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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248126" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248126</id>
  <updated>2026-05-09T04:55:41Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-05-09T04:55:41Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>From contractors to investors? Evolving engagement of Chinese state capital in global infrastructure development and the case of Lekki Port in Nigeria</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268858" />
    <author>
      <name>Zhang, Hong</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268858</id>
    <updated>2023-12-30T02:37:21Z</updated>
    <published>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: From contractors to investors? Evolving engagement of Chinese state capital in global infrastructure development and the case of Lekki Port in Nigeria
Authors: Zhang, Hong
Abstract: This paper introduces and critically analyzes an emerging form of global infrastructure development by China's infrastructure construction companies, known as "integrated investment, construction, and operation" (IICO). This model has been promoted by the Chinese infrastructure industry, financial institutions, and policymakers in recent years, as a response to the moral hazard problems exposed in the past sovereign loan-based infrastructure engagements, the industry's need to upgrade, and the global rise of PublicPrivate Partnerships. IICO can be understood as a form of market-seeking foreign direct investment. Compared to past forms of globalization of Chinese state capital, it has a much more complicated risk profile and less clear pay-off. While Chinese state capital actors are not yet well equipped to manage such new risks, they have been driven to make such attempts by the political pressure to become globally leading firms. A case study of Lekki Port in Nigeria serves to illustrate the challenges in the transition toward IICO. This paper calls for continued attention to this emerging form of Chinese state capital's engagement in global infrastructure development, especially on how risks are managed and the implications for the relationships between Chinese actors and host country stakeholders.</summary>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>How Africa Borrows From China: And Why Mombasa Port is Not Collateral for Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253388" />
    <author>
      <name>Brautigam, Deborah</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Bhalaki, Vijay</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Deron, Laure</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Wang, Yinxuan</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253388</id>
    <updated>2023-11-10T02:05:15Z</updated>
    <published>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: How Africa Borrows From China: And Why Mombasa Port is Not Collateral for Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway
Authors: Brautigam, Deborah; Bhalaki, Vijay; Deron, Laure; Wang, Yinxuan
Abstract: In December 2018, a leaked letter from Kenya's Auditor General (AG) warned that Kenya Ports Authority's assets-of which Mombasa Port is the most valuable-risked being taken over by China Eximbank if Kenya defaulted on the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) loans. The rumor that Kenya had used Mombasa Port as collateral for the railway became widely accepted globally as another example of "Chinese debt trap diplomacy". Our research shows why this rumor is wrong. Unpacking this complicated case required expertise in the practice of international contract law, auditing, and commercial project finance. Our scholar-practitioner team's forensic analysis of all available primary documentation, over nearly two years, found significant mistakes in the AG's analysis. The AG's misreading was amplified by media misinterpretations of the project's take-or-pay agreement (TOPA) and its sovereign immunity waiver clause, both common features in international commercial project finance. Instead of a deliberate debt trap, the railway project was carefully and creatively designed to reduce the risks of a sovereign default and enhance the bankability of a project with high costs but significant long-term benefits for Kenya and the region. Our research puts Kenya's SGR in the context of debates over Chinese strategy and African development. We shed new light on how China Eximbank lends to large Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects - and how African and other governments borrow. And for Kenyans, we provide the explanation that Kenya's government has failed to give: a detailed account of why they can rest easy that China is not going to be seizing their port - or indeed, any port.</summary>
    <dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Laying the Tracks: The Political Economy of Railway Development in Ethiopia's Railway Sector and Implications for Technology Transfer</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248171" />
    <author>
      <name>Chen, Yunnan</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248171</id>
    <updated>2023-11-12T02:06:43Z</updated>
    <published>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Laying the Tracks: The Political Economy of Railway Development in Ethiopia's Railway Sector and Implications for Technology Transfer
Authors: Chen, Yunnan
Abstract: Explore Yunnan Chen's analysis of railway construction as a manifestation of China's economic statecraft in Africa. As African leaders have eagerly leveraged the railway sector, this paper looks through the lens of African agency to examine the case of Ethiopia's Chinese-financed railway projects, including the Addis- Djibouti Railway, contrasting it to Ethiopia's experience with subsequent European/Turkish financed projects. Chen shows the opportunities, missed and taken, by Ethiopian actors in leveraging external partners, focusing on areas of technology and skills transfer. Ultimately, the different financing arrangements entail different relationships—one politicized, one commercial—offering different scopes of bargaining power: while the political relationship offers greater flexibility regarding financing, the commercial project has been more successful for exercising agency in relation to contractors.</summary>
    <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Private Security Companies in Kenya and the Impact of Chinese Actors</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248172" />
    <author>
      <name>Zheng, Shuwen</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Xia, Ying</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248172</id>
    <updated>2023-11-20T02:54:00Z</updated>
    <published>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Private Security Companies in Kenya and the Impact of Chinese Actors
Authors: Zheng, Shuwen; Xia, Ying
Abstract: Researchers Shuwen Zheng and Ying Xia use Kenya as an active case study to explore the development and impact of Chinese private security companies (PSCs). As a whole, the private security sector is in a boom period – but how are Chinese actors faring in this growth? Join Zheng and Xia as they delve into the nuances involved in the sustainability of Chinese PSCs and conclude with several recommendations for how Chinese actors can adjust to flourish in the private security sector.</summary>
    <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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