<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62598" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62598</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T11:21:01Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T11:21:01Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Diversity and conflict</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/227602" />
    <author>
      <name>Eren Arbath, Cemal</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Ashraf, Quamrul H.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Galor, Oded</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Klemp, Marc</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/227602</id>
    <updated>2023-11-12T02:16:41Z</updated>
    <published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Diversity and conflict
Authors: Eren Arbath, Cemal; Ashraf, Quamrul H.; Galor, Oded; Klemp, Marc
Abstract: This research advances the hypothesis and establishes empirically that interpersonal population diversity, rather than fractionalization or polarization across ethnic groups, has been pivotal to the emergence, prevalence, recurrence, and severity of intrasocietal conflicts. Exploiting an exogenous source of variations in population diversity across nations and ethnic groups, as determined predominantly during the exodus of humans from Africa tens of thousands of years ago, the study demonstrates that population diversity, and its impact on the degree of diversity within ethnic groups, has contributed significantly to the risk and intensity of historical and contemporary civil conflicts. The findings arguably reflect the contribution of population diversity to the non-cohesivnesss of society, as reflected partly in the prevalence of mistrust, the divergence in preferences for public goods and redistributive policies, and the degree of fractionalization and polarization across ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.</summary>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Trust, beliefs and cooperation: An experiment</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202609" />
    <author>
      <name>Kim, Jeongbin</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Putterman, Louis G.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Zhang, Xinyi</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202609</id>
    <updated>2023-11-24T02:34:51Z</updated>
    <published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Trust, beliefs and cooperation: An experiment
Authors: Kim, Jeongbin; Putterman, Louis G.; Zhang, Xinyi
Abstract: We use a two-phase experimental design to study how systematically manipulated beliefs about trust and trustworthiness can promote or deter cooperation. We use decisions in an initially played trust game to create five environments that differ in the information subjects have about the relative trust/trustworthiness of fellow group members when they make a voluntary contribution decision in our experiment's second phase. We find that perceived high trusting environments are treated equivalently to ones of perceived high trustworthiness, with both positively affecting subjects' first-order beliefs about the cooperativeness of group-mates, and in consequence, leading to higher contributions. Our results thus suggest that people cooperate more and hence produce more together in an environment of high trust/trustworthiness, indicating one channel through which trust helps to grow the economic pie.</summary>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The nucleolus, the kernel, and the bargaining set: An update</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202612" />
    <author>
      <name>Iñarra García, Elena</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Serrano, Roberto</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Shimomura, Ken-ichi</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202612</id>
    <updated>2023-11-27T02:43:08Z</updated>
    <published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The nucleolus, the kernel, and the bargaining set: An update
Authors: Iñarra García, Elena; Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, Ken-ichi
Abstract: One of the many important contributions in David Schmeidler's distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set.</summary>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The theory of weak revealed preference</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202613" />
    <author>
      <name>Aguiar, Victor H.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Hjertstrand, Per</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Serrano, Roberto</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202613</id>
    <updated>2023-12-11T03:00:13Z</updated>
    <published>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The theory of weak revealed preference
Authors: Aguiar, Victor H.; Hjertstrand, Per; Serrano, Roberto
Abstract: We offer a rationalization of the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) and of the weak generalized axiom of revealed preference (WGARP) for both finite and infinite data sets of consumer choice. We call it maximin rationalization, in which each pairwise choice is associated with a "local" utility function. We develop its associated weak revealed-preference theory. We show that preference recoverability and welfare analysis à la Varian (1982) may not be informative enough, when the weak axiom holds, but when consumers are not utility maximizers. We clarify the reasons for this failure and provide new informative bounds for the consumer's true preferences.</summary>
    <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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