Bruegel, Brussels https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45498 2026-09-14T11:20:09Z 2026-09-14T11:20:09Z Mariniello, Mario https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322592 2025-08-01T01:06:29Z 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Reinforcing EU merger control against the risks of acquisitions by big tech Authors: Mariniello, Mario Abstract: Since 2000, online platforms that are now within the scope of the European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA), have bought nearly 700 small, promising companies worldwide. However, only 19 of their attempted acquisitions were notified to the European Commission, the authority exercising merger control over deals with a substantive EU connection. In the other cases, the acquired target's turnover did not meet the conditions for merger notification. These acquisitions have happened in the context of digital markets becoming increasingly concentrated, leading to speculation that concentration levels might have been lower had some of those acquisitions not taken place. The harm that the concentration of market power in a handful of American digital companies may cause is magnified by the current position of the United States, which aims to shield platforms from regulatory enforcement. Acquisitions of small companies may have pro- or anti-competitive effects. Established market players may buy startups to become more competitive or to supply a higher quality product or service, ultimately benefitting final users. Mergers may also incentivise innovation and attract venture capital. However, incumbents might also acquire small companies with strategic, anti-competitive objectives. They might want to stop challengers to their market power from emerging in the future. Or they might acquire small companies to prevent competitors from relying on the target's supply to complement their competing products. Moreover, competition authorities struggle to make accurate predictions about the evolution of competitive dynamics in new and complex markets, such as digital markets. Authorities thus may be unable to take the correct decision, even if the merger is notified. Responding to these issues hinges on amending the DMA. The European Commission should be empowered to scrutinise any acquisition performed by the large platforms within the DMA scope (currently, the DMA requires these platforms to inform the Commission of any intended concentration, but envisages no other action). Moreover, the burden of proving that the merger is not harmful should be shifted to the large platforms. This would leverage market players' knowledge to help increase the accuracy of merger decisions in a highly dynamic and uncertain environment.

2025-01-01T00:00:00Z Heussaff, Conall Jüngling, Eva Tagliapietra, Simone Zachmann, Georg https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322603 2025-08-01T01:06:10Z 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Who should be charged? Principles for fair allocation of electricity system costs Authors: Heussaff, Conall; Jüngling, Eva; Tagliapietra, Simone; Zachmann, Georg Abstract: The high costs in the European Union of supplying electricity can only be structurally reduced through decarbonisation and deeper European electricity system integration. In the short-term, policymakers have few choices. They can redistribute system costs by shifting components from one consumer to another. Another immediate distributional option would be to reduce energy taxation, implicitly shifting costs to the taxpayer. Meanwhile, decision-making processes that translates electricity system costs into final consumer prices are fragmented. Rules on the short-term production, transmission and consumption of electricity are determined at EU level. National regulators and governments determine how the fixed costs of the system are recovered from consumers, while national policymakers also set energy taxes. This Policy Brief sets out options for shifting the fixed costs of the electricity system between consumers, for changing energy taxation to reduce prices and for evaluating systemic trade-offs between system cost and other characteristics, such as sustainability and reliability. We also estimate the quantitative effects of shifting costs between consumers and reducing taxes on electricity. We set out four principles for pricing electricity fairly. Policy interventions in the electricity system should not seek to achieve broader economic objectives at the expense of energy-policy goals. Consumer prices should incentivise efficient system operation. Carbon emissions should be priced in. The fixed costs of the electricity system should be primarily recovered from inelastic consumption. European policymakers should develop transparent analytical tools to assess the distributional effects of electricity-policy interventions. Lessons should be learned from the energy crisis, during which EU and national policies attempted to shield consumers from price impacts, and these lessons should form the basis of ongoing efforts to reduce prices. EU guidelines for electricity cost recovery should be established, following fundamental economic principles, and could form a policy toolbox for national governments to reduce energy prices. Finally, the long-term strategic goal of deeper physical and institutional integration of the European electricity should be pursued to structurally reduce electricity prices.

2025-01-01T00:00:00Z McWilliams, Ben Tagliapietra, Simone Zachmann, Georg https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322588 2025-08-01T01:06:13Z 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Europe's energy information problem Authors: McWilliams, Ben; Tagliapietra, Simone; Zachmann, Georg Abstract: Comprehensive information on energy-related topics, such as take-up of heat pumps, industrial natural gas consumption and prices, and battery connections to the electricity grid, is either not available in Europe in a timely manner, or not available at the level of granularity, reliability and consistency needed for informed decision-making. Certain information is simply not collected, while other information is collected but is not comparable or consistent across Europe, or is hard to access. European policy targets, such as greenhouse-gas emission reduction pathways, are evaluated using models for which input assumptions and parameters are not public knowledge. It should be a European Union priority to improve this situation. Doing so will enable better decision-making by policymakers and companies. This is especially relevant when Europe faces the triple challenge of decarbonisation, ensuring security of energy supply and growing its internationally competitive energy-consuming industries. The EU status quo is that good energy information is provided by a mix of institutions, agencies, national bodies, industrial associations and non-governmental organisations, but with substantial room for improvement. Lessons can be learned from the United States Energy Information Administration and the European Environment Agency, which was established to better coordinate climate data. Improving energy information will involve difficult political decisions. A process should be started to evaluate the options and to measure the continued cost of inaction.

2025-01-01T00:00:00Z Calcaterra, Matteo Consiglio, Andrea Martorana, Vincenzo Tavoni, Massimo Zenios, Stauros Andrea https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322549 2025-08-01T01:06:35Z 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Sovereigns on thinning ice: Debt sustainability, climate impacts and adaptation Authors: Calcaterra, Matteo; Consiglio, Andrea; Martorana, Vincenzo; Tavoni, Massimo; Zenios, Stauros Andrea Abstract: A fundamental problem for sovereigns enacting climate policies is whether they can manage increasing debts as their economies suffer from adverse climate impacts. We develop stochastic debt sustainability analysis integrating a coupled climate-economy model with debt financing scenario optimisation, and stress test sovereign debt for representative countries globally under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change marker narrative scenarios of climate change. The stress test combines socioeconomic and climate pathways with calibrated aleatory scenario trees of economic, fiscal and financial variables to generate forward-looking debt projections over the century. These projections incorporate climate-induced damages to economic growth, spanning the broad spectrum of impact functions from the literature. Our findings reveal significant risks to sovereign debt sustainability, particularly under high climate damages, that are large from mid-century. Expected costs increase by up to 3 percent of GDP under high climate impact in a world of regional rivalries, or 0.25 percent under low impact in a middle-of-the-road narrative, with considerable variation between countries. The long-run debts of highly impacted countries are unsustainable. We assess whether adaptation investments or fiscal consolidation can mitigate potential climate-debt crises. Public financing of reactive adaptation is a justified expenditure that breaks even but does not fully restore the debt sustainability of highly impacted high-debt countries. Maintaining public spending while ensuring debt sustainability appears infeasible under climate impacts.

2025-01-01T00:00:00Z