<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32803" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32803</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T14:09:23Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T14:09:23Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Ein Vorschlag zur Governance und Finanzierung der europäischen Verteidigung</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335872" />
    <author>
      <name>Hildebrand, Philipp</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Rey, Hélène</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Schularick, Moritz</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335872</id>
    <updated>2026-02-04T04:42:41Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Ein Vorschlag zur Governance und Finanzierung der europäischen Verteidigung
Authors: Hildebrand, Philipp; Rey, Hélène; Schularick, Moritz
Abstract: • Europa muss seine militärischen Fähigkeiten substanziell ausbauen und seine strategische Handlungsfähigkeit stärken, um die Abhängigkeit von externen Akteuren zu reduzieren. • Dieser Vorschlag skizziert eine europäische Verteidigungsarchitektur der Zukunft, die auf Militärtechnologien der nächsten Generation sowie strategische Enabler wie KI, Cyber und Satelliten setzt - Bereiche, in denen eine europäische Zusammenarbeit effizienter ist als nationale Lösungen. • Die Finanzierung erfordert einen gemeinsamen Ansatz über die Emission von gemeinsamen Anleihen zur Finanzierung der Europäischen Verteidigung mit gesamtschuldnerischer Haftung, um die Finanzierungskosten zu senken. Ein solches Instrument wäre ein wesentlicher Schritt hin zu einem sicheren europäischen Anleihemarkt (safe asset). • Die Governance-Struktur sollte auf einem zwischenstaatlichen Vertrag einer Koalition williger EU-Mitgliedstaaten ("Team Europa") basieren. Vorgesehen sind Lenkungsausschüsse für Verteidigung/Technologie sowie für Finanzierung; letzterer könnte in eine reformierte ESM-Struktur integriert werden. • Das vorgeschlagene Ausgabeprofil sieht über zehn Jahre ein Ausgabevolumen von 1 % des BIP vor, was 1,8 bis 2 Billionen € (abhängig von der Größe des "Team Europa") entspricht. Diese Schulden würden danach durch die Haushaltsmittel der Mitgliedsländer stabilisiert.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>A proposal on European defence governance and financing</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335873" />
    <author>
      <name>Hildebrand, Philipp</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Rey, Hélène</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Schularick, Moritz</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335873</id>
    <updated>2026-02-04T04:42:25Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: A proposal on European defence governance and financing
Authors: Hildebrand, Philipp; Rey, Hélène; Schularick, Moritz
Abstract: • Europe must urgently strengthen its defence capabilities and secure strategic autonomy to avoid vulnerability to external pressures. • The proposal outlines a European Future of Defence Architecture focusing on next generation military technologies and strategic enablers (like AI, cyber, and satellites) which have a distinct European dimension and are inefficient at the national level. • Financing requires a joint approach through the issuance of European Future of Defence Bonds (with joint and several liabilities) to minimize costs. This joint financing is a critical step toward the emergence of a European safe asset. • The governance structure relies on an intergovernmental treaty among a coalition of willing EU countries (the European Team). It proposes Steering Committees for both Defence/Technology and Financing, with the financing mechanism possibly housed within an amended ESM structure. • A suggested spending profile involves a 1% of GDP annual catch-up phase for 10 years, potentially totaling 1.8 tn to 2 tn (depending on the team size). This debt would be stabilized thereafter by member country fiscal resources.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Europe steps up: Ukraine support after four years of war</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336813" />
    <author>
      <name>Trebesch, Christoph</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Nishikawa, Taro</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336813</id>
    <updated>2026-02-19T04:54:29Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Europe steps up: Ukraine support after four years of war
Authors: Trebesch, Christoph; Nishikawa, Taro
Abstract: · This brief provides a big-picture overview of support for Ukraine after four years of war. The key finding from 2025 is that Europe has almost offset the collapse in US support. · US aid fell by 99 percent. At the same time, Europe sharply increased its aid allocations, by 59 percent for financial and humanitarian aid and by 67 percent for military aid compared to the 2022-24 average. As a result, total aid in 2025 remained close to previous years. · Within Europe, financial and humanitarian aid is now dominated by EU institutions, as EU loans and grants account for 89 percent of these flows in 2025. Military aid is ever more concentrated on a few countries. Northern and Western Europe accounted for about 95 percent, in particular Scandinavia, Germany, the United Kingdom. In contrast, the military aid from Southern and Eastern Europe continued to fall. · To help replace US support, NATO launched the PURL initiative, through which donors purchased US weapons for Ukraine worth EUR 3.7 billion in 2025, including HIMARS and Patriot systems. Donors also increasingly procured weapons directly from Ukraine's defense industry. The share of procurement in Ukraine reached 22 percent in late 2025.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The EU-India trade deal: Strategic diversification in an era of uncertainty</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336759" />
    <author>
      <name>Hinz, Julian</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Langhammer, Rolf J.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Mahlkow, Hendrik</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Thakur, Vasundhara</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336759</id>
    <updated>2026-02-19T04:54:15Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The EU-India trade deal: Strategic diversification in an era of uncertainty
Authors: Hinz, Julian; Langhammer, Rolf J.; Mahlkow, Hendrik; Thakur, Vasundhara
Abstract: • The EU-India FTA generates mutual economic gains of 0.12-0.13% of GDP for both partners, with bilateral trade surging by 41-65%. • Since the 50 percentage points tariffs imposed by the US cost India 1.6% of GDP, the EU-India FTA provides a crucial hedge while the EU demonstrates commitment to open trade amid global protectionism. • The EU-India FTA results in a substantial trade diversion from China (an estimated 5-9%), supporting both EU de-risking objectives and India's supply chain diversification strategy. • The FTA's structural benefits persist regardless of US policy changes making this trade deal a long-term partnership, not a temporary hedge.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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