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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45499" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45499</id>
  <updated>2026-05-05T23:52:17Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-05-05T23:52:17Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Reinforcing EU merger control against the risks of acquisitions by big tech</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322592" />
    <author>
      <name>Mariniello, Mario</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322592</id>
    <updated>2025-08-01T01:06:29Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Reinforcing EU merger control against the risks of acquisitions by big tech
Authors: Mariniello, Mario
Abstract: Since 2000, online platforms that are now within the scope of the European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA), have bought nearly 700 small, promising companies worldwide. However, only 19 of their attempted acquisitions were notified to the European Commission, the authority exercising merger control over deals with a substantive EU connection. In the other cases, the acquired target's turnover did not meet the conditions for merger notification. These acquisitions have happened in the context of digital markets becoming increasingly concentrated, leading to speculation that concentration levels might have been lower had some of those acquisitions not taken place. The harm that the concentration of market power in a handful of American digital companies may cause is magnified by the current position of the United States, which aims to shield platforms from regulatory enforcement. Acquisitions of small companies may have pro- or anti-competitive effects. Established market players may buy startups to become more competitive or to supply a higher quality product or service, ultimately benefitting final users. Mergers may also incentivise innovation and attract venture capital. However, incumbents might also acquire small companies with strategic, anti-competitive objectives. They might want to stop challengers to their market power from emerging in the future. Or they might acquire small companies to prevent competitors from relying on the target's supply to complement their competing products. Moreover, competition authorities struggle to make accurate predictions about the evolution of competitive dynamics in new and complex markets, such as digital markets. Authorities thus may be unable to take the correct decision, even if the merger is notified. Responding to these issues hinges on amending the DMA. The European Commission should be empowered to scrutinise any acquisition performed by the large platforms within the DMA scope (currently, the DMA requires these platforms to inform the Commission of any intended concentration, but envisages no other action). Moreover, the burden of proving that the merger is not harmful should be shifted to the large platforms. This would leverage market players' knowledge to help increase the accuracy of merger decisions in a highly dynamic and uncertain environment.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Who should be charged? Principles for fair allocation of electricity system costs</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322603" />
    <author>
      <name>Heussaff, Conall</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Jüngling, Eva</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Tagliapietra, Simone</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Zachmann, Georg</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322603</id>
    <updated>2025-08-01T01:06:10Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Who should be charged? Principles for fair allocation of electricity system costs
Authors: Heussaff, Conall; Jüngling, Eva; Tagliapietra, Simone; Zachmann, Georg
Abstract: The high costs in the European Union of supplying electricity can only be structurally reduced through decarbonisation and deeper European electricity system integration. In the short-term, policymakers have few choices. They can redistribute system costs by shifting components from one consumer to another. Another immediate distributional option would be to reduce energy taxation, implicitly shifting costs to the taxpayer. Meanwhile, decision-making processes that translates electricity system costs into final consumer prices are fragmented. Rules on the short-term production, transmission and consumption of electricity are determined at EU level. National regulators and governments determine how the fixed costs of the system are recovered from consumers, while national policymakers also set energy taxes. This Policy Brief sets out options for shifting the fixed costs of the electricity system between consumers, for changing energy taxation to reduce prices and for evaluating systemic trade-offs between system cost and other characteristics, such as sustainability and reliability. We also estimate the quantitative effects of shifting costs between consumers and reducing taxes on electricity. We set out four principles for pricing electricity fairly. Policy interventions in the electricity system should not seek to achieve broader economic objectives at the expense of energy-policy goals. Consumer prices should incentivise efficient system operation. Carbon emissions should be priced in. The fixed costs of the electricity system should be primarily recovered from inelastic consumption. European policymakers should develop transparent analytical tools to assess the distributional effects of electricity-policy interventions. Lessons should be learned from the energy crisis, during which EU and national policies attempted to shield consumers from price impacts, and these lessons should form the basis of ongoing efforts to reduce prices. EU guidelines for electricity cost recovery should be established, following fundamental economic principles, and could form a policy toolbox for national governments to reduce energy prices. Finally, the long-term strategic goal of deeper physical and institutional integration of the European electricity should be pursued to structurally reduce electricity prices.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Europe's energy information problem</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322588" />
    <author>
      <name>McWilliams, Ben</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Tagliapietra, Simone</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Zachmann, Georg</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322588</id>
    <updated>2025-08-01T01:06:13Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Europe's energy information problem
Authors: McWilliams, Ben; Tagliapietra, Simone; Zachmann, Georg
Abstract: Comprehensive information on energy-related topics, such as take-up of heat pumps, industrial natural gas consumption and prices, and battery connections to the electricity grid, is either not available in Europe in a timely manner, or not available at the level of granularity, reliability and consistency needed for informed decision-making. Certain information is simply not collected, while other information is collected but is not comparable or consistent across Europe, or is hard to access. European policy targets, such as greenhouse-gas emission reduction pathways, are evaluated using models for which input assumptions and parameters are not public knowledge. It should be a European Union priority to improve this situation. Doing so will enable better decision-making by policymakers and companies. This is especially relevant when Europe faces the triple challenge of decarbonisation, ensuring security of energy supply and growing its internationally competitive energy-consuming industries. The EU status quo is that good energy information is provided by a mix of institutions, agencies, national bodies, industrial associations and non-governmental organisations, but with substantial room for improvement. Lessons can be learned from the United States Energy Information Administration and the European Environment Agency, which was established to better coordinate climate data. Improving energy information will involve difficult political decisions. A process should be started to evaluate the options and to measure the continued cost of inaction.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Upgrading Europe's electricity grid is about more than just money</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322585" />
    <author>
      <name>Heussaff, Conall</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Zachmann, Georg</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322585</id>
    <updated>2025-08-01T01:06:14Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Upgrading Europe's electricity grid is about more than just money
Authors: Heussaff, Conall; Zachmann, Georg
Abstract: Electricity network investment is essential for the energy transition, with annual investments of tens of billions of euros required across Europe. Network companies are already investing such amounts and delivering efficient grid investments requires more than additional money. Assessing infrastructure needs is the first step in grid investment. At local, national and European Union levels, network development planning is determined by policy choices and can greatly affect the efficiency of investments. Coordinated grid planning is crucial to set the right incentives for the efficient development of the European electricity system. An EU independent system operator could assume responsibility for network planning by providing regular, independent assessment of efficient network investment needs from a holistic European perspective. Although significant capital expenditure is undoubtedly necessary, network regulation should encourage network companies to invest in the most-efficient solutions. Current regulatory approaches may favour traditional capital expenditure, leading to system inefficiencies and higher-than-necessary consumer costs. Cross-border electricity transmission infrastructure is critical to integrate renewables into the electricity system at scale and reduce costs for European consumers. But such projects are often not built or are delayed because those that decide on and pay for the infrastructure are not necessarily those that benefit from it. A European fund could smooth negotiations between parties and accelerate the physical interconnection of the European electricity system. Fairly recovering the costs of grid investments from consumers is vital to maintain public support for the energy transition. National funds could smooth out cost impacts over time, keeping electricity affordable throughout the energy transition.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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