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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/156096" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/156096</id>
  <updated>2026-04-30T01:44:49Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-30T01:44:49Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>International Sanctions and Corruption</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340063" />
    <author>
      <name>Gutmann, Jerg</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Langer, Pascal</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Neuenkirch, Matthias</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340063</id>
    <updated>2026-04-25T07:03:39Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: International Sanctions and Corruption
Authors: Gutmann, Jerg; Langer, Pascal; Neuenkirch, Matthias
Abstract: A major concern about the imposition of international sanctions is that they may permanently deteriorate the quality of institutions in target countries, potentially causing an increase in corruption. While case studies suggest that this is frequently the case, systematic evidence is so far missing. We provide the first cross-country statistical analysis of the impact of sanctions on public-sector corruption. Using a panel difference-in-differences model and an event study approach, we analyze sanctions against 125 countries from 1971 to 2019. Our results show that Western (and UN) sanctions cause a significant decline of corruption in democracies, while non-Western sanctions and those targeting autocracies have no systematic impact. Event study estimates time the reductions in corruption at about three to four years into the sanctions episode. They persist throughout the sanctions period, but once sanctions are lifted, corruption levels revert to their pre-treatment baseline, indicating that the corruption-reducing effect is limited to the duration of the sanctions episode. Further analysis reveals that the effect is stronger when sanctions explicitly target democratization or human rights improvements.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Leader similarity and international sanctions</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319718" />
    <author>
      <name>Gutmann, Jerg</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Langer, Pascal</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Neuenkirch, Matthias</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319718</id>
    <updated>2025-06-25T08:58:03Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Leader similarity and international sanctions
Authors: Gutmann, Jerg; Langer, Pascal; Neuenkirch, Matthias
Abstract: It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. Here, we ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data for the period 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanction imposition ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity in the sample to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity seems to matter especially for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights improvements, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Privacy concerns and willingness to adopt AI products: A cross-country randomized survey experiment</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313871" />
    <author>
      <name>Gutmann, Jerg</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Brandimarte, Laura</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Muehlheusser, Gerd</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Weber, Franziska</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313871</id>
    <updated>2025-04-25T15:13:48Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Privacy concerns and willingness to adopt AI products: A cross-country randomized survey experiment
Authors: Gutmann, Jerg; Brandimarte, Laura; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Weber, Franziska
Abstract: We examine the trade-off between functionality and data privacy inherent in many AI products by conducting a randomized survey experiment with 1,734 participants from the US and several European countries. Participants' willingness to adopt a hypothetical, AI-enhanced app is measured under three sets of treatments: (i) installation defaults (opt-in vs. opt-out), (ii) salience of data privacy risks, and (iii) regulatory regimes with different levels of data protection. In addition, we study how the willingness to adopt depends on individual attitudes and preferences. We find no effect of defaults or salience, while a regulatory regime with stricter privacy protection increases the likelihood that the app is adopted. Finally, greater data privacy concerns, greater risk aversion, lower levels of trust, and greater skepticism toward AI are associated with a significantly lower willingness to adopt the app.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Culture and constitutional compliance</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327977" />
    <author>
      <name>Gutmann, Jerg</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lewczuk-Czerwińska, Anna</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lewkowicz, Jacek</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Voigt, Stefan</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327977</id>
    <updated>2025-10-08T10:23:20Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Culture and constitutional compliance
Authors: Gutmann, Jerg; Lewczuk-Czerwińska, Anna; Lewkowicz, Jacek; Voigt, Stefan
Abstract: Constitutions as the formal foundation of a country's legal and political system have important economic and political effects. Yet, we still know little about why constitutions set effective constraints on politicians in some societies, while being largely disregarded in others. Here, we ask if national culture matters for constitutional compliance. We study a cross-section of 115 countries, making use of novel indicators of constitutional compliance. We find that societies with a more individualistic population exhibit higher levels of compliance. These results are robust and extend to instrumental variable estimations. They imply a novel transmission channel from cultural traits to long-term economic development: individualistic national culture increases the credibility of constitutional self-commitments. Our analysis also supports the more general idea that the effects of formal institutions depend on the informal institutional environment in which they are embedded. Regarding religion, our results are consistent with past research that attributes the lack of development in the modern Muslim world to deficient institutional quality.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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