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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/223033" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/223033</id>
  <updated>2026-11-06T02:32:36Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-11-06T02:32:36Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234733" />
    <author>
      <name>Göller, Daniel</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234733</id>
    <updated>2023-12-06T02:30:47Z</updated>
    <published>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion
Authors: Göller, Daniel
Abstract: A loss-averse buyer and seller face an uncertain environment. Should they write a long-term contract or wait until the state of the world is realized? I show that simple long-term contracts perform better than insinuated in Herweg and Schmidt (2015), even though loss aversion makes renegotiation sometimes inefficient. During renegotiation, the outcome induced by the long-term contract constitutes the reference point to which the parties compare gains and losses induced by the renegotiated transaction. Whereas Herweg and Schmidt consider that the long-term contract is always performed, it should not in "bad" states. This alters the threat point in renegotiation, making it easier to renegotiate and thus improves the performance of long-term contracts. Specific performance contracts perform better than in Herweg and Schmidt but are still problematic. Option contracts perform much better since only one party has the ex-post trade decision making it much easier to prevent the contract is inefficiently enforced due to loss aversion. My findings suggest that loss aversion alone cannot explain why parties sometimes abstain from writing beneficial long-term contracts but give important insights on how long-term contracts should be written when parties are aware they are loss averse.</summary>
    <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Do soda taxes affect the consumption and health of school-aged children? Evidence from France and Hungary</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/247153" />
    <author>
      <name>Gangl, Selina</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/247153</id>
    <updated>2023-12-26T02:53:06Z</updated>
    <published>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Do soda taxes affect the consumption and health of school-aged children? Evidence from France and Hungary
Authors: Gangl, Selina
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of two different soda taxes on consumption behaviour and health of school-aged children in Europe: Hungary imposed a Public Health Product Tax (PHPT) on several unhealthy products in 2011. France introduced solely a soda tax, containing sugar or artificial sweeteners, in 2012. In order to exploit spatial variation, I use a semi-parametric Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach. Since the policies differ in Hungary and France, I analyse the effects separately by using a neighbouring country without a soda tax as a control group. The results suggest a counter-intuitive positive effect of the tax on soda consumption in Hungary. The reason for this finding could be the substitution of other unhealthy beverages, which are taxed at a higher rate, by sodas. The effect of the soda tax in France is as expected negative, but insignificant which might be caused by a low tax rate. The body mass index (BMI) is not affected by the tax in any country. Consequently, policy makers should think carefully about the design and the tax rate before implementing a soda tax.</summary>
    <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Social Networks, Promotions, and the Glass-Ceiling Effect</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224534" />
    <author>
      <name>Zaharieva, Anna</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Neugart, Michael</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224534</id>
    <updated>2023-11-10T02:02:13Z</updated>
    <published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Social Networks, Promotions, and the Glass-Ceiling Effect
Authors: Zaharieva, Anna; Neugart, Michael
Abstract: Empirical studies show that women are under-represented in highly paid top management positions of firms (glass-ceiling effect) which could be a cause of the gender wage gap. In order to study women's career paths, we develop a search and matching model where job ladders consist of three hierarchical levels and workers can progress in the career by means of internal promotions and job-to-job mobility. Both, formal applications and referral hiring via endogenous social networks, can be used for external moves between firms. We show that when female workers are the minority in the occupation and social link formation is gender-biased (homophily) there are too few female contacts in the social networks of their male colleagues. This disadvantage implies that female workers are referred less often and, thereby, become under-represented in top level management positions of firms. Our results suggest that endogenously forming homophilous social networks when female workers are the minority can explain a substantial part of the empirically observable total wage gap stemming from the glass-ceiling effect. In addition, we demonstrate that the effects on an unequal gender-representation are amplified by stronger clustering of social networks, and gender-biased promotion times. Furthermore, deeper hierarchical firm structures amplify the network-driven gender inequality but mitigate inequality arising from direct discrimination in internal promotions.</summary>
    <dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Trade Unions and Corporate Social Responsibility</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224609" />
    <author>
      <name>Goerke, Laszlo</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224609</id>
    <updated>2023-11-10T02:03:29Z</updated>
    <published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Trade Unions and Corporate Social Responsibility
Authors: Goerke, Laszlo
Abstract: Trade unions distort a profit-maximising firm's input choice. The nature of the resulting inefficiency depends on whether there is wage or efficient bargaining. Moreover, trade unions redistribute income and thereby affect welfare. If firms also pursue Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) objectives, input choices are distorted already in the absence of collective bargaining. Adopting a positive perspective, we show that CSR objectives which foster economic activity have ambiguous wage and employment consequences in case of wage negotiations and raise employment if there is efficient bargaining. Importantly from a normative vantage point, such CSR objectives make a welfare-enhancing role of trade unions more likely in the presence of wage negotiations, whereas the reverse may be true in case of efficient bargaining.</summary>
    <dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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