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  <title>EconStor Community:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88191" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88191</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T11:39:18Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T11:39:18Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Oil price shocks, monetary policy and current account imbalances within a currency union</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206879" />
    <author>
      <name>Baas, Timo</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Belke, Ansgar</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206879</id>
    <updated>2023-11-10T02:25:17Z</updated>
    <published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Oil price shocks, monetary policy and current account imbalances within a currency union
Authors: Baas, Timo; Belke, Ansgar
Abstract: For more than two decades now, current-account imbalances are a crucial issue in the international policy debate as they threaten the stability of the world economy. More recently, the government debt crisis of the European Union shows that internal current account imbalances inside a currency union may also add to these risks. Oil price fluctuations and a contracting monetary policy that reacts on oil prices, previously discussed to affect the current account may also be a threat to the currency union by changing internal imbalances. Therefore, in this paper, we analyze the impact of oil price shocks on current account imbalances within a currency union. Differences in institutions, especially labor market institutions and trade result in an asymmetric reaction to an otherwise symmetric shock. In this context, we show that oil price shocks can have a long-lasting impact on internal balances, as the exchange rate adjustment mechanism is not available. The common monetary policy authority, however, can reduce such effects by specifying an optimum monetary policy target. Nevertheless, we also show that there is no single best solution. CPI, core CPI or an asymmetric CPI target all come at a cost either regarding an increase in unemployment or increasing imbalances.</summary>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Trade and capital flows: Substitutes or complements? An empirical investigation</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206880" />
    <author>
      <name>Belke, Ansgar</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Domnick, Clemens</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206880</id>
    <updated>2023-11-12T02:19:32Z</updated>
    <published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Trade and capital flows: Substitutes or complements? An empirical investigation
Authors: Belke, Ansgar; Domnick, Clemens
Abstract: This paper examines the linkages between the trade of goods and financial assets. Do both flows behave as complements (implying a positive correlation) or as substitutes (negative correlation)? Although a classic topic in international macroeconomics, the empirical evidence has remained relatively scarce so far, in particular for the Euro area where trade and financial imbalance played a prominent role in the build-up of the European sovereign debt crisis. Consequentially, we use a novel dataset, providing estimates for financial flows and its four main categories for 42 countries and covering the period from 2002-2012, to test the so-called trade-finance nexus. Since theoretical models stress that both flows might be influencing each other simultaneously, we introduce a novel time-varying instrumental variable based on capital control restrictions to estimate a causal effect. The results of the gravity regressions support theories that underline the complementarity between exports and capital flows. When testing the trade-finance nexus for different types of capital flows, the estimated coefficient is most pronounced for foreign direct investment, in line with theories stressing informational frictions. Robustness checks in the form of different estimation methods, alternative proxies for capital flows and sample splits confirm the positive relationship. Interestingly, the trade-finance nexus does not differ among countries belonging to the EMU, the European Union or among core and peripheral Euro area countries.</summary>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The yen exchange rate and the hollowing out of the Japanese industry</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206884" />
    <author>
      <name>Belke, Ansgar</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Volz, Ulrich</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206884</id>
    <updated>2023-11-13T02:44:35Z</updated>
    <published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The yen exchange rate and the hollowing out of the Japanese industry
Authors: Belke, Ansgar; Volz, Ulrich
Abstract: Since the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the yen has seen several episodes of strong appreciation, including in the late 1970s, after the 1985 Plaza Agreement, the early and late 1990s and after 2008. These appreciations have not only been associated with "expensive yen recessions" resulting from negative effects on exports; since the late 1980s, the strong yen has also raised concerns about a de-industrialisation of the Japanese economy. Against this backdrop, the paper investigates the effects of changes to the yen exchange rate on the hollowing out of the Japanese industrial sector. To this end, the paper uses both aggregate and industry-specific data to gauge the effects of yen fluctuations on the output and exports of different Japanese industries, exploiting new data for industry-specific real effective exchange rates. Our findings support the view that the periods of yen appreciation had more than just transitory effects on Japanese manufacturing. The results also provide indication of hysteresis effects on manufacturing. While there are certainly also other factors that have contributed to a hollowing out of Japanese industry, a strong yen played a role, too</summary>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>QE in the euro area: Has the PSPP benefited peripheral bonds?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206877" />
    <author>
      <name>Belke, Ansgar</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Gros, Daniel</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206877</id>
    <updated>2023-11-12T02:21:18Z</updated>
    <published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: QE in the euro area: Has the PSPP benefited peripheral bonds?
Authors: Belke, Ansgar; Gros, Daniel
Abstract: The asset purchase program of the Euro area, active between 2015 and 2018, constitutes an interesting special case of Quantitative Easing (QE) because the ECB's (Public Sector Purchase Program) PSPP program involved the purchase of the bonds of peripheral Euro area governments, which were clearly not riskless. Moreover, these purchases were undertaken by national central banks at their own risk. Intuition suggests, and a simple model confirms, that, ceteris paribus, large purchases of the bonds of the own sovereign by the national central bank should increase the risk for the remaining private bond holders. This might seem incompatible with the observation that risk spreads on peripheral bonds fell when the Euro area's QE was announced. However, the initial fall in risk premia might have been due to the expectation of the bond being effective in lowering risk free rates. When these expectations were disappointed risk premia went back to their initial level. Formal statistical test confirm that indeed risk premia on peripheral bonds did not follow a random walk (contrary to what is assumed in event studies). Nor did the announcements of bond buying change the stochastics of these premia. One should thus not expect the impact effect to have been permanent.</summary>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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