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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54350" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54350</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T10:15:29Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T10:15:29Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/68256" />
    <author>
      <name>Dechenaux, Emmanuel</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Kovenock, Dan</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Sheremeta, Roman M.</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/68256</id>
    <updated>2023-11-03T02:01:37Z</updated>
    <published>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Authors: Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman M.
Abstract: Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rankorder tournaments. This survey provides a review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the contest success function, number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review research on sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, and contests between groups, as well as real-effort and field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests to the study of legal systems, political competition, war, conflict avoidance, sales, and charities, and suggest directions for future research.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Alliances in the shadow of conflict</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350" />
    <author>
      <name>Ke, Changxia</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Konrad, Kai A.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Morath, Florian</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350</id>
    <updated>2023-11-20T02:18:23Z</updated>
    <published>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Alliances in the shadow of conflict
Authors: Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
Abstract: Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Contracted government: Unveiling the European Commission's contracted staff</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58348" />
    <author>
      <name>Murdoch, Zuzana</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Trondal, Jarle</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58348</id>
    <updated>2023-11-24T02:48:18Z</updated>
    <published>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Contracted government: Unveiling the European Commission's contracted staff
Authors: Murdoch, Zuzana; Trondal, Jarle
Abstract: Over the past two decades, reliance on short-term contracted staff has increased in government institutions across the Western world. This tendency towards contracted government may be strengthened during periods of economic and financial stress. This article therefore poses the following questions: First, does contracted government lead to civil servants less loyal and attentive to the concerns of their government institutions? Secondly, and more generally, what factors shape the behavioural perceptions of contracted government staff? Benefiting from a new, full-scale survey among seconded national experts in the European Commission, this study shows that contracted Commission staff are largely integrated and committed to the Commission and its administrative sub-units. The general lesson learned is that when under contract, contracted personnel seem mainly loyal and attentive to the concerns of the government institution under which they formally serve. This finding dispels fears that contracted government officials may serve several masters. Theoretically, the behavioural perceptions of contracted Commission officials are explained with reference to their primary organisational affiliation towards the Commission and its sub-units, as well as by the internal organisational composition of the Commission services.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Success and failure in electoral competition: Selective issue emphasis under incomplete issue ownership</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56052" />
    <author>
      <name>Geys, Benny</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56052</id>
    <updated>2023-11-24T09:57:54Z</updated>
    <published>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Success and failure in electoral competition: Selective issue emphasis under incomplete issue ownership
Authors: Geys, Benny
Abstract: Political parties are often argued to compete for voters by stressing issues they feel they own - a strategy known as 'selective emphasis'. While usually seen as an electorally rewarding strategy, this article argues that cultivating your themes in the public debate is not guaranteed to be electorally beneficial and may even become counter-productive. It describes the conditions under which 'selective emphasis' becomes counter-productive, and applies the argument to recent discussions regarding the strategies of mainstream parties confronting the extreme right.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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