 2019. Our results show that Western (and UN) sanctions cause a significant decline of corruption in democracies, while non-Western sanctions and those targeting autocracies have no systematic impact. Event study estimates time the reductions in corruption at about three to four years into the sanctions episode. They persist throughout the sanctions period, but once sanctions are lifted, corruption levels revert to their pre-treatment baseline, indicating that the corruption-reducing effect is limited to the duration of the sanctions episode. Further analysis reveals that the effect is stronger when sanctions explicitly target democratization or human rights improvements.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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