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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179</id>
  <updated>2026-05-06T21:07:47Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-05-06T21:07:47Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Does mobility of educated workers undermine decentralized education policies?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39440" />
    <author>
      <name>Schuppert, Christiane</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39440</id>
    <updated>2023-12-03T02:33:04Z</updated>
    <published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Does mobility of educated workers undermine decentralized education policies?
Authors: Schuppert, Christiane
Abstract: The present paper studies a multi-jurisdictional framework, in which, from a federal perspective, educational subsidies turn out to be efficiency enhancing. However, in the presence of mobile high-skilled labor, local jurisdictions might try to free-ride on other regions' education policies and abstain from subsidizing education. Social mobility is introduced as an additional dimension of labor mobility. Using this framework, it is shown that local governments abide by the optimal decision rule for subsidizing human capital investments. Hence, decentralized education policies remain to be efficient, although high-skilled workers are perfectly mobile. Only if one allows for high- and low-skilled mobility, local incentives to promote education vanish.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39438" />
    <author>
      <name>Konrad, Kai A.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Leininger, Wolfgang</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39438</id>
    <updated>2023-12-15T03:08:46Z</updated>
    <published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
Authors: Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang
Abstract: In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition.</summary>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>On the dynamics of interstate migration: Migration costs and self-selection</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39444" />
    <author>
      <name>Bayer, Christian</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Juessen, Falko</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39444</id>
    <updated>2023-12-21T02:50:39Z</updated>
    <published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: On the dynamics of interstate migration: Migration costs and self-selection
Authors: Bayer, Christian; Juessen, Falko
Abstract: This paper develops a tractable dynamic microeconomic model of migration decisions that is aggregated to describe the behavior of interregional migration. Our structural approach allows us to deal with dynamic self-selection problems that arise from the endogeneity of location choice and the persistency of migration incentives. Keeping track to the distribution of migration incentives over time has important consequences, because the dynamics of this distribution influences the estimation of structural parameters, such as migration costs. For US interstate migration, we obtain a cost estimate of somewhat less than one-half of an average annual household income. This is substantially less than the migration costs estimated by previous studies. We attribute this difference to the treatment of the dynamic self-selection problem.</summary>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Strategic unemployment</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39439" />
    <author>
      <name>Angerhausen, Julia</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Bayer, Christian</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Hehenkamp, Burkhard</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39439</id>
    <updated>2023-12-28T02:43:35Z</updated>
    <published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Strategic unemployment
Authors: Angerhausen, Julia; Bayer, Christian; Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Abstract: We propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may be reluctant to pick up work although the wage is above their reservation wage. Accepting low paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual's low reservation wage from his working history. Employers will exploit their knowledge offering low wages to this individual unemployment to signal a high reservation wage.</summary>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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