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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290</id>
  <updated>2026-10-24T01:41:01Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-10-24T01:41:01Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Disclosure under unawareness: An experiment</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324796" />
    <author>
      <name>Li, Ying Xue</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Schipper, Burkhard</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324796</id>
    <updated>2025-09-04T06:55:38Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Disclosure under unawareness: An experiment
Authors: Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard
Abstract: We consider a disclosure game between a seller and a buyer. The seller knows the quality of a good, while the buyer does not. Before the buyer decides how many units to purchase, the seller can disclose verifiable information about the good. The better the information, the more the buyer is inclined to buy. The information about the good is two-dimensional. We design two experimental treatments: In the unawareness treatment, the buyer is uncertain about the first dimension, but unaware of the second. Here, unawareness refers to a lack of conception rather than lack of information. In the control treatment, the buyer is aware of both dimensions, but uncertain about them. The theory predicts unraveling of information in the control treatment but not in the unawareness treatment. Our experimental findings are consistent with this prediction. However, a closer examination reveals that this outcome is driven by buyers becoming confused when sellers naively raise awareness of the second dimension.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Matching, unanticipated experiences, divorce, flirting, rematching, etc</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324797" />
    <author>
      <name>Schipper, Burkhard</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Zhang, Tina Danting</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324797</id>
    <updated>2025-09-04T06:56:42Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Matching, unanticipated experiences, divorce, flirting, rematching, etc
Authors: Schipper, Burkhard; Zhang, Tina Danting
Abstract: We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching where players' preferences evolve due to unanticipated experiences. Stability requires no pairwise common belief in blocking, but unanticipated experiences can destabilize matchings. We show the existence of self-confirming outcomes that are stable and do not lead to unanticipated experiences. We propose a decentralized matching process that prioritizes mutual optimal blocking pairs with probability 1 - &amp;#x03b5; and picks any other optimal blocking pair with &amp;#x03b5;, representing market friction. Frictions are necessary for convergence to self-confirming stable outcomes even without unawareness. We extend our results by allowing communication and show convergence to flirt-proof self-confirming outcomes.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Kuhn's Theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324795" />
    <author>
      <name>Foo, Ki Vin</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Ki Vin Foo</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324795</id>
    <updated>2025-09-04T06:56:23Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Kuhn's Theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness
Authors: Foo, Ki Vin; Ki Vin Foo
Abstract: We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. This extension is not obvious: First, games of the extensive form with non-trivial unawareness involve a forest of partially ordered game trees rather than just one game tree. An information set at a node in one tree may consist of nodes in a less expressive tree. Consequently, perfect recall takes a more complicated form as players may also become aware of new actions during the play. Second, strategies can only be partially an object of ex ante choice in games with unawareness. Finally, nodes that a player may expect to reach with a strategy profile may not be the nodes that actually occur with this strategy profile, requiring us to define appropriate notions of equivalence of strategies. We show if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy but the converse does not hold under unawareness.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>A modal logic translation of the AGM axioms for belief revision</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324794" />
    <author>
      <name>Bonanno, Giacomo</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324794</id>
    <updated>2025-09-04T06:56:32Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: A modal logic translation of the AGM axioms for belief revision
Authors: Bonanno, Giacomo
Abstract: Building on the analysis of Bonanno (2025) we introduce a simple modal logic containing three modal operators: a unimodal belief operator B, a bimodal conditional operator &gt; and the unimodal global operator &amp;#x25a1;. For each AGM axiom for belief revision, we provide a corresponding modal axiom. The correspondence is as follows: each AGM axiom is characterized by a property of the Kripke-Lewis frames considered in Bonanno (2025) and, in turn, that property characterizes the proposed modal axiom.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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