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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/196265" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/196265</id>
  <updated>2026-04-28T14:09:22Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-28T14:09:22Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Economic development and political violence in Ethiopia</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282257" />
    <author>
      <name>Woldesenbet, Ermias</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Gebreluel, Goitom</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Bedasso, Biniam</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282257</id>
    <updated>2024-02-13T02:09:13Z</updated>
    <published>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Economic development and political violence in Ethiopia
Authors: Woldesenbet, Ermias; Gebreluel, Goitom; Bedasso, Biniam</summary>
    <dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Industrial policy and risk sharing in public development banks: Lessons for the post-COVID response from the EIB and EFSI</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/258976" />
    <author>
      <name>Griffith-Jones, Stephany</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Naqvi, Natalya</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/258976</id>
    <updated>2023-12-04T02:28:57Z</updated>
    <published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Industrial policy and risk sharing in public development banks: Lessons for the post-COVID response from the EIB and EFSI
Authors: Griffith-Jones, Stephany; Naqvi, Natalya
Abstract: The European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Investment Fund (EIF) have been key partners in implementing the Juncker Plan (EFSI) (2015-2020), which aims to increase lending to economically or socially valuable projects too risky to receive private finance through leveraging scarce budgetary resources, and going forward will play an important role in the EU's post-COVID industrial policy response. In order to evaluate these initiatives, we: 1) distinguish between "real economy" risks arising from natural uncertainty relating to investments in certain types of projects or sectors and "financial" risks that are related to financial products or intermediaries themselves, and create the danger of subsidising the profits of private investors while socialising their risk of losses; and 2) outline the trade-off between increased leverage and policy steer and control over projects due to the number of intermediaries involved, and the need to make projects attractive for private investors. We argue that EFSI has made significant achievements, including enabling the EIB and EIF to provide long-term finance in the post-crisis period and to take more "real economy" risk, leading to valuable investments that would otherwise have not taken place. However, member states' budgetary constraints have created incentives for EFSI to focus excessively on increasing leverage, at the expense of policy steer. Furthermore, the use of complex financial products and opaque pricing methods with terms too generous for private investors has in some cases generated excessive "financial risk" at the expense of "real economy risk". In order to increase investment in the real economy and play a role in structural transformation, the EIB's post-COVID response must have a greater focus on the final beneficiaries of projects rather than on the private financial intermediaries themselves. In those cases where it is necessary to use intermediaries, performance related conditionalities should be strictly enforced to have greater control over projects.</summary>
    <dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Transforming the global plastics economy: The political economy and governance of plastics production and pollution</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224117" />
    <author>
      <name>Barrowclough, Diana</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Deere Birkbeck, Carolyn</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224117</id>
    <updated>2023-12-22T02:26:32Z</updated>
    <published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Transforming the global plastics economy: The political economy and governance of plastics production and pollution
Authors: Barrowclough, Diana; Deere Birkbeck, Carolyn
Abstract: Despite growing alarm about plastic pollution, the production and use of plastics is forecast to continue to expand over coming decades. Efforts on the part of governments, civil society and business to reduce plastics pollution are encouraging signs of awareness and an appetite for engagement but are, nonetheless, failing to stem the tide of growing plastic production, use and waste. To date, there has been remarkably little scholarly interest in the global plastics economy. Both the global political economy and root causes of the plastics crisis are vastly under-studied. Most efforts towards change (whether voluntary or regulatory) have been focused on the 'end of life' of the plastics value chain, rather than its starting point. Attention to the upstream dimensions of the plastics economy - that is, to the production end of the plastics life cycle - is not yet central to international policy discussions nor are the international policy frameworks needed to address them. This paper seeks to spur discussion on an integrated set of policies - and an enabling international framework - to support an effective transformation of the plastics economy, including a just and sustainable transition, away from excessive plastic production and unnecessary use. It brings together, for the first time in the literature, a first step toward an integrated analysis of what we call the missing 'political economy piece' of evolving global discussions of challenges and responses to plastic pollution. It highlights some critical policy steps that can be taken to help face these structural challenges and transform our economy away from the grip of plastics, along with a policy-oriented research agenda.</summary>
    <dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Ripe for reform: UK scrutiny of international trade agreements</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/258977" />
    <author>
      <name>Jones, Emily</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Sands, Anna</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/258977</id>
    <updated>2023-12-29T02:33:44Z</updated>
    <published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Ripe for reform: UK scrutiny of international trade agreements
Authors: Jones, Emily; Sands, Anna
Abstract: Now that the UK has left the EU, the Government is negotiating trade agreements for the first time in almost 50 years. What role should Parliament play in scrutinising trade deals? This paper compares current processes of parliamentary scrutiny in the UK, United States, European Union, Australia, and Canada. It shows how parliaments in the US and EU have extensive powers of scrutiny, including oversight of the negotiations, and a debate and vote on the trade agreement before it is ratified. In contrast, in the UK, Australia, and Canada, the negotiation and ratification of trade agreements is an executive power, and parliaments are not guaranteed a debate or vote on trade agreements before ratification. Their main role is to enact any legislation that is needed for the trade agreement to come into effect, but only some parts of an agreement may require implementing legislation, and this may be secondary legislation which is not subject to parliamentary debate. Unless changes are made, the UK's future trade deals will receive less scrutiny than the trade deals it entered as part of the EU. There are compelling reasons for strengthening Parliament's scrutiny role. Contemporary trade agreements involve policy decisions that affect the everyday lives of citizens. Effective scrutiny would improve the quality of decision-making, provide leverage in negotiations, and reassure negotiating partners any treaty they negotiate with the UK will be ratified and implemented. Properly engaging devolved administrations and legislatures would respect devolution and ensure that all parts of the UK support negotiated outcomes. For scrutiny to be effective, Parliament needs access to much more information throughout negotiations and more time to scrutinise final agreements, and there are strong grounds for guaranteeing Parliament the opportunity to shape the negotiating mandate, and to debate and vote on treaties before they are ratified. This paper identifies practices in other countries that the UK can learn from.</summary>
    <dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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