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    <title>EconStor Community:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/118</link>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335903" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335904" />
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    <dc:date>2026-10-24T21:58:45Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335903">
    <title>Stablecoins as private money: A policy agenda</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335903</link>
    <description>Title: Stablecoins as private money: A policy agenda
Authors: Gersbach, Hans; van Buggenum, Hugo; Zelzner, Sebastian
Abstract: Stablecoins are rapidly expanding as money-like assets for payments, trading, settlement, and cross-border transfer. In response, policymakers are moving quickly to develop new regulatory frameworks to safeguard the monetary and financial system. This article develops a forward-looking, research-based policy agenda for stablecoins, drawing on monetary theory, recent market developments (including stress events), our own analytical framework, and the broader academic literature. In our view, a world in which stablecoins reach scale requires a coherent package of measures: tools to preserve financial stability and resilience against liquidity crises; protections for monetary sovereignty and the singleness of money; rules on stablecoin remuneration; constraints on platform market power alongside interoperability requirements; robust financial-integrity rules; and international coordination to limit regulatory arbitrage and close cross-border loopholes such as multi-issuer structures. We also highlight several areas that require further evaluation prior to policy adoption, including whether (and under what conditions) a public liquidity backstop for systemic issuers or central-bank reserve access is warranted, as well as modernization pathways within the traditional monetary system. We benchmark our agenda against the U.S. GENIUS Act and the EU's MiCA and provide a cross-jurisdictional comparison.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335904">
    <title>The response of debtors to rate changes</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335904</link>
    <description>Title: The response of debtors to rate changes
Authors: Fuster, Andreas; Gianinazzi, Virginia; Hackethal, Andreas; Schnorpfeil, Philip; Weber, Michael
Abstract: How borrowers respond to future changes in the interest rate on their debt matters for the transmission of monetary policy and for household financial stability. Combining bank data, a letter RCT, and a survey, we study this question in the context of the German mortgage market, where since 2022 borrowers have faced high interest rates when their rate fixation period ends. We find that borrower actions substantially reduce the impact of higher rates on monthly payments. Survey responses corroborate high informedness and a strong propensity to prepare for rate changes. The letter intervention does not affect rate beliefs but increases awareness of available options and refinancing among borrowers close to expiration of their rate fixation.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337453">
    <title>Central bank independence: An update</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337453</link>
    <description>Title: Central bank independence: An update
Authors: Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.; de Haan, Jakob
Abstract: Central bank independence (CBI) refers to the absence of influence of politicians on monetary policy making. Since we wrote our first surveys of the literature on central bank independence (Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996 and Berger et al., 2001), a lot has changed. The level of CBI has increased considerably in almost all countries, also more recently. According to Romelli (2024), following a slowdown in central bank law reforms between 2010 and 2015, after 2016 reforms led to further increases in independence in 35 cases, while it declined in only 7 cases. However, Garriga (2025) argues that although there is a global tendency towards more CBI, there is significant variance across and within regions, including numerous reforms reducing CBI in the past two decades.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336755">
    <title>Tax incentives, portfolio choice, and macroprudential risks</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336755</link>
    <description>Title: Tax incentives, portfolio choice, and macroprudential risks
Authors: Brenzel-Weiss, Janosch; Koeniger, Winfried; Valladares-Esteban, Arnau
Abstract: We calibrate a lifecycle portfolio-choice model of homeowners facing uninsurable income risk to show that tax deductions for mortgage interest payments and voluntary pension contributions have sizable effects on household portfolios and macroprudential risks. The deductions reduce the after-tax cost of debt and increase the after-tax return of pension savings so that the mortgage incidence increases and portfolios shift from home equity and liquid assets towards pension savings. Because the consumption responses to a house-price decline are heterogeneous, the distribution of household debt shapes the quantitative effect of the tax deductions on the homeowners' resilience after a house price bust.</description>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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