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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93736" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93736</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T11:25:34Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T11:25:34Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>A theory of Crowdfunding: A mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/157304" />
    <author>
      <name>Strausz, Roland</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/157304</id>
    <updated>2023-11-02T02:29:43Z</updated>
    <published>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: A theory of Crowdfunding: A mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard
Authors: Strausz, Roland
Abstract: Crowdfunding provides the innovation that, before the investment, entrepreneurs contract with consumers. Under demand uncertainty, this improves a screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this benefit. Focusing on the trade-off between value screening and moral hazard, the paper characterizes optimal mechanisms. Current crowdfunding schemes reflect their salient features. Efficiency is sustainable only if returns exceed investment costs by a margin reflecting the degree of moral hazard. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment. Crowdfunding blurs the distinction between finance and marketing, but complements rather than substitutes traditional entrepreneurial financing. As a screening tool for valuable projects, crowdfunding unambiguously promotes social welfare.</summary>
    <dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Weak markets, strong teachers: Recession at career start and teacher effectiveness</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121369" />
    <author>
      <name>Nagler, Markus</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Piopiunik, Marc</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>West, Martin R.</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121369</id>
    <updated>2023-11-04T02:55:34Z</updated>
    <published>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Weak markets, strong teachers: Recession at career start and teacher effectiveness
Authors: Nagler, Markus; Piopiunik, Marc; West, Martin R.
Abstract: How do alternative job opportunities affect teacher quality? We provide the first causal evidence on this question by exploiting business cycle conditions at career start as a source of exogenous variation in the outside options of potential teachers. Unlike prior research, we directly assess teacher quality with value-added measures of impacts on student test scores, using administrative data on 33,000 teachers in Florida public schools. Consistent with a Roy model of occupational choice, teachers entering the profession during recessions are significantly more effective in raising student test scores. Results are supported by placebo tests and not driven by differential attrition.</summary>
    <dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Does contingent capital induce excessive risk-taking?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110403" />
    <author>
      <name>Berg, Tobias</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Kaserer, Christoph</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110403</id>
    <updated>2023-11-08T02:04:14Z</updated>
    <published>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Does contingent capital induce excessive risk-taking?
Authors: Berg, Tobias; Kaserer, Christoph
Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the effect of the conversion price of CoCo bonds on equity holders' incentives. First, we use an option-pricing context to show that CoCo bonds can magnify equity holders' incentives to increase the riskiness of assets and decrease incentives to raise new equity in a crisis in cases in which conversion transfers wealth from CoCo bond holders to equity holders. Second, we present a clinical study of the CoCo bonds issued so far. We show that i) almost all existing CoCo bonds are designed in a way that implies a wealth transfer from CoCo bond holders to equity holders at conversion and ii) this contractual design is reflected in traded prices of CoCo bonds. In particular, CoCo bonds are short volatility with a magnitude five times greater than that which can be observed for straight bonds. These results are robust and economically significant. We conclude that the CoCo bonds issued so far can create perverse incentives for banks' equity holders.</summary>
    <dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Who goes first? Strategic delay and learning by waiting</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121384" />
    <author>
      <name>Wagner, Peter</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121384</id>
    <updated>2023-11-19T02:10:53Z</updated>
    <published>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Who goes first? Strategic delay and learning by waiting
Authors: Wagner, Peter
Abstract: This paper considers a "war of attrition" game in which agents learn about an uncertain state of the world through private signals and from their peers. I provide existence and uniqueness results for a class of equilibria that satisfy a "full-participation" condition, and show that asymmetries in the distribution of information can lead to excessive stopping and an oversupply of information relative to the social optimum.</summary>
    <dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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