<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62005" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62005</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T08:50:03Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T08:50:03Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? A nationwide field experiment on Facebook</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283196" />
    <author>
      <name>Adena, Maja</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Hager, Anselm</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283196</id>
    <updated>2024-07-17T01:14:09Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? A nationwide field experiment on Facebook
Authors: Adena, Maja; Hager, Anselm
Abstract: Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? Using the Facebook advertising tool, we implemented a natural field experiment across Germany, randomly assigning almost 8,000 postal codes to Save the Children fundraising videos or to a pure control. We studied changes in the donation revenue and frequency for Save the Children and other charities by postal code. Our georandomized design circumvented many difficulties inherent in studies based on click-through data, especially substitution and measurement issues. We found that (i) video fundraising increased donation revenue and frequency to Save the Children during the campaign and in the subsequent five weeks; (ii) the campaign was profitable for the fundraiser; and (iii) the effects were similar independent of video content and impression assignment strategy. However, we also found some crowding out of donations to other similar charities or projects. Finally, we demonstrated that click data may be an inappropriate proxy for donations and recommend that managers use careful experimental designs that can plausibly evaluate the effects of advertising on relevant outcomes.</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Narrative persuasion</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295066" />
    <author>
      <name>Barron, Kai</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Fries, Tilman</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295066</id>
    <updated>2024-05-24T09:57:40Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Narrative persuasion
Authors: Barron, Kai; Fries, Tilman
Abstract: We study how one person may shape the way another person interprets objective information. They do this by proposing a sense-making explanation (or narrative). Using a theory-driven experiment, we investigate the mechanics of such narrative persuasion. Our results reveal several insights. First, narratives are persuasive: We find that they systematically shift beliefs. Second, narrative fit (coherence with the facts) is a key determinant of persuasiveness. Third, this fit-heuristic is anticipated by narrative-senders, who systematically tailor their narratives to the facts. Fourth, the features of a competing narrative predictably influence both narrative construction and adoption.</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Navigating moral trade-offs</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306849" />
    <author>
      <name>Barron, Kai</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Stüber, Robert</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>van Veldhuizen, Roel</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306849</id>
    <updated>2024-11-29T02:10:51Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Navigating moral trade-offs
Authors: Barron, Kai; Stüber, Robert; van Veldhuizen, Roel
Abstract: An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. However, less is known about the psychological mechanisms that operate when two moral motives come into conflict. We hypothesize that individuals adhere to the moral motive that aligns with their self-interest. We test this hypothesis using experiments that induce a conflict between two of the most-studied moral motives: fairness and truth-telling. Consistent with our hypothesis and across experiments, our results show that individuals do prefer to adhere to the moral motive that is more aligned with their self-interest.</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Rationality is not consistency</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/274074" />
    <author>
      <name>Caliari, Daniele</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/274074</id>
    <updated>2023-12-08T02:42:37Z</updated>
    <published>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Rationality is not consistency
Authors: Caliari, Daniele
Abstract: We challenge the standard definition of economic rationality as consistency by making use of a novel distinction between axioms of decision theory: consistency and preference axioms. We argue that this distinction has been overlooked by the literature and, as a result, evidence that consistency is a proxy of decision-making ability is often based on incorrect identification strategies. We conduct an experiment to investigate the factors that drive violations of consistency alone. While we find no evidence that consistency axioms are a proxy of decisionmaking ability, we provide suggestive evidence that some preference axioms are, confirming their potential role as confounding factors. Overall, our experimental evidence raises doubts about the choice of language that equates consistency with rationality in economics.</summary>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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