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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29</id>
  <updated>2026-04-29T04:07:23Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-29T04:07:23Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Informal Labor Markets and Macroeconomic Fluctuations</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19862" />
    <author>
      <name>Fiess, Norbert M.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Fugazza, Marco</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Maloney, William F.</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19862</id>
    <updated>2023-11-12T02:33:04Z</updated>
    <published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Informal Labor Markets and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
Authors: Fiess, Norbert M.; Fugazza, Marco; Maloney, William F.
Abstract: This paper examines the adjustment of developing country labor markets to macroeconomic shocks. It models a two sector labor market: a formal salaried (tradable) sector that may or may not be affected by union or legislation induced wage rigidities, and an unregulated (nontradable) self-employment sector facing liquidity constraints to entry. This is embedded in a standard small economy macro model that permits the derivation of patterns of comovement among relative salaried/self-employed incomes, salaried/self-employed sector sizes and the real exchange rate with respect to different types of shocks in contexts with and without wage rigidities. The paper then explores time series data from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to test for cointegrating relationships corresponding to the patterns predicted by theory. We identify two types of regime. The first corresponds to periods where demand shocks to the nontradable sector offer new opportunities to (informal) entrepreneurs, the informal sector expands ?procyclically,? and the exchange rate overshoots toward appreciation in the short run, or remains at its productivity determined levels. The second corresponds to periods of negative shocks to the formal salaried sector in the presence of wage rigidities where the sector plays a more traditional ?buffer? role during downturns.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Long-Run Monetary and Fiscal Policy Trade-Off in an Endogenous Growth Model with Transaction Costs</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19878" />
    <author>
      <name>Villieu, P.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Minea, Alexandru</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19878</id>
    <updated>2023-11-12T02:14:43Z</updated>
    <published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Long-Run Monetary and Fiscal Policy Trade-Off in an Endogenous Growth Model with Transaction Costs
Authors: Villieu, P.; Minea, Alexandru
Abstract: In this paper, we study maximizing long-run economic growth trade-off in monetary and fiscal policies in an endogenous growth model with transaction costs. We show that both monetary and fiscal policies are subject to threshold effects, a result that gives account of a number of recent empirical findings. Furthermore, the model shows that, to finance public expenditures, maximizing-growth government must choose relatively high seigniorage (respectively income taxation), if ?tax evasion? and ?financial repression? coefficients are high (respectively low). Thus, our model may explain why some governments resort to seigniorage and inflationary finance, and others rather resort to high tax-rate, as result of maximizing-growth strategies in different structural environments (notably concerning tax evasion and financial repression). In addition, the model allows examining how the optimal mix of government finance changes in response to different public debt contexts.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Measuring Chronic Non-Income Poverty</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19866" />
    <author>
      <name>Klasen, Stephan</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Günther, Isabel</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19866</id>
    <updated>2023-11-04T02:37:19Z</updated>
    <published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Measuring Chronic Non-Income Poverty
Authors: Klasen, Stephan; Günther, Isabel
Abstract: An increasing interest in poverty dynamics has lately also led to an extensive literature on the analysis of chronic poverty. Based on Amartya Sen?s groundbreaking work on capabilities and functionings static poverty measures have long used non-income indicators. In contrast, measures of poverty dynamics - including chronic poverty – have in general conceptualised poverty only in an income dimension. Hence, this paper first critically discusses the conceptual and empirical potentials and limitations of analysing chronic poverty from a nonincome perspective. Second, it proposes methods to empirically measure chronic nonincome poverty, with an exploratory application to panel data from Vietnam from 1992 and 1997, which demonstrates that a range of useful insights can be generated from such an analysis. In particular, we find that the correlation between chronic income and non-income poverty is rather low which is mostly due to a low correlation between income and nonincome poverty in each period, while both move relatively closely over time. We also find a surprising amount of heterogeneity in static and dynamic non-income poverty within households.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19869" />
    <author>
      <name>Hefeker, Carsten</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19869</id>
    <updated>2023-11-10T02:20:40Z</updated>
    <published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
Authors: Hefeker, Carsten
Abstract: The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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