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  <title>EconStor Community:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70085" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70085</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T11:20:36Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T11:20:36Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Hayek-Myrdal interactions in the early 1930s: New facts change an old story</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322446" />
    <author>
      <name>Jonung, Lars</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Laidler, David E. W.</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322446</id>
    <updated>2025-09-24T13:21:18Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Hayek-Myrdal interactions in the early 1930s: New facts change an old story
Authors: Jonung, Lars; Laidler, David E. W.
Abstract: It is widely believed that Friedrich von Hayek's first encounter with Gunnar Myrdal involved the latter's last-minute contribution, as a replacement for Erik Lindahl, to a Sammelband edited by the former in 1933, and that Hayek was lukewarm towards Myrdal and his ideas from the very beginning. Correspondence between the two shows that, in fact Myrdal was among Hayek's original invitees, and that their relationship was co-operative and cordial for two years prior to the publication of this collection. We suggest that the content, and perhaps even more, the tone of Myrdal's paper, originally intended for the Journal of Political Economy, alienated Hayek, who nevertheless treated Myrdal's work with academic propriety thereafter. The origin of Myrdal's famous ex post - ex ante terminology is also revealed.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Locally greedy characterizations of interim allocations</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322445" />
    <author>
      <name>Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322445</id>
    <updated>2025-09-24T13:21:46Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Locally greedy characterizations of interim allocations
Authors: Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
Abstract: The received characterizations of feasible interim allocations are mostly in the spirit of Border (1991): Fix a family of sets, each containing some player-types, and test the interim allocation under consideration against all these sets. In the published literature, such Border-like characterizations are known to be valid only in the paramodularity framework, which rules out combinatorial complexities such as matchings. This paper presents a necessity and suciency test for Border-like characterizations with or without paramodularity. It implies that the validity of the characterizations requires that any interim allocation about to become infeasible be locally greedy: that its domain be covered by a family of subsets within each of which the underlying ex post allocation follows some greedy algorithm. I prove impossibility of Border-like characterizations in the knapsack model of sharing economies and prove Border-like characterizations in a matching model that allows each player to have arbitrary numbers of types, and in a ranked-item auction model with a group-specific quota constraint.</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Adverse selection among early adopters and unraveling innovation</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286703" />
    <author>
      <name>McGee, Rory</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286703</id>
    <updated>2024-03-23T02:35:09Z</updated>
    <published>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Adverse selection among early adopters and unraveling innovation
Authors: McGee, Rory
Abstract: I provide an equilibrium analysis of "selection markets": where consumers not only vary in how much they are willing to pay, but also in how much they cost to the seller. The model provides a joint explanation for three empirical phenomena: low uptake of existing products, slow demand for new products, and market inactivity despite unmet demand. I characterize when early adopters are more adversely selected in new markets. This lowers demand, increases costs, and leads markets to unravel prematurely. With endogenous market entry for new products (e.g., reverse mortgages, annuities), extended patents serve as de facto time-varying subsidies.</summary>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The insurance implications of government student loan repayment schemes</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286702" />
    <author>
      <name>Gervais, Martin</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Liu, Qian</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lochner, Lance</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286702</id>
    <updated>2024-03-23T02:32:40Z</updated>
    <published>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The insurance implications of government student loan repayment schemes
Authors: Gervais, Martin; Liu, Qian; Lochner, Lance</summary>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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