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  <title>EconStor Collection: IfW</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/8" />
  <subtitle>IfW</subtitle>
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/8</id>
  <updated>2026-11-15T08:31:41Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-11-15T08:31:41Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Europe steps up: Ukraine support after four years of war</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336813" />
    <author>
      <name>Trebesch, Christoph</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Nishikawa, Taro</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336813</id>
    <updated>2026-02-19T04:54:29Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Europe steps up: Ukraine support after four years of war
Authors: Trebesch, Christoph; Nishikawa, Taro
Abstract: · This brief provides a big-picture overview of support for Ukraine after four years of war. The key finding from 2025 is that Europe has almost offset the collapse in US support. · US aid fell by 99 percent. At the same time, Europe sharply increased its aid allocations, by 59 percent for financial and humanitarian aid and by 67 percent for military aid compared to the 2022-24 average. As a result, total aid in 2025 remained close to previous years. · Within Europe, financial and humanitarian aid is now dominated by EU institutions, as EU loans and grants account for 89 percent of these flows in 2025. Military aid is ever more concentrated on a few countries. Northern and Western Europe accounted for about 95 percent, in particular Scandinavia, Germany, the United Kingdom. In contrast, the military aid from Southern and Eastern Europe continued to fall. · To help replace US support, NATO launched the PURL initiative, through which donors purchased US weapons for Ukraine worth EUR 3.7 billion in 2025, including HIMARS and Patriot systems. Donors also increasingly procured weapons directly from Ukraine's defense industry. The share of procurement in Ukraine reached 22 percent in late 2025.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Development perspectives of STRING: How to form a thriving, sustainable and resilient megaregion</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336790" />
    <author>
      <name>Gold, Robert</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Schrader, Klaus</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336790</id>
    <updated>2026-02-19T04:58:37Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Development perspectives of STRING: How to form a thriving, sustainable and resilient megaregion
Authors: Gold, Robert; Schrader, Klaus
Abstract: STRING (South Western Baltic Sea Transregional Region - Implementing New Geography) is a regional cooperation of urban centers and regions in the Nordic countries and Northern Germany. The study shows that the member countries of STRING have developed dynamically over the last decades, both economically and institutionally. Economic growth has been driven by the urban agglomerations, but the less densely populated areas have benefitted as well. Altogether, STRING seems on a stable growth trajectory. The analyses suggest that STRING may well be on the way to integrating into a mega-region in the sense of theory. However, national borders still provide significant obstacles to economic exchange within the STRING region. The authors observe that the STRING organization provides a suitable institutional framework for mitigating administrative barriers to economic exchange by improving coordination between the local and regional decisionmakers. Still, they conclude that the heterogenous membership structure of STRING may complicate its further integration, due to differing interests, competencies, and resources. Based on their findings, they suggest a two-sided approach: On the one hand, strengthening the mandate of the STRING Secretariat as an agency in policy areas of universal interest, specifically vis-à-vis national governments and the European Union. On the other hand, allowing for optionality in the members' involvement in cooperative projects.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The EU-India trade deal: Strategic diversification in an era of uncertainty</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336759" />
    <author>
      <name>Hinz, Julian</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Langhammer, Rolf J.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Mahlkow, Hendrik</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Thakur, Vasundhara</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336759</id>
    <updated>2026-02-19T04:54:15Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The EU-India trade deal: Strategic diversification in an era of uncertainty
Authors: Hinz, Julian; Langhammer, Rolf J.; Mahlkow, Hendrik; Thakur, Vasundhara
Abstract: • The EU-India FTA generates mutual economic gains of 0.12-0.13% of GDP for both partners, with bilateral trade surging by 41-65%. • Since the 50 percentage points tariffs imposed by the US cost India 1.6% of GDP, the EU-India FTA provides a crucial hedge while the EU demonstrates commitment to open trade amid global protectionism. • The EU-India FTA results in a substantial trade diversion from China (an estimated 5-9%), supporting both EU de-risking objectives and India's supply chain diversification strategy. • The FTA's structural benefits persist regardless of US policy changes making this trade deal a long-term partnership, not a temporary hedge.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>America's own goal: Who pays the tariffs?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336744" />
    <author>
      <name>Hinz, Julian</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lohmann, Aaron</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Mahlkow, Hendrik</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Vorwig, Anna</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336744</id>
    <updated>2026-02-19T04:54:18Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: America's own goal: Who pays the tariffs?
Authors: Hinz, Julian; Lohmann, Aaron; Mahlkow, Hendrik; Vorwig, Anna
Abstract: • The 2025 US tariffs are an own goal: American importers and consumers bear nearly the entire cost. Foreign exporters absorb only about 4% of the tariff burden - the remaining 96% is passed through to US buyers. • Using shipment-level data covering over 25 million transactions valued at nearly $ 4 trillion, we find near-complete pass-through of tariffs to US import prices. • US customs revenue surged by approximately $ 200 billion in 2025 - a tax paid almost entirely by Americans. • Event studies around discrete tariff shocks on Brazil (50%) and India (25-50%) confirm: export prices did not decline. Trade volumes collapsed instead. • Indian export customs data validates our findings: when facing US tariffs, Indian exporters maintained their prices and reduced shipments. They did not "eat" the tariff.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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