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  <title>EconStor Community:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338416" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338416</id>
  <updated>2026-05-09T16:00:23Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-05-09T16:00:23Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Does institutional innovation of patent financing ease corporate financing woes? Evidence from patent collateral and patent insurance policy</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338549" />
    <author>
      <name>Li, Xiaoxi</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Zhong, Qinger</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Yang, Guochao</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Rao, Pingui</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338549</id>
    <updated>2026-03-21T02:00:45Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Does institutional innovation of patent financing ease corporate financing woes? Evidence from patent collateral and patent insurance policy
Authors: Li, Xiaoxi; Zhong, Qinger; Yang, Guochao; Rao, Pingui
Abstract: This paper employs patent collateral data from China's State Intellectual Property Office and finds that patent collateral policy increases the use of patents as collateral and corporate debt financing; further, patent insurance policy enhances the effect of patent collateral policy. However, these policies only lead to an increase in corporate short-term debt. Additionally, we document a stronger effect for cities that integrate an effective government and an efficient market, cities where governments provide guarantees to firms, firms with high-quality patents, and financial constrained firms. As a result, increases in corporate short-term debt resulting from patent collateral policy and patent insurance policy lead to higher patent output in the short run, rather than in the long run.</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>CSRC's random inspection and capital market information efficiency: An empirical evidence from stock price synchronicity</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338527" />
    <author>
      <name>Xia, Xue</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Teng, Fei</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Xu, Liping</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Xin, Yu</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338527</id>
    <updated>2026-03-21T02:01:41Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: CSRC's random inspection and capital market information efficiency: An empirical evidence from stock price synchronicity
Authors: Xia, Xue; Teng, Fei; Xu, Liping; Xin, Yu
Abstract: The random inspection of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is an important policy for practicing "standardizing regulatory behavior and innovating management modes". This study investigates how CSRC's random affect capital market information efficiency from the perspective of stock price synchronicity. Using a sample of China's non-financial A-share firms from 2013 to 2019, we find that random inspections significantly reduced the stock price synchronicity of inspected firms. Random inspections could increase the probability of releasing management earnings forecasts, media coverage and investor attention, and thereby improve information efficiency. Further study finds that the effect of random inspections on stock price synchronicity is stronger for non-state controlled firms, districts with more listed firms, and districts with more transparent government. This study enriches the literature on the consequences of random inspections and extends our knowledge of the relationship between regulatory innovations and the information efficiency of the capital market.</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Is digital finance always beneficial to accounting information transparency? Evidence from China</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338530" />
    <author>
      <name>Du, Xingqiang</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Hong, Jing</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Tao, Hexin</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Zhang, Yongkui</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338530</id>
    <updated>2026-03-21T02:01:31Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Is digital finance always beneficial to accounting information transparency? Evidence from China
Authors: Du, Xingqiang; Hong, Jing; Tao, Hexin; Zhang, Yongkui
Abstract: Using a sample of Chinese listed firms over 2011-2020, this study examines the impact of digital finance on accounting information transparency. Our findings reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between digital finance and accounting information transparency, suggesting that digital finance within certain limits increases accounting information transparency by optimising information acquisition and processing, but excessive digital finance leads to information overload and impairs accounting information transparency. Our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and are still valid after using two-stage "shift-share" instrumental variable procedures, propensity score matching method and firm-level fixed effect regression to control for the endogeneity issue. Lastly, MD&amp;A and annual reporting disclosure timeliness are two influential channels by which digital finance affects accounting information transparency, and further the inverted U-shaped relationship is more pronounced for firms in provinces with lower marketisation indexes (CEO-chairman duality) than for their counterparts.</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Bank competition, real investment return and corporate financialization</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338533" />
    <author>
      <name>Mao, Yihuan</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Xu, Nan</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338533</id>
    <updated>2026-03-21T02:00:35Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Bank competition, real investment return and corporate financialization
Authors: Mao, Yihuan; Xu, Nan
Abstract: The competition and interaction between the financial and real industry transmitted to the micro level are manifested in the allocation trade-off between financial and non-financial assets of companies. However, little literature has discussed the role of financial intermediaries in corporate financialization. Using samples from China's A-share non-financial and non-real estate listed companies, we distinguish two competing hypotheses, the Reservoir hypothesis and the Profit-seeking hypothesis. We find that bank competition intensifies corporate financialization driven by profit-seeking motivation. This effect is strengthened in firms with a lower return on non-financial investments, greater market arbitrage space, or private ownership. Finally, economic consequences analysis suggests that bank competition enhances the crowding out effect of corporate financialization on real investments. This article focuses on the potential costs brought by financial competition and provides empirical evidence for our in-depth understanding of the relationship between the evolution of financial system and the financial asset allocation of micro-enterprises.</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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