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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307781" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307781</id>
  <updated>2026-05-02T16:12:43Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-05-02T16:12:43Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Markets, Contracts, and Hierarchies: How Bargaining Frictions Affect Governance</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316353.2" />
    <author>
      <name>Ellingsen, Tore</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Miettinen, Topi</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316353.2</id>
    <updated>2026-01-26T15:31:36Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Markets, Contracts, and Hierarchies: How Bargaining Frictions Affect Governance
Authors: Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi
Abstract: We develop an organizational governance model with a single buyer and endogenous upstream entry. Investments and control rights over assets and actions are immediately contractable; production is contractable after uncertainty resolves. We show the following: Supplier competition eliminates pre-entry bargaining frictions. To minimize postentry bargaining frictions, control rights over assets and actions are always bundled. If entry is sufficiently cheap, there is frictionless post-entry competition, sometimes due to buyer sponsorship. Otherwise, only one supplier enters. There is vertical integration if the asset’s expected profitability is highest in the buyer’s favorite use; if not, the buyer contracts with an autonomous supplier.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Gender gap in high-stakes exams: What role for exam preparation?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339356" />
    <author>
      <name>Bonneau, Cécile</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Dousset, Léa</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339356</id>
    <updated>2026-04-04T02:07:18Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Gender gap in high-stakes exams: What role for exam preparation?
Authors: Bonneau, Cécile; Dousset, Léa
Abstract: In this paper, we show that gender gaps in performance observed in high-stakes exams, relative to low-stakes exams, are partially shaped by the context of exam preparation. We examine the role of exam preparation using data from French elite STEM higher education programs. First, we document a substantial gender gap in admissions to the most selective STEM graduate schools compared with slightly less selective institutions. Second, we provide causal evidence that the competitiveness of the learning environment during exam preparation affects the gender gap in performance in high-stakes exams. Our results further indicate that widening gender gaps in competitive learning environments primarily reflect disproportionate male gains rather than female underperformance. These findings have important implications for understanding the underrepresentation of women in elite programs and the gender pay gap among top STEM workers.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Endogenous education duration, fertility choice, and mortality: A framework for optimal population policy</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339386" />
    <author>
      <name>Palokangas, Tapio K.</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339386</id>
    <updated>2026-04-04T02:07:14Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Endogenous education duration, fertility choice, and mortality: A framework for optimal population policy
Authors: Palokangas, Tapio K.
Abstract: This paper characterizes optimal education and population policies within a continuous-time overlapping generations (OLG) framework where fertility, schooling duration, and health expenditures are endogenous. In this model, mortality risk is driven by a negative congestion effect from population growth and a positive spillover effect from education duration. We demonstrate that when labor productivity is tied to schooling length, traditional fiscal instruments - such as taxes on newborns - are insufficient to achieve social efficiency. Instead, we propose a multi-faceted policy framework integrating public health provision, education grants, and a corrective poll tax, supported by government-backed student loans to mitigate liquidity constraints. Our analysis yields three optimality conditions. First, public health care must be expanded until its marginal product equals that of private health care. Second, the student grant must be proportional to the marginal rate of substitution between education and health care, but inversely proportional to the interest rate and cohort size. Third, the poll tax must cover public health costs while reflecting the marginal rate of transformation between congestion and private health care. These findings advocate for a strategic policy pivot: shifting from the Pigouvian management of population quantity toward fostering the quality and longevity of human capital.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Licensing resource exploitation with endogenous and privately known reserves</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339385" />
    <author>
      <name>Jääskeläinen, Jarmo</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lappi, Pauli</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339385</id>
    <updated>2026-04-04T02:07:16Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Licensing resource exploitation with endogenous and privately known reserves
Authors: Jääskeläinen, Jarmo; Lappi, Pauli
Abstract: We design optimal mechanism to collect revenues from nonrenewable resource exploitation, when the resource must be explored and discovered and when there is asymmetric information. The exploration effort may result in a discovery that is revealed only to the firm, and the effort is not observed by the owner. After discovery, the firm may pay development costs including set-up costs to build extraction capacity. To overcome the discontinuity caused by the set-up costs in this adverse selection problem, we use a two-step procedure to solve the model and show that the optimal license contract involves a discontinuity at the reserve cut-off level. We show that compared to the case without any pricing of the resource exploitation, the optimal mechanism requires richer discoveries to yield a reserve, induces less exploration, and results in lower capacity and extraction. We also argue that often applied royalties and resource rent taxes distort exploration and extraction even when deductions for exploration expenses are allowed.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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