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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/123500</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175273" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/173265" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/173266" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/172333" />
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    <dc:date>2026-04-28T10:22:09Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175273">
    <title>Varieties of risk elicitation</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175273</link>
    <description>Title: Varieties of risk elicitation
Authors: Friedman, Daniel; Habib, Sameh; James, Duncan; Crockett, Sean
Abstract: We explore a variety of risk preference elicitation procedures that involve direct choice from a set of lotteries, including budget lines (BL) and binary choice lists (HL). We find statistically significant violations of the expected utility hypothesis (EUH) consistent with disappointment aversion, and also find violations of first order stochastic dominance, but both sorts of violations are mostly small and only slightly impair the predictive power of a parametric implementation of EUH. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion, gamma, varies widely across individual subjects (consistent with EUH) and also across elicitation tasks (inconsistent with direct implementation of EUH). An alternative nonparametric measure of risk preferences displays similar patterns. The two risk preference measures are highly correlated with each other for each elicitation task. Each separate measure varies widely across individual subjects and across elicitation tasks, with low to nil correlation between BL tasks and HL tasks. Some of the variation across tasks can be explained by attributes such as graphical vs text representation that have no role in decision theory.</description>
    <dc:date>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/173265">
    <title>Order protection through delayed messaging</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/173265</link>
    <description>Title: Order protection through delayed messaging
Authors: Aldrich, Eric M.; Friedman, Daniel
Abstract: Several financial exchanges have recently introduced messaging delays (e.g., a 350 microsecond delay at IEX and NYSE American) intended to protect ordinary investors from high-frequency traders who exploit stale orders. We propose an equilibrium model of this exchange design as a modification of the standard continuous double auction market format. The model predicts that a messaging delay will generally improve price efficiency and lower transactions cost but will increase queuing costs. Some of the predictions are testable in the field or in a laboratory environment.</description>
    <dc:date>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/173266">
    <title>Economic recommendation based on pareto efficient resource allocation</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/173266</link>
    <description>Title: Economic recommendation based on pareto efficient resource allocation
Authors: Zhang, Yongfeng; Zhang, Yi; Friedman, Daniel
Abstract: A fundamentally important role of the Web economy is Online Resource Allocation (ORA) from producers to consumers, such as product allocation in E-commerce, job allocation in freelancing platforms, and driver resource allocation in P2P riding services. Since users have the freedom to choose, such allocations are not provided in a forced manner, but usually in forms of personalized recommendation, where users have the right to refuse. Current recommendation approaches mostly provide allocations to match the preference of each individual user, instead of treating the Web application as a whole economic system where users therein are mutually correlated on the allocations. This lack of global view leads to Pareto inefficiency, i.e., we can actually improve the recommendations by bettering some users while not hurting the others, and it means that the system did not achieve its best possible allocation. This problem is especially severe when the total amount of each resource is limited, so that its allocation to one (set of) user means that other users are left out. In this paper, we propose Pareto Efficient Economic Recommendation (PEER) - that the system provides the best possible (i.e., Pareto optimal) recommendations, where no user can gain further benefits without hurting the others. To this end, we propose a Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) framework to maximize the surplus of each user simultaneously, and provide recommendations based on the resulting Pareto optima. To benefit the many existing recommendation algorithms, we further propose a Pareto Improvement Process (PIP) to turn their recommendations into Pareto efficient ones. Experiments on real-world datasets verify that PIP improves existing algorithms on recommendation performance and consumer surplus, while the direct PEER approach gains the best performance on both aspects.</description>
    <dc:date>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/172333">
    <title>Aggregation and convergence in experimental general equilibrium economies constructed from naturally occurring preferences</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/172333</link>
    <description>Title: Aggregation and convergence in experimental general equilibrium economies constructed from naturally occurring preferences
Authors: Crockett, Sean; Friedman, Daniel; Oprea, Ryan
Abstract: Prior laboratory experiments have studied general equilibrium economies constructed from "induced preferences" for artificial goods. We introduce new methods that allow us to study economies constructed instead from subjects' actual, "homegrown" preferences. Our subjects reveal their preferences by choosing portfolios of Arrow securities from budget lines through fixed endowments for a series of prices. We then construct several different economies by sorting subjects according to their revealed preferences. The constructed economies exhibit a wide range of predicted outcomes, where predictions are competitive general equilibria given the revealed preferences. Perhaps surprisingly, in every one of our markets the predicted excess demand is well-behaved, and avoids the pathologies highlighted in the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem. (The main reason seems to be heterogeneity in revealed preferences.) Actual trade in the constructed economies using a tatonnement market institution closely tracks predictions in most markets. The exceptions occur in economies with severe wealth effects that generate excess demands that are flat relative to measured preference volatility.</description>
    <dc:date>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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