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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/264606" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/264606</id>
  <updated>2026-10-24T21:58:45Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-10-24T21:58:45Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>The South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia): A high-growth, resource-rich strategic crossroads in the focus of geo-economic tensions</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/318446" />
    <author>
      <name>Barisitz, Stephan</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/318446</id>
    <updated>2025-06-03T04:52:47Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia): A high-growth, resource-rich strategic crossroads in the focus of geo-economic tensions
Authors: Barisitz, Stephan
Abstract: The three South Caucasus economies - Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - have performed relatively well since the COVID-19 pandemic, benefiting from certain spillovers of Russia's war against Ukraine. The oil importers Armenia and Georgia achieved double-digit GDP growth in 2022 - 12.6% and 11.0%, respectively, followed by annual average rates of 7% to 8% in 2023-24. A recovery in tourism and private consumption since 2021 and a (temporary) surge in immigration, capital and remittance inflows and intermediated trade triggered by the war and sanctions have bolstered economic growth and fiscal revenues and shored up external balances as well as national currencies. The strengthened currencies contributed to declines in inflation and public debt, while vigorous growth helped lower unemployment and poverty. Structural problems and insufficient investment in its oil industry are largely responsible for Azerbaijan's lower GDP growth dynamics - 4.7% in 2022 and an average of 2% to 3% in 2023-24. Notwithstanding the suffering inflicted by the Nagorno-Karabakh war, fiscal expenditure for the reconstruction of the region (Azerbaijan) and for sheltering and integrating about 100,000 refugees (Armenia), respectively, stimulated growth in 2023-24. While the European Union is Azerbaijan's dominant trading partner, Russia and China together outstrip the EU in trade with Armenia and Georgia. EU integration prospects of candidate country Georgia are currently shrouded in political and geo-economic uncertainty. The same holds true for Armenia's recently expressed EU aspirations.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>80 Jahre "Der Weg zur Knechtschaft" / 50 Jahre Nobel-Gedächtnispreis F.A. Hayek: Relevanz für heute und morgen?! 19. November 2024. Konferenzbericht</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312881" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312881</id>
    <updated>2025-04-25T05:55:19Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: 80 Jahre "Der Weg zur Knechtschaft" / 50 Jahre Nobel-Gedächtnispreis F.A. Hayek: Relevanz für heute und morgen?! 19. November 2024. Konferenzbericht
Editors: Oesterreichische Nationalbank
Abstract: Am 19. November 2024 fand in der Oesterreichischen Nationalbank (OeNB) auf Einladung von Gouverneur Univ.-Prof. Dr. Robert Holzmann die Konferenz "80 Jahre 'The Road to Serfdom' / 50 Jahre Nobel-Gedächtnispreis F.A. Hayek: Relevanz für heute und morgen?!" statt. Anlass für die Konferenz war das 50-jährige Jubiläum der Verleihung des Alfred-Nobel-Gedächtnispreises für Wirtschaftswissenschaften an den österreichischen Ökonomen Univ.-Prof. DDr. Dr. h.c. Friedrich August von Hayek, der den Preis 1974 für die Arbeiten auf dem Gebiet der Geld- und Konjunkturtheorie gleichzeitig mit Gunnar Myrdal erhielt. Darüber hinaus war die Konferenz dem 80-jährigen Jubiläum der Veröffentlichung von Hayeks wegweisendem Buch "Der Weg zur Knechtschaft" ("The Road to Serfdom") gewidmet.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Robust growth in Central Asia 2019-24: In the face of uncertainties, the pandemic and protracted war in the neighborhood</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312865" />
    <author>
      <name>Barisitz, Stephan</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312865</id>
    <updated>2025-04-25T05:55:22Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Robust growth in Central Asia 2019-24: In the face of uncertainties, the pandemic and protracted war in the neighborhood
Authors: Barisitz, Stephan
Abstract: In contrast to most Central, Eastern and Southeastern European (CESEE) economies, Central Asia (CA) - comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - has witnessed quite robust demographic as well as economic growth in the period from 2019 to 2024. This period was marked by the aftermath of the oil price and Russian ruble plunge of 2014-16, the COVID-19 crisis (2020-21) and Russia's invasion of Ukraine and incisive Western sanctions imposed on Russia (2022-24). China overtook Russia to become the region's most important trading partner, while trade shares of EU countries have somewhat declined. Led by Kazakhstan (2015), most Central Asian countries made steps to move away from their US dollar pegs toward inflation targeting. Higher energy and commodity prices, Russia's surprisingly swift recovery from its Western sanctions-induced recession following its invasion of Ukraine, inflows of some highly skilled migrants from Russia ("relokanty"), strongly growing labor migration to and remittance inflows from Russia, and increased gains from transit trade with the region's northern neighbor all underpinned CA's economic expansion in 2022, 2023 and 2024. There are strong indications that at least part of CA's recently swelling transit trade has been in circumvention of Western sanctions against Russia. In the long run, Russia's war in Ukraine and heightened tensions between the United States and China could deepen global economic fragmentation, yet losses for CA according to IMF experts would likely remain comparatively limited given the region's already high level of trade concentration with its immediate neighbors China and Russia.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Fiscal-monetary policy mix: Challenges facing the EU</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324208" />
    <author>
      <name>Gnan, Ernest</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Holzmann, Robert</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324208</id>
    <updated>2025-08-23T04:19:33Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Fiscal-monetary policy mix: Challenges facing the EU
Authors: Gnan, Ernest; Holzmann, Robert
Abstract: Starting from the Tinbergen principle and four areas of economic policy, we argue that in practice economic policies each have multiple effects, rendering a clear and simple allocation of objectives and instruments to different policies and their responsible institutions complex. First, the case of demand and supply shocks is briefly outlined. Then, after a summary of the discussion on the policy mix since the 1960s, the concepts of monetary versus fiscal dominance are juxtaposed, while noting the existence of intermediate regimes. Finally, key features of the fiscal-monetary-structural policy institutional setup in the euro area are presented. The paper concludes with design shortcomings of this setup, the forces driving its incremental evolution over time, and future challenges.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
</feed>

