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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88678" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88678</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T14:09:21Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T14:09:21Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Upward bias in inflation perceptions: Persistence, drivers, implications</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337489" />
    <author>
      <name>Andre, Peter</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Schaffranka, Claudia</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Weber, Michael</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337489</id>
    <updated>2026-03-04T05:45:48Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Upward bias in inflation perceptions: Persistence, drivers, implications
Authors: Andre, Peter; Schaffranka, Claudia; Weber, Michael
Abstract: This paper examines the persistent upward bias in euro area households' inflation perceptions and expectations, even when realized inflation is near the ECB's target. It discusses behavioural and informational drivers of this bias, its implications for consumption, wage setting, and monetary policy transmission, and the challenges it poses for ECB communication and credibility. The study concludes that improved monitoring and household-oriented communication are essential. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 26 February 2026.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Market transparency and dealer behavior: Lessons from MiFID II/MiFIR transparency requirements</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339599" />
    <author>
      <name>Lindner, Vincent</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lucke, Konrad</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Pelizzon, Loriana</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339599</id>
    <updated>2026-04-04T04:07:42Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Market transparency and dealer behavior: Lessons from MiFID II/MiFIR transparency requirements
Authors: Lindner, Vincent; Lucke, Konrad; Pelizzon, Loriana
Abstract: This policy paper examines the effects of the introduction of the MiFID II / MiFIR framework on the transparency regime for sovereign bonds. The main purpose of the framework is to provide markets with real-time information and lower market asymmetries, thereby increasing liquidity in the market. Combining regulatory transaction data from BaFin with MTS limit order book data, we find contrasting results. While mandatory trade reporting had the desired effect in over-the-counter markets, as it narrowed spreads and improved liquidity, the MTS limit order book tells a different story. Once quotes and trades became generally public, dealers reacted by widening spreads and curtailing their quoting agressiveness which ultimately undermined liquidity and deteriorated price discovery. These findings have important consequences for further market integration efforts under the Savings and Investment Union umbrella. Policymakers must carefully consider the unintended consequences of desirable policy outcomes, such as market transparency, and should tailor policy solutions to venue type.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The financial architecture of stablecoins: A primer</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339581" />
    <author>
      <name>Farina, Tatiana</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Franke, Günter</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Heider, Florian</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Krahnen, Jan Pieter</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Subrahmanyam, Marti G.</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339581</id>
    <updated>2026-04-04T04:06:48Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The financial architecture of stablecoins: A primer
Authors: Farina, Tatiana; Franke, Günter; Heider, Florian; Krahnen, Jan Pieter; Subrahmanyam, Marti G.
Abstract: This SAFE White Paper presents a structured economic framework for assessing asset-backed stablecoins in their capacity as privately issued, fiscally anchored monetary instruments. Specifically, we evaluate the implications of stablecoins for financial intermediation, sovereign debt markets, and monetary transmission while devoting particular attention to differences between the United States and European Union. To this end, we characterize the basic economics of stablecoins by comparing their balance-sheet structure to narrow banks, money market funds, commercial banks, and central banks, highlighting that issuers engage in minimal maturity transformation and hold predominantly high-quality liquid assets against par-redeemable digital liabilities. Furthermore, we examine the regulatory design of the US GENIUS Act and the EU's MiCAR framework, showing how differences in reserve composition and supervisory architecture shape incentives for regulatory arbitrage and influence whether stablecoin growth reallocates existing sovereign debt holdings or generates net additional demand. For the euro area, the central question is whether digital liquidity remains anchored in domestic sovereign assets or shifts toward foreign-currency stablecoins, with implications for monetary sovereignty and financial stability. We conclude that Europe requires an active response: advancing a digital euro, strengthening global supervisory coordination, and reinforcing cross-border AML enforcement in public blockchain environments to safeguard monetary sovereignty and financial stability.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Assessing real estate risks and vulnerabilities: Hidden cracks in the financial system?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319064" />
    <author>
      <name>Berg, Tobias</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Haselmann, Rainer</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319064</id>
    <updated>2025-09-24T13:23:23Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Assessing real estate risks and vulnerabilities: Hidden cracks in the financial system?
Authors: Berg, Tobias; Haselmann, Rainer
Abstract: The European financial system faces significant risks from excessive bank lending to the real estate sector. Historical trends show a strong link between real estate credit booms and banking crises. Current data indicate that real estate loans constitute a substantial share of banks' corporate loan portfolios, with varying risk levels across countries. Key drivers include expansionary ECB policies and regulatory incentives favouring mortgage lending. Strengthening oversight, improving data collection, and adjusting regulations are essential for financial stability. This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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