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  <title>EconStor Community: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44601" />
  <subtitle>Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen</subtitle>
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44601</id>
  <updated>2026-10-06T05:29:22Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-10-06T05:29:22Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>The contending futures of UN peacekeeping</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315176" />
    <author>
      <name>van Emmerik, Corine</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Albrecht, Peter</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315176</id>
    <updated>2025-04-24T12:47:41Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The contending futures of UN peacekeeping
Authors: van Emmerik, Corine; Albrecht, Peter
Abstract: This paper examines the contending futures of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping through an analysis of key UN publications and interviews conducted in New York in 2024. At a time when peacekeeping faces multiple challenges - including a crisis of trust, diminished legitimacy, and a deadlocked Security Council - the study traces how visions of peacekeeping's future reflect the organisation's decision-making processes, institutional constraints, and political interests. By analysing documents and interviews with UN officials and diplomats, the paper identifies three emergent categories: broadened futures emphasising flexibility and integration; suspended and anticipated futures awaiting catalytic moments; and retroactive futures advocating return to core principles. Rather than offering prescriptive recommendations, the paper argues that peacekeeping's chronic challenges are inherently unsolvable and must be continuously navigated. The analysis concludes that peacekeeping's future lies not in fixed forms but in functional flexibility, reflecting broader tensions within the UN system itself.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Essays on development and development cooperation</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315175" />
    <author>
      <name>Andersen, Ole Winckler</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Engberg-Pedersen, Lars</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Moe Fejerskov, Adam</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Funder, Mikkel</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Gwaindepi, Abel</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Friis-Hansen, Esbern</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Kolling, Marie</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Pedersen, Rasmus Hundsbæk</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Stepputat, Finn</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Therkildsen, Ole</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315175</id>
    <updated>2025-04-24T12:47:27Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Essays on development and development cooperation
Authors: Andersen, Ole Winckler; Engberg-Pedersen, Lars; Moe Fejerskov, Adam; Funder, Mikkel; Gwaindepi, Abel; Friis-Hansen, Esbern; Kolling, Marie; Pedersen, Rasmus Hundsbæk; Stepputat, Finn; Therkildsen, Ole
Abstract: After earlier strategies for Denmark's development cooperation from 1993, 2000, 2010, 2012 and 2017, the latest strategy, The World We Share, from 2021 now expires, and a new is accordingly(?) needed. The parliament will start negotiating the strategy in May 2025. One may fear that it will be in line with earlier strategies focussing on Danish concerns in the short run and so broad that the government can do whatever it finds useful. There are, however, many reasons for rethinking development cooperation thoroughly, and the latest events - the de facto abolishment of USAID and the significant cuts in several European countries - do not reduce the need for reflection. Written before these events, this DIIS Working Paper contains a number of essays by DIIS researchers who reflect on the needs within their field of specialisation. Thus, the collection of essays covers a broad range of topics. Cutting across the essays there is an attempt to look for opportunities and ways forward. Although the world may appear bleak, there is also room-for-manoeuvre, and even a small country like Denmark can take initiatives that will help people suffering from poverty and a world suffering from instability.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The political economy of mini-grids in Ghana: Policy ambitions versus the realities of implementation</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322125" />
    <author>
      <name>Abubakari, Abdul-Bassit</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322125</id>
    <updated>2025-07-26T01:09:20Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The political economy of mini-grids in Ghana: Policy ambitions versus the realities of implementation
Authors: Abubakari, Abdul-Bassit
Abstract: Despite Ghana's explicit plans to deploy mini-grids for the electrification of off-grid and remote communities, progress has been slow. This paper explores how political dynamics and policy shifts have shaped the governance of mini-grids over time. It examines the evolution of mini-grids in Ghana in three phases: preliminary design stage (2007-2013); active implementation period, marked by policy modifications (2013-2019); and subsequent consolidation under a predominantly public-led model post-2019. Guided by an adapted political settlements framework and process tracing methodology, the paper argues that misalignment between the government of Ghana and donors over governance and ownership models, mediated by the country's competitive clientelist politics, explains Ghana's limited progress in the development of mini-grids. The paper provides nuanced insights into the complex ways transnational factors and domestic politics interact in shaping the development of mini-grids with wide implications for debates on energy governance and reform in sub-Saharan Africa.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>"Don't mention the war": The failure of historical analogies in geopolitical decision-making</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322240" />
    <author>
      <name>Mouritzen, Hans</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322240</id>
    <updated>2025-07-26T01:09:19Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: "Don't mention the war": The failure of historical analogies in geopolitical decision-making
Authors: Mouritzen, Hans
Abstract: As seldom before, the current war in Ukraine has seen the use of World War II analogies by belligerents and also some Western non-belligerents. They thereby follow in the footsteps of such political leaders as Anthony Eden, Margaret Thatcher, Joseph Stalin, or John F. Kennedy. Indeed, statesmen sometimes make decisions by referring to a lesson from an 'analogous' historical situation, overriding or colouring the interpretation of contemporary concerns. Regarding geopolitical decisions, reference is typically made to the last major war of one's own country. That is, however, seldom a good idea, since critical conditions have usually changed in the meantime. This is illustrated here by four case studies, two based on a World War II, and two based on a World War I lesson. It is argued that any historical analogy formulated by a political leader should make alarm bells ring regarding the contemporary decision or project being legitimised. However, if such analogical decision-making cannot be avoided (which would be preferable), it is imperative to let at least two alternative analogies 'compete' in the decision-making process so as to avoid groupthink. In relation to the contemporary Ukraine war, these results do not bode well for either Russia or the West. Misled by their analogies, Russia initially overstated NATOs ambitions in Ukraine, and NATO now overstates Russia's ambitions beyond Ukraine. It is almost impossible to back down from these exaggerations.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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