<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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  <title>EconStor Community:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47264" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47264</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T14:09:24Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T14:09:24Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Unwillingly informed: The prosocial impact of third-party informers</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311738" />
    <author>
      <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Hua, Tony</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lind, Jo Thori</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Nyborg, Karine</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311738</id>
    <updated>2025-02-22T02:06:06Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Unwillingly informed: The prosocial impact of third-party informers
Authors: Grossman, Zachary; Hua, Tony; Lind, Jo Thori; Nyborg, Karine
Abstract: While people often avoid learning about negative social consequences of their actions in order to behave selfishly, many social situations involve another person who is in a position to impose this information. How does the presence of a potential informer affect information, behavior, and welfare in social decisions with moral wiggle-room? We introduce a third-party informer into the moral wiggle-room game. Almost half of the dictators tried to avoid information only to have it imposed upon them by the informer. These unwillingly-informed dictators frequently revised their behavior to benefit the recipient, even at their own expense. Given an opportunity to reward informers, most dictators chose to do so, but those who had bad news thrust upon them by the informer were more likely to withhold the reward. Interestingly, a subtle change in the choice interface - separating the dictator's ignorance and allocation choices in two separate screens-caused a substantial reduction in the share of dictators choosing ignorance.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The mixed effects of making contribution behaviors observable</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311630" />
    <author>
      <name>Hoven, Noel Z.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Nyborg, Karine</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311630</id>
    <updated>2025-02-22T02:06:00Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The mixed effects of making contribution behaviors observable
Authors: Hoven, Noel Z.; Nyborg, Karine
Abstract: Voluntary contributions to public goods have been shown to increase when contribution behaviors become observable by peers. We examine the effect of social pressure on moral behaviour, using a framework distinguishing explicitly between observable and nonobservable forms of contribution. We show that even with moral motivation and social pressure, there is underprovision of the public good. Making some contribution behaviors observable does increase effort, but also causes misallocation of effort between observable and non-observable effort types. The latter negative effect can possibly outweigh the positive effect of increased effort on public good provision.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Entrepreneurial returns to college</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339018" />
    <author>
      <name>Leuven, Edwin</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Semb, Ingrid Mikkelsen</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339018</id>
    <updated>2026-04-04T08:46:05Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Entrepreneurial returns to college
Authors: Leuven, Edwin; Semb, Ingrid Mikkelsen
Abstract: How does college education shape entrepreneurship? We first document striking differences between college fields in the share of students becoming entrepreneurs. We then leverage quasi-random variation in college admissions near GPA-based thresholds to study the causal impact of the college environment on subsequent entrepreneurship. Exposure to more entrepreneurially intensive college programs, measured as a higher share of entrepreneurs among alumni, substantially increases the probability that a student starts their own business.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The anatomy of mismatch in the college market</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/303262" />
    <author>
      <name>Reiremo, Tore Adam</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/303262</id>
    <updated>2024-10-03T01:10:04Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The anatomy of mismatch in the college market
Authors: Reiremo, Tore Adam
Abstract: Both the availability of college education and the demand for college skills have expanded rapidly over the past decades in most countries. However, it remains an open question whether the increasing number of college-educated workers are able to successfully match with jobs where college skills are rewarded. Using rich Norwegian administrative data, I provide evidence on the evolution of mismatch in the college market. I further decompose the overall college mismatch into (i) a structural mismatch that captures misalignment between underlying demand and supply, (ii) a geographical component, and (iii) a within-location assignment component. Over the past two decades, overall mismatch in the college market has remained relatively stable, affecting about 20% of workers, despite large shifts in both the demand and supply of college workers. I further show that within-location assignment mismatch can account for more than two-thirds of the overall mismatch and its relative contribution has remained relatively unchanged. This evidence points to the vital role of reassignment policies that improve matching in the college market.</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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